INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND COLLECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY*

MAURICE HALBWACHS
University of Paris

During the forty years in which sociology has been seriously studied in France, many articles have been published concerning the relation of the new science to psychology. This was natural; for sociology first of all had to be distinguished from traditional psychology and emancipated from it, insofar as psychology conceived socio-psychic states merely as combinations or even as simplifications of individual psychic states.

First of all, the term “collective psychology” should be defined, for it can be confused with two others: social psychology and psychological sociology. The aim of psychological sociology is to show that the laws, institutions, and customs of a society can be explained by tendencies or beliefs, rather than to study these laws, institutions, and customs themselves. Psychological sociology can be contrasted to biological sociology which treats society as the effect or result of the organic life, purely and simply. Psychological sociology does not analyze the nature of these tendencies and beliefs which can be conceived as a combination and summation of individual beliefs.

On the contrary, social psychology applies directly to the states of consciousness related to the life of social groups. Within this science, such states of consciousness are described as a self-sufficient reality. In spite of the fact that they are engendered by society, they are assumed to originate and to develop independently of the forms of social life.

It is therefore better to use the term “collective psychology.” Doing so, we say that we are dealing with psychic facts, considered in themselves and in their proper nature, character and interrelations, yet with psychic facts which are derived from the association of men in groups; in addition

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to this, we say that we do not know in advance whether these facts are, or are not, of the same nature as those studied by individual psychology. Consequently, collective psychology, or the psychology of social groups, offers us a specific object for study and poses a number of problems (whatever their solution may be).

At this point, we may wonder why it was necessary to wait so long for the discovery of this new field in psychology, broadly conceived. Today, many psychologists explicitly recognize it was sociology which opened to them these new perspectives. Let us study the Traité de psychologie which follows the classic Manuel by Janet and Dumas. In this Traité, Dumas declares that nothing is more useful for psychology than the study of the adjustment of psychic life to social life which begins at the birth of an individual and which, in Auguste Comte’s opinion, forms all that we call psychology: education, training, adaptation to the physical and social environment, labor, and still more, when the expression of emotions is studied. Always, the state of the civilization in which we live, our social position, and our education, present and impose the collective patterns upon our emotional expressions. Delacroix, for his part, recognized the importance of tradition, i.e., of the ideas which exist before the individual, are imposed on him, and survive him. Finally, another qualified psychologist, Charles Blondel, has gone still further. For him, one cannot understand the functioning of the will and the nature of the personality if one does not give first place to the role played by the social imperatives, to the ideas which are common to all group-members.

These authors, and many others, are aware that a collective mentality exists and that it is not like a lost, isolated or negligible province, but exerts an influence upon all the functions of individual mentality which cannot be understood or explained without it. The consciousness of an individual is not self-sufficient; the ideas of associated men must be related to each other and be considered as parts of a whole which completely penetrates, directs, and organizes them. This is a complete change of viewpoint. It is a discovery. But how did it happen that it was imposed on psychology from the outside, and only after sociology had been established in its own right? How was it that the study of the facts of consciousness, which had occupied psychologists for so long a time never led them to that discovery?

The facts cannot be contested. It suffices to open any textbook on philosophy published before 1900, or even after, and to make a cursory review of the classic systems of philosophy from ancient times up to Kant, to the psychological works of the nineteenth century, Maine de Biran, Jouffroi, Stuart Mill, Taine, and even of Bergson himself. Society and social facts are mentioned, but rather outside or at the margin of their researches and analytic principles. When speaking of mind, judgment, memory, association of ideas, perception, they limit themselves and us to
the consciousness of the individual without any connection with the environment or with other men. They do not appear to doubt that the mind could develop its faculties and exert its functions in the state of isolation, as it is assumed by them.

There must have been a basic defect in the research method of the psychologists who did not realize an important part of their object and ignored one of its aspects entirely, or rather, a defect common to all their methods, for they employed many. Let us briefly analyze them and distinguish them in the following way: one can explain the facts of consciousness either by a reality which is superior to them; or by a reality which is inferior to them; or finally, by the facts themselves.

The first method is that of the great classic philosophers who were inspired either by religion or by a metaphysics related to religion; this is the deductive or rationalistic method. The human mind was created by a Being who is perfect or who has the idea of perfection. To explain the properties of the mind, it suffices to imagine that perfect Being and to ascribe to the creative power of such a Being all that we may observe in the human mind.

This idea was based on the rather legitimate feeling that the highest faculties of man cannot be explained by his organic qualities, but the cause of the dominance of this idea was the belief in a Supreme Being. In any case, this was a natural hypothesis as long as the role of society in the development of our faculties was not sufficiently recognized. Of course, one could assume that the Supreme Being had first created society and that it was within society that every individual, little by little, developed his own nature; but what is the use of this longer way, and does it not limit the omnipotence of God if one refuses Him the power of creating the creature directly? More especially, since God is conceived to be a person and to have made man in His own image.

Whatever difference there may be between such systems, they all agree in affirming that all our faculties and ideas are inborn and exist in us, at least virtually, since birth. For, as regards these ideas and faculties, all men develop alike and become similar when they reach the age of discretion. How would that be possible, if every individual nature had not contained from the first all that later appeared in it? It could result, it is true, from the fact that all live in the same social environment and that society exerts on them the same influence. But, as has already been said, nothing is more difficult to see and to be conceived as a distinct reality, than the totality of influences of collective origin which unconsciously enter into us from the awakening of our consciousness, so that we are accustomed to identify them with ourselves.

Besides, from a purely rational viewpoint, it was natural to consider the group a resultant of the elements or units which it contains. Indeed,
social organization, including custom and law, seems to testify to a pre-
vision and design which goes beyond the power of an isolated individual. 
But here again thinkers of this trend were led to believe that institutions 
were introduced into the world by a superior power, just as individual 
creations were, the individuals serving as instruments. Just as God gave to 
Moses the tables of the law, just so, until Rousseau's *Contrat Social,* a 
legislator, that is to say a man inspired from on high, was necessary to 
organize society. Social institutions were conceived as an artificial invention 
or an artifice, robbed, perhaps, from that part which, in the nature of God, 
is exterior to man; similarly, men, after they had developed the human 
form, had succeeded in realizing a social order, the secret of which had 
been revealed to them by some individuals of superhuman nature. These 
institutions are necessary because men come into conflict with each other 
and live in a secular world; but they represent something exterior, some-
thing more or less arbitrary and contingent, a kind of inert framework 
which must be cleared away if one wishes to reach the mind in its very 

To be sure, some philosophers had sensed that man could be completely 
understood only in and through society. Aristotle defined men as political, 
i.e., social things. But, in the seventeenth century, Descartes found it 
necessary to turn his thought away from all opinion or custom, in order to 
understand the nature and the activity of the mind. For Leibniz, al-
though man cannot think without signs, without symbolic language, the 
individual thought of the philosopher ought to create a language in his 
own image; the universal language was conceived as a logical instrument 
which would express reason and be independent of custom or tradition. 
All these thinkers made great efforts to forget not only the material, but 
also the social world, and advised man to isolate himself and meditate. 
They did not realize that for a being who is and remains a product of social 
life, this was the means of destroying any possibility of explaining what 
he is. This trend was so strong that even now some psychologists, even if 
they are free from every moralizing tendency, think that, in addition to 
biological and social elements, there is in us "un je ne sais quoi," a some-
thing, which has its "principle" outside of nature.

One would think that the opposite method which tries to explain the 
psychic functions by something inferior to them, intelligence by sensations, 
sensations and images by organic life, would have induced psychologists to 
locate men within the group and to recognize the ties which unite men to 
other men, these others being organisms without which our own organism 
would not be what it is. For this method is based on observation, and the 
statements above are experimental. Yet one has only to consider empiric 
evolutionist psychology and psychophysiology. Their representatives have 
been interested only in the individual. Although they opposed the classic,
deductive psychology, they remained, notwithstanding, in the old posi-
tion,—that of individual psychology.

As regards the empiricists, this is explained by their tendency to apply
to the psychic world the methods of physics and chemistry. These sciences
are first of all analytical; they try to decompose the whole into simpler and
simpler parts. When empiricists study ideas, judgments, perceptions, they
try to decompose them into psychic elements; they only see them as com-
binations or associations of simpler elements, so simple that they partly
escape consciousness. All this analytical study is carried on within an
isolated consciousness. One should deal merely with concrete and well de-
limited facts, of which sensation is the neatest example. Now one cannot
conceive a sensation outside of an individual consciousness. In one sense,
empiricists are still more incapable than metaphysicians of recognizing the
existence of collective psychic facts. In order to do so, they would have to
admit the existence of ideas distinct from perceptions and images; but this
would have brought them close to the rationalists.

Their attitude is perfectly well characterized by their conception of
words, i.e., of the elements of language. For them, there is in mind nothing
else than images and words associated with groups of similar images. In
his book on The Intelligence, Taine explains that words are images of a par-
ticular kind, signs which facilitate mental work. It seems that these signs
and their application were invented by isolated individuals, and that
only later were they used to communicate our thoughts to others who
conceived similar signs. Empiricists cannot admit that words are closely
related to meanings which are common to many minds and that, when
speaking, men leave the state of isolation and begin to think in common.
They cannot do it because this would mean recognizing the reality of what
is commonly called “ideas.”

As regards psychophysiology, it connects the facts of consciousness
with changes in the organism. Yet organisms are conceived as isolated units,
separated from each other in space and self-sufficient. It seems that all the
living beings of the same species are representatives of the same type,
similar because they reproduce the same pattern, so that it suffices to
study one of them to gain knowledge of all the others. Yet psychophys-
ologists could have observed that there were certain psychic facts and
functions such as language or the expression of emotions which do not
appear to result from the organism as such. These facts and functions pre-
suppose the previous interaction of many human bodies, of many human
brains and nervous systems and the durable existence of connections be-
tween them. Isolated organisms could not have reached this level, es-
pecially the more complex functions of the mind. Nevertheless, faithful to
the method which explains the behavior of a living being by its structure
and its biological properties, psychophysiology assumes certain unknown
mechanisms by which such functions are spontaneously performed. It fears, if it only slightly abandons the biological position, that it will fall back into the traditional "spiritualistic" psychology.

There remains the method of searching for an explanation neither above nor below, but on the level of the psychic facts themselves. This is a proper method for a psychology which turns away completely from metaphysics and natural science; it is introspection, the internal observation of states of consciousness. Here, more clearly than in the two preceding cases, since the psychologist explicitly confines himself within his own consciousness, he seems to exclude in advance any possibility of dealing with anything which exists outside of it, in particular, groups, their tendencies, or their products. Indeed, really to observe oneself, one must carefully avoid the viewpoint of others. Therefore, one forgets all that is due to social life, or rather, that something, at least, is due to it. One searches in one's own consciousness for what is most independent of relations with others, for what is purely personal and incommunicable. This is declared to be the essence of psychic life, because it will have been learned from within, through immediate contact, by an intuition which penetrates to the fundamental nature of things.

But what will one think, then, of thought, properly speaking, of thought in its highly developed forms, ideas, judgments, reasonings, principles, fundamental concepts? Although one can say the mind knows them because it is aware of them, this cannot be understood in the same sense as when we are aware of an emotion, a pain, or a muscular effort, for all that we perceive is communicable to others. It seems that at the very moment when we consider an idea or a reasoning, they are present not only in our mind, but also in the mind of others, and, in any case, we never are alone when considering them; we consider them only from the viewpoint of others who surround us and upon whom, in some sense, we depend.

Now, is not that which is true of intellectual operations also true of others though to a lesser degree? We believe that only we ourselves experience emotional or conative states, that they exist only for us, and that we are unable to express them to others. Is not this an illusion based on the fact that we remember only those conditions and tendencies which are closely related to our organisms, and because of this, they escape all actual knowledge both of ourselves and others? Insofar as they are knowable, are they not in the common field, and is it not by means of ideas and judgments, i.e., by the instruments of collective knowledge, that we attain them? Is it not this which distinguishes human consciousness, which is knowledge, from that of animals, which is not knowledge?

Introspective psychology, on the contrary, discredits intellectual operations which have the defect, in their eyes, of distracting the individual from introspection. It sees in this, merely diminished emotional states and does
not attribute to them any other reality than that of an artificial and almost material framework. This is the way a nightbird would reason, an owl for whom shade and darkness are the reality *par excellence*, a reality rich and profound, where one confusedly sees mysterious masses and vague forms which seem to extend to infinity. Accustomed to live in obscurity, if indeed he could live and move there, an owl would not know that if the surrounding objects appeared to him like shadows taking a substantial aspect, it is because of dim light coming from distant luminous bodies. He would say that light has no reality of its own, that it is merely a weakened darkness. Similarly, the introspectionists see in collective or intellectual thought the lowest degree of consciousness; they do not perceive that consciousness itself, in its most intimate forms, exists and is observable only by means of the light projected by group thought.

One could not explain why introspectionists, in applying their methods, deliberately neglected the social nature of thought which is deeply impressed in all aspects of conscious life, if one did not take account of the strong pressure exerted on them by society, which tends to turn their attention toward their own individual personality and toward that alone, and to persuade them that their thought, in its deepest and most essential aspects, is independent of collective influences. It is a condition of group life that the more complex groups become, the more their members are individualized and particularized, and the more deeply they feel themselves to be different from each other.

We have said that the religious belief in a Supreme Being prepared the way for metaphysical psychology; similarly, a kind of scientific superstition derived from the achievements of physics and of biology is the basis of psychophysiology. But it is in the religion of the individual, of the individual thought, which has developed and taken on more and more consistency in modern civilizations, that introspective psychology found its support. In summary, we see that to define its methods and to indicate the conditions under which they can be applied is sufficient to show clearly that everything pertaining to collective psychology has been excluded in advance from the field of psychological observation.

Shall we take, for example, the belief in the principle of causality, which has had such an important place in the entire history of psychology? For the metaphysicians it was an inborn belief, of which the germ, at least, existed in us at birth. But then they were led to represent the development of thought, in course of elaborating that idea by itself and by itself alone, on the pattern of deductive or mathematical development, as if causality were only a pure, rational relation between principle and consequence. Under such circumstances, what help can we get for understanding the group and the relations between the group and its members? Meanwhile, it was overlooked that reason had been put or constituted in us by society.
For the empiricists, the belief in causality rested on experience, but on individual experience, for the experience of others is valid for the individual only to the extent that he takes account of it. Now it is curious that nobody invoked collective experience in order to fortify this explanation of causality, to which objection could be made regarding the necessity and universality of the principle. The evolutionists, neglecting the effect of the present social environment on the individual, insisted, rather, on the ancestral experience, on the experience transmitted by former generations, but by a lineage of which the successive parts are individuals. Thus, the experience of causality would be transmitted to us like a hereditary acquisition, as if our individual life were indefinitely prolonged in time. But society is always excluded.

Introspective psychology searches for the origin of the principle of causality in our consciousness of an active and personal causation, of a creative spontaneity. Only thus, it thinks, can the idea of causality have a substantial content. On the contrary, it is etiolated and desiccated, it loses a part of its substance, when it is reduced to intellectual terms which one mind can communicate to another mind and which can be understood in common and in the same way by all members of a group. It is not perceived that in order to grasp real causality in the behavior of an individual it is first necessary to have conceived causality itself in broad and general terms. There is no concept more alien than that of causality to the succession of psychological states revealed to us by introspection.

Since the effect is a resultant of the cause, there is more in the cause than in the effect; that is why the causal action exercised by society upon its parts and members is the prototype of causal action itself. But introspective psychology does not want to see this type of behavior which has its source in society, or even in ourselves, insofar as we are members of the group; it considers us as so many isolated beings. It separates our motives, ideas, and representations from the social environment which gives them their force and substance. What surprises us, then, is that those motives and representations which are so weak, reduced as they are to a form of individual existence, can produce such marked effects in us, and even outside of us, following a centrifugal direction. Introspection thus maintains in us constantly the illusion that the weaker can produce the stronger, the less can emerge from the greater,—which is contrary to causality. This forces us to ignore that our psychic being is rooted in the social milieu; whence comes the idea of a plant growing without roots, from a petty germ; this is what introspective psychology calls liberty, which would be the starting point and primitive or living form of causality. As if the primitive "given" which is imposed on us when we consider ourselves in our relation with our social milieu, were not just the causal action of society in its particular application to ourselves, and as if one could conceive liberty
other than as a negation of that social causality,—nothing positive but simply the more or less convenient refusal to see it.

For these reasons, we see that the three major methods applied until now in psychology were not only unable to open the way for collective psychology but also systematically or instinctively closed it, and why nothing inspired a more profound feeling of uneasiness in that (the "old") psychology than the evocation of what was for them a "ghost,"—not in the sense of a phantom but an object which one does not desire to see.

In the main also, both metaphysical psychology and psychophysiology remained compatible with the recognition of a socio-psychic actuality and even invoked it, in certain respects, as an observable substitute for the Supreme Being, and saw in nature itself (for psychophysiology) socio-psychic actuality as a necessary complement to the biologically "given" individuals and an explanation of all that results when they are incorporated into associations of organisms, i.e., into collective units. However, introspective psychology appeared to be completely incompatible with the viewpoint of sociology. Despite this, it was introspection which pushed to the extreme, i.e., to absurdity, the isolation and "autarchy" of the individual consciousness and made obvious the necessity and urgency of departing from such an impasse.

It must be added that it is on introspective psychology that most of our attacks must be made. For, under the name of facts of interior observation it has presented us with a collection of real facts, without doubt, but detached from the conditions in which alone they find their raison d'etre. It is necessary to take them, and, replacing them in their own frame of reference, i.e., putting them in relation to the social realities of which they are a part, to restore the true nature of collective psychic states,—a larger and more consistent picture than introspective psychology has shown us. It is especially necessary to understand that the so-called internal observation is such only in appearance, in the degree to which it does not permit itself to be complete, and that, if one extends it to its natural limits, it would appear that it must be an observation of things and the foundation of an actually objective psychology.
THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY IN THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

ALEXANDER GOLDENWEISER
Reed College and Portland Extension Center

I. Causality Among the Primitives. The primitive, when he thinks, deals with animated causes. They are generative powers inherent in things, creatures, persons, divinities. Such are the powers of magic, spirits, mana, supernatural creators. These powers as causes are built on the pattern of the human will, the only source of acts or events with which the primitive is familiar in his personal experience. To us, a universe thus constructed appears mystical, fantastic. Many writers, for example, Lévy-Bruhl, impressed by this aspect of primitive thought, have ascribed to the primitive a mentality radically different from our own. It must be remembered, however, that in certain spheres of primitive culture a very different approach to things comes to light, e.g., in industry. Here there is ample evidence of a thoroughly objective orientation to experience. Things and creatures are observed in their properties and behaviors. When intent upon fashioning tools or weapons or other articles of use, such as baskets, pots or canoes, the primitive is well cognizant of the qualities of the materials he uses and of the purposes his handiwork is to serve. His pot is not too heavy nor too brittle, his basket is waterproof; his canoe sits lightly on the water, it moves fast when properly propelled, nor does it capsize too easily. All this the primitive achieves in the only way it can be achieved, namely, by paying proper heed to the stuffs with which he operates and to the objective character of processes and techniques. If he fails, he permits the inadequate results to retroact upon the procedure. He modifies it until success crowns his efforts. There is here indisputable evidence, inferential though it be, of insight into causal linkages. The insight is not overt; the primitive may not be aware of it, usually he is not, but his behavior betrays his wisdom. When he thinks, he dreams; but when he acts, he thinks, especially so when his acts are deeply immersed in natural things and processes. In a sense, and, to repeat, without being aware of it, he assimilates himself to nature, which is his working companion. Uniformity, rational intent, knowledge, trial and error, learning from experience, linking causes with effects and vice versa, are here, indubitably.¹

II. Causality in Science. These two facets of the causal concept per-

¹ An interesting sidelight is thrown on the basic matter-of-factness of mind by an analysis of primitive grammars. Here, the categories used are singularity, plurality, gender, tense, direction, beginning or end of action, shape, conditionality. This, it will be seen, is an objective universe of discourse; there is no trace of magic or subjective vagaries. Also, grammar is unconscious. The primitive is profoundly unaware of its very existence.
sisted in science until quite recently: on the one hand, meticulous objective-
mindedness in the laboratory, with its weights and measures, repeated ob-
servations, verification of assumed causal relations, discovery, foresight, control; on the other hand, persistence of animated causes or of causeless effects,—combustion was induced by phlogiston until the day of Priestley and Lavoisier, and microorganisms were propagated by spontaneous generation until Pasteur took them in hand. Meanwhile, in the domain of theo-
retical physics, the most precise of the abstract disciplines, the modern, though now dated, concept of cause was being forged. The natural uni-
verse, as conceived by the mind, is a causal nexus. No cause without effect, no effect without cause, i.e., a linked and closed system; cause and effect, action and reaction, are equal and opposite,—a quantitative proposition expressible mathematically; in other words, an abstraction of unimpeach-
able precision.

The time had now arrived for a thorough housecleaning. In his Analyse
der Empfindungen, Ernst Mach made a final effort to rid the concept of cause of all animistic vestiges. The causal nexus is a function in the mathe-
matical sense, like any other. To this Karl Pearson said Amen in his
Grammar of Science, and Meyerson added a postscript in which he equated causality with identity. Thus, the concept of causality was purified to the point of elimination.²

III. What Factors Led to the Elimination of the Concept of Causality?

1. Quantification. Cause and effect having been quantitatively identified, all element of newness vanishes. There is nothing to account for, nothing to explain. What we have is a conceptualized description (quantifiable at will) of two phases of a process.

2. Mechanization. The behavioristic viewpoint of science in a mechanico-
mathematical universe finds for itself beautifully descriptive (if concep-
tualized) formulations which are external, objective, nonevaluative, and amenable to quantification, and which make possible that upper limit of similarity called identity.²

² It will be well here to distinguish equations that are mere definitions from causal equa-
tions; e.g., \( d = vt \), distance equals velocity multiplied by time. Here velocity is a unit of distance covered in a unit of time. Therefore, the equation is expressed in terms of distance on both sides of the equation sign. There is quantitative and qualitative identity, the only difference being in form. The equation is a definition.

On the other hand take, \( v = \frac{F}{M} t \), velocity equals force over mass multiplied by time. Here the symbols to the right of the equation sign are reducible to force, the \( v \) to the left being velocity. There is quantitative identity but qualitative difference,—the equation is causal. Incidentally, it reveals the fact that "cause" here is a quantitative function.

² As Wundt pointed out long ago, and today his words sound prophetic, the mechanical pattern is not logically compelling. Another type of conceptual reduction of the universe, say, more like the organic, may eventually prove more fully adequate to all the facts. The fact remains that the mechanical pattern, while it operates, lends itself perfectly to a formulation
3. Continuity. The conceptually transfigured universe, beyond experience, is reduced by means of analysis to a continuum subsumable under a formula. Here causes and effects, in particulars, are no longer called for, except as verbal symbols. 4

IV. What is the Situation in the Social Sciences, and First of All, in History? In this field, we want to understand. We call for meaning. A scientific formulation with its precision, its mathematical garb, its foresight and control, is inapplicable here, and if it were, it would not give us what we want. Franklin H. Giddings once said that history as lived was adventure, history as written, romance. The great sociologist was too wise a man to have meant this literally. What he had in mind was the human reference in history. It is spun of mind stuff, shot through and through with human will, dream, purpose, insight, significance. Our question is, By what means can we achieve, do we achieve, the humanization of written history?

1. A mere record of behavior, however detailed, would fail of this purpose. If a complete vocal and motor record of historic events were at hand, it would still fail. It would, in fact, present to the mind an utterly meaningless chaos, an incomprehensible jumble of successive and contemporaneous events.

2. Moreover, abstraction through analysis to a level beyond experience is here impossible, and if it were not, it would be futile. For such abstraction would eliminate the human reference, and with it all meaning and significance, the very things we seek. 5

3. Further, the “wholes” of history,—and every historic event, complex, era, is a whole,—must not be broken. The reason is the same,—part of the reality, the concrete experienceable factuality, of historic affairs rests

in which particular causes and effects, through quantification and identification, are swallowed up in an endless (for all practical purposes) chain of linked events.

In connection with the statement as to the possible eventual dethronement of the mechanical pattern, let me just refer to the apparently irreconcilable contradiction between the conception of a mechanical universe with its implied reversibility, persistence, conservation-identity, and the so-called principle of Carnot, namely, that heat passes from the hotter to the less hot object and never the reverse, which implies change and irreversibility. On this, Meyerson has some illuminating comments in his brilliant book Identity and Reality.

4 I should add here that the quantum concept, if accepted as an analytically irreducible ultimate, may well call forth a renewed demand for a causal concept. Here, once more, there is something to account for which pure reason cannot reach.

5 This statement should not be understood to imply that operating with historical facts eschews abstraction altogether. The opposite is the case. As in all sciences, all thinking, if you like, history cannot be understood by a mere recounting or enumerating. There is what we might call a primary abstraction. The very words used in telling of an historic event, or in discussing it, are one degree removed from direct portrayal. Further, when we treat, say, of a religious episode, the very classification used implies comparison and categorizing, that is, abstraction. When we deal with city-states, the middle ages, feudalism, a transition period, we use abstractions. The point remains that there is a concrete factual reference in all these abstractions. The level of the experienceable is not relinquished.
in their "wholeness." This therefore cannot be permitted to be spirited away through abstraction. A table is no longer a table when it is conceived as a collection of elements, atoms, or electrons, but a battle remains a battle whatever you may say or think about it, as a historian.

4. Hence, the historian selects. In selecting, he must have a point of view, some reference to a standard or value.

5. Moreover, there is emphasis, a center of interest. Evaluation is not implied here, for distinction with reference to a value is part of the historian's function, as Röckert insists, but evaluation is not. The historian need not censure Theodore Roosevelt for calling the Portsmouth Conference, nor extol him, in fact, he should not do so, but the fact that he selects the Conference as part of his account and the manner in which he deals with it, reflect certain values with reference to politics, peace, etc., which determine his procedure.

6. There is in every reasoned historic record, as contrasted with a mere chronicle, a certain lack of continuity due to the presence of historic wholes (we must remember that every whole is framed in a halo of separateness, a distance) and to the further presence of gaps, missing facts or events, eliminated in the process of selection. The historic account thus comes to be punctured by shocks of newness,—something has happened. Why? The causal impulse is aroused.

The emphasis of which I spoke in the preceding point is, in a sense, a compensation for the "missing causal links." This can be illustrated by the following example.

Supposing you are observing a horseman, "in person" or in a moving picture, galloping in pursuit of a fox. After taking an obstacle the horse strikes a rock with its left front hoof. It stumbles, the rider clears the head of the horse and falls to the ground. What is the cause of the mishap? The fall is not an obvious event; it requires an explanation. Things were going smoothly, and then suddenly, down he goes, and now he lies spread out on the ground. What was the cause? Well, if thinking with the primitives, we say, the stone (a substantial cause), the evil-working stone (animated cause), or just,—the stone. If more modern in our thinking, but still quite nontechnical, we say, the horse striking the stone (a dynamic cause), establishing a relation between horse and stone. In either version, the stone is selected out of an indefinite number of other causes (horse approaching the stone, horse is not experienced, the rider sits loosely in his saddle, he loses control of the reins, etc., etc.). The "cause" is selected because it cuts into a continuous series of intent, performance, expectation, and does so as an unanticipated outside thing or event. The fact that the incident is described as an "accident" need not concern us here, but I shall return to this aspect later.

Suppose, however, that the same episode is represented in a slow-motion
movie. What do we see? The horse is galloping along, its left front leg descends upon the rock, slowly the leg slips, it bends,—and so does the horse’s neck; meanwhile, as the horse’s neck begins to bend, the rider rises slowly upward and forward in his saddle, smoothly he sails over the mount’s head, his body inclines forward and downward, headfirst, arms and hands stretching downward, legs thrust apart, until he reaches the ground gently, like a bird alighting. This event, per se, requires no explanation. The causal impulse is dormant. Why? The obvious reason lies in the fact that the slowness of the motion picture permitted a serial observation of a large number of successive events, each apparently equally obvious and inevitable. As far as the visual aspect of the event is concerned, in fact, the man did not “fall” at all; his leisurely progress via the horse’s head to the ground was part of a continuous series of which other parts were, the man riding, the horse galloping, etc. The slowness of the motion made possible the observation of so minutely continuous a series of events that no occasion arose to observe at any point that anything had happened, hence no shock, no prompting to ask, Why?

Now, it will be recognized that historic situations, episodes, short or lengthy series of events, as commonly related or analyzed, do not fall into the category of the slow-motion movie, where minute successions can be serially observed and noted. On the contrary, what the historian does is to select a relatively small number of items out of an indefinitely large number, a practically infinite number, in fact, if all were considered, and then proceeds to present the context in a way intelligible to the mind, intelligible in a number of respects, including the causal. Moreover, this selection of certain items, and exclusion of others, is but seldom (and certainly not necessarily) made from the causal standpoint. What the historian is after is significance, and this, in any particular case, is determined by his point of view as to history and its factors in general, e.g., he may hold that political, dynastic, or military matters are of the very essence of history; or by the prevailing notions of his time, e.g., he may seek out the items dealing with the daily lives and thoughts of the common people, or he may stress the economic factors; or by the particular purpose of his research, e.g., he may be interested in showing the role of the individual in history, or the pervasive power of the Church, or the influence of ideas; and so on, ad infinitum. Inevitably, he leaves out as much as he includes, to understate the case. Always, the gaps are at least as numerous as the items related. There is, therefore, no serial continuity, as in the slow-motion movie. On the contrary, the account is jerky; neatly fitting articulation of item with item, such as reality would disclose, if the whole of it were there, is neither achieved nor intended. Constantly, therefore, as the account is read, there comes a shock of newness, the continuity is broken, the events and episodes seem strange, incomprehensible, at times miracu-
CAUSALITY IN THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

lous. Again and again an insistent Why? rises in the mind. The causal urge is powerfully aroused. We want to understand, we ask for meaning, for linkage. When these are offered in the form of causal references, the factors chosen must be stressed; in fact, they must, in a sense, be overstressed; for at best, in view of the gaps, such factors are but partial causes. If they are to give intellectual illumination, to set the mind at rest, their causal relevance must be artificially heightened.

For the sake of identification, we may designate this approach to an analysis of historic thinking as the theory of missing causal links.

7. To the reasons just given for broken continuity in historic accounts, there must now be added one more, viz., the constant and inevitable intrusion of mental factors such as wish, desire, intent, purpose, ideal, idea. This in itself negates continuity. Physical items are comparable and commensurable; abstractly speaking, they can be arranged into a contemporaneous or successive series of any degree of differential minuteness, but as we saw, physical facts or events, alone, mean nothing to the historian; they must be humanized before they can come to figure in history. Mental facts, on the other hand, are neither commensurable nor directly comparable with either physical or other mental facts. History as it is, the whole of our history, is rendered such by the inclusion of mental factors. These are all pervasive without articulating, either obviously or even plausibly, with physical or with other mental factors. In and of itself, history is not lubricated by them; rather, it is befogged by them. To assure meaning or understanding here, interpretation is indispensable, including causal interpretation.

In concluding this section, it may be well to add that the role of the concept of causality in history cannot be regarded as merely suitable to past or present outlooks, perhaps to be dispensed with or replaced in the future. On the contrary, the concept of causality flows from the very essence of historic perspectives and will, in all probability, persist indefinitely.®

With admirable logical acumen, Heinrich Rickert has argued this question in Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Insisting that abstraction and conceptualization are common to the historical and the natural (or exact) sciences, he points out that the direction of conceptu-

® With reference to mind in history, it should be added that scholars like Eduard Meyer, the historian, Wilhelm Wundt, the psychologist, and many others, tend to misconstrue the logical import of the psychological level. They see in it the very differential of history, including the "uniqueness" of historic events. This is certainly an error. That human history must be humanized, is, of course, true enough, as we have seen, but the historical point of view is applicable to all things, whether physical, psychical, or social. When Dewey says that every thing is the end-point of a history, this applies to any thing, when viewed historically, from the cosmos to the atom, from the amoeba to man, physical or psychic, individual or social. The differential of history, therefore, must be looked for in other quarters.
eralization is different in the two fields. In the natural sciences, it aims at
generalization, the formulation of laws ever more and more abstract, but
in the historical sciences, it aims at particularization, a conceptual demar-
cation of wholes with reference to other wholes.

V. History and the Social Sciences. There is an obvious parallel between
history and the individual personality which in this context may be desig-
nated a historic complex *sui generis*. A historic event or situation *is*
a personality imbedded in material, psychological, social determinants within
a particular place and time. Strictly speaking, there is never a question
here of a something with general and repeatable characteristics (as in a
laboratory experiment) which can and will recur under certain determined
conditions. What is involved, on the contrary, is something specific, with
unique spatial and temporal coordinates. Although comparison and other
heuristic devices will be employed in an effort to understand it, it can only
be understood as what it is, in its specificity, individuality and wholeness,
like the subject of a biography.

The social sciences, economics, politics, sociology, are logical hyphenates.
In their data, their raw material, as it were, they are historical. The facts
they gather and analyze have occurred, are occurring, in history, and they
carry all the earmarks of the historic,—concreteness, spatial and temporal
particularity, unrepeatableness (in any strict sense). In their point of view,
however, these sciences approach the theoretical sciences of nature. They
are in search of regularities, they want to discover at least "limited laws,"
they aim at foresight, at least partially, at control. These viewpoints, how-
ever, are not to be applied to the historic process as a whole nor to any
miniature sample of it, but to certain aspects within the historic process,
such as man's political arrangements and acts, his economic conditions and
relations, or his more strictly social behaviors. Social behaviorism, with
its techniques of measurement, enumeration, statistical computation,
makes possible foresight, within very broad limits, and to this extent,
a modicum of control. I say "a modicum," because political, economic,
social facts and processes occur within the current of historic events, not
in a test tube cut off from all but certain relevant factors, and one must,
therefore, be prepared for surprises. The social scientist, moreover, is
constantly tempted to shift from the role of at least a potential manipu-
lator to that of a pure analyst, an observer, an interpreter. He is sensitized
to meaning, significance, values, and he turns to "causes" which alone can
bring meaning. Whether this tendency can or should be resisted is a prob-
lem I shall leave unanswered here.

At this point, I propose to examine the dictatorial model of social control
which may prove instructive in the context of this essay.

The difficulty with all historic material, and particularly so when it is
human, is its lack of uniformity. Regularities, foresight, control, seem
problematic in the face of the great complexity and variety, descriptively, behavioristically, and psychologically, of the concrete historic reality. This reality, moreover, when human, is recalcitrant. It can be acted upon, but also, it reacts. It resents highhanded manipulation. Press down upon it and it strikes back. The dictator’s first task, then, is to reduce variety by fostering uniformity. This he achieves, more or less successfully, by doctrinaire education, propaganda, mass festivals and parades, drastic laws extending to all aspects of national life. As an accessory measure, the dictator has ways of checking the overflow; by methods more or less highhanded, he neutralizes the deviates, or puts them out of commission by “liquidating” them. The operative tool here is secret police of the Gay-Pay-Oo variety which ferrets out subversion before it begins to count.\footnote{Another more perfect example of the same technique is, of course, an army. Here training and discipline, physical, psychological, and social, achieve an astounding reduction of variety. The uniform imposes a visual pattern, generalized habit extirpates individual behavior, the person vanishes with its name. At periodic maneuvers, a quasi experimental situation, details of relevant behaviors are developed and perfected, and at parades and other ceremonial spectacles, the mind is attuned to the military universe. As a result, regularities can be counted on, foresight becomes possible, and control, on the whole, effective. All this, however, is within limits. An army on paper is a nearly perfect example of mechanization; an army during peace comes close to it; an army in the field is a different matter. Disease, shell-shock, panic, unpopularity of commanders, nostalgia, a hundred and one factors of the situation as lived, attack the mechanical disguise. The human, the individual, revives beneath the uniform; the private becomes a man; causal determination, normally allocated to the will of the commander, becomes distributive again; discipline crumbles. The army is threatened with disintegration. But the worst foe of an army, as a perfect dehumanized model, is the presence of the enemy, another similarly constituted machine. The purpose of the two armies is theoretically identical but concretely opposite, viz., the extermination of the opponent. As a result, the two armies cannot be fused into a larger mechanical unit. They do not articulate; rather, each becomes a “monkey-wrench in the machinery” of the other. The soldiers may be robots, but a battle is a living reality, and presently the component human units become revivified by its breath. As a result, as every wise commander knows, the fates of battle, all else being equal, rest upon the knees of the gods. Consideration of facts such as these has led some extremists like Tolstoy to reduce almost to naught the role of strategy, tactics, officers’ orders, and to visualize a battle as a chaotic and wholly adventitious collection of individual or group histories. This is, of course, an extreme view, but not without basis in fact.}

By the application of these devices, the dictator succeeds to a degree in transforming a society, i.e., a living historical complex or organism, into a quasi mechanical model. By persistently lopping off the subversive deviates, he may for a while achieve a considerable measure of foresight, planning, control. It should be noted that planning here is to a large extent a substitute for foresight,—the dictator, rather than merely foreseeing what is going to happen, prescribes it. This might continue indefinitely if something did not crack,—and it does, or will!

That history cannot thus be sidetracked is apparent enough. In an as yet but partially subdued society, in 1921, Lenin had to introduce the NEP (New Economic Policy) to save the situation. This was a bargain with history. Similarly, Stalin adopted the policy of intermittent pressure
and relaxation, as in collectivization, to make time for historical readjustment,—time, be it noted, being a major tool of history.

However this may be, we see in dictatorial society a crude example of what society in its inherent essence is not. If for any reason, say, that of taste, we reject the dictatorial scheme of things, we once more shall have to resign ourselves to accepting the limitations set upon "law," foresight, control, by the historic process, and the correlated limitations upon the ambitions of the social sciences to follow in the tracks of the natural sciences. Furthermore, dictatorial society itself, if it is to be understood, must be given a historic personality, and its meaning to us must be set in a frame of humanized causes.

VI. Max Weber's "Objective Possibility" and "Adequate Causation."

From what has been said in sections IV and V, one might gather the impression that the selection of "causes" in the social or historical field is wholly a matter of subjective choice, at best reinforced by a prevailing cultural convention,—that any objectivity here is neither attainable nor even sought. At this point, Weber's contribution is illuminating and encouraging. What Weber recommends, or rather identifies as actually taking place in the selection of a historical cause, is a sort of mental experiment. Imagine what would have happened if what had actually occurred, a particular event selected as a cause, had not taken place. Should such a mental construct reveal no change in the later events consequent upon the elimination of the presumed causal event, then its selection as such would be revealed as mistaken, the event itself as an inadequate cause. If, on the contrary, the mental construct should depict a change or a substantial change in the consequent events, then the selection of the presumed causal event would be declared correct, the event itself an adequate cause.

The mental construct, moreover, here emphasized as an heuristic device, should not be conceived to be a matter of pure fantasy, an irresponsible excursion into the conjectural. Not at all. We have here a helpful guide in what Weber calls nomological experience which discloses certain regularities in historic affairs. Nomological experience confirms or rejects the "objective possibility" of the mental construct. As a matter of ordinary life, on a small scale, as it were, this procedure is adopted daily. In a small group of people you want to make a suggestion the purport of which is known to another man in the group. When about to speak you glance at the man, he nods approvingly, you make your statement. The cause of your having made the suggestion at that time was his nod. Had he shaken his head or withheld the approving nod, you would not have spoken, etc. Or take this. A number of race horses, jockeys up, are rounding the corner for the home stretch. Number 7 is in the lead, going strong halfway down the stretch; suddenly the horse collapses, the jockey falls to the ground, and Number 3 pulls ahead and wins the race. The cause of Number 3's
victory, you say, is Number 7's collapse. Had this not occurred, 7, which had already beaten 3 a number of times and was well in the lead, would have won. This, of course, is not certain, but probable, more or less, according to circumstances. The collapse of 7 was an adequate cause, within probability, of 3's victory. Incidentally, it will be observed that in this instance there is no direct contact of any sort between 3 and 7, such as obtains, for example, between a cue ball and the first object ball in a billiard shot, where you can say that left "English" on the cue ball caused the first object ball to rebound to the right after striking the cushion. Had you put right "English" on the cue ball or no "English," the object ball would have rebounded differently. In our case there is, I say, no such relationship between 3 and 7. But in the historic situation in question, a race, 7 was almost certainly the winner, 3 was just behind and considerably ahead of the other horses. The accident to 7 gave 3 the chance it needed to win, and it took it. This interpretation gives meaning to the event. So we say, 3 won because 7 collapsed.

Weber uses as his illustration the Battle of Marathon. We say, the victory of the Greeks changed the course of European history. It was the cause, or one of the important causes, of European history having been what it has. Mental experiment: had the Persians won, Greek creativeness would have been hampered, a theocratic regime would have been imposed upon Greece, things would have been different all around. The nomological experience justifying this conclusion is that the Persians had repeatedly imposed an oppressive regime upon conquered peoples, as have other conquerors, that in particular they were wont to force their theocracy upon the vanquished, that there existed certain conditions in the religious life of the Greeks which stood for receptivity to such a regime, that theocracy and political oppression stultify (as, for example, among the Persians) free creativeness, a realistic outlook, and the spirit of toleration, etc., etc. Things would have been very different had the Persians won. Hence, we declare the Greek victory at Marathon to have been an adequate cause, or at least an important partial cause, of European history as it actually occurred.

It appears thus that the selective attitude of the historian, his tendency to stress some things, to leave out or merely passingly refer to others, in other words, the entire procedure determined by a reference to certain values, does not preclude a degree of objectivity in the offering of causal interpretations. In some instances the degree of objectivity attainable will be relatively slight; in others, it will approach certainty without, of course, ever quite reaching it. At best we are dealing with the probable in our mental experiment; but anything even the most improbable, will on occasion happen in history, anything short of the impossible, and who is there to be quite sure what is impossible?
VII. System, Determinism, and Accident. Determinism, that is, the universal applicability of the principle of causality, is a basic assumption of all science. The reformulation of this principle, suitable to the present needs of the theoretical aspect of the exact sciences, does not mitigate against the validity, as a basis of scientific thought, of the comprehensive concept of universal determinism. This concept can also be restated in a different form, e.g., everything that happens must happen as determined by the conditions of its occurrence. Miracles, i.e., uncaused events, or events outside of natural determinism, do not occur. The admission of even a single miracle, for example, a spirit, however tiny, at once destroys the entire structure of science. Should such a spirit be assumed as existing or functioning, there would no longer be any certainty about, or necessity for, the natural determination of anything. The principle of determinism, as here defined, must apply equally to anything that occurs, whether in the physical, psychic or social field. It is, however, merely a postulate of scientific thought, not a demonstrable proposition.

In the theoretical field of the exact sciences, a field of extreme abstraction, it will be remembered, the application of the principle of determinism has made possible a very exact and harmonious formulation of the universe, or at least, of our universe. As soon as the realm of abstraction, the particular field of mathematical formulae, is left behind, no perfect application of the principle, except as a general postulate, is possible. Even in the more concrete aspects of the natural sciences we find ourselves in a realm of approximation,—certain inaccuracies, gaps, contingencies, make their appearance. In the psychological field this becomes only too apparent. In the field of the socio-historical sciences, where extreme concreteness is imperative and selection unavoidable, absolute determinism figures only as a remote ultimate postulate,—to keep us, as it were, from slipping into mysticism or supernaturalism; in actual performance, in our concrete thinking about such matters, only a very relative determinism is applicable.

What concerns us here is that such limited determinism, as a guiding concept, is possible here also. The frame of reference to which it applies may be called a "system of preferential relations" or, as some would have it, a "unified process." Take, for example, this instance from the history of mathematics. With the invention of analytical geometry by Descartes the road was paved for the discovery of the differential calculus. There were two possible approaches, by the use of infinitesimals, or by the "method of least squares." Newton chose the former road to the calculus, Leibniz, the latter. We say then, granted analytical geometry and (NB!) provided the history of mathematics continued, calculus was, in all probability, to be invented in one of two ways, or in both. That the limited determinism implied here is not of history, strictly speaking, but merely in history, can be further illustrated by the following fictitious case. Suppose, after Des-
cartes' discovery, a number of talented and trained mathematicians were put in jail and completely cut off from outside contacts, while being given access to whatever books or monographs on mathematics they might require. In all probability these mathematicians would have arrived at the same discoveries they have actually made in the course of known history. This instance shows that the limited determinism implied here belongs to the realm of logic, not history, from which these thinkers were isolated. The mathematical realm, then, is a system of preferential relations, a relatively unified process more specifically interrelated with itself than it is with things outside.

Similar mental experiments could be undertaken in the realms of technology, social psychology, art, religion, with the same result. To quote from another publication,

In the first place, these determinisms should not be confused with the universal principle of causality; when compared to the latter, they are, as it were, more intimate, and certainly more concrete and specific. Further, let us repeat that these determinisms are in no sense absolute, but relative in two respects, they obtain within systems of preferential relations, and the events predicated allow of alternatives, more or less limited. In most instances, again, the spring of action is not supplied in these determinisms. In other words, they do not, in themselves, constitute a guarantee that anything further will happen. The general formula applicable to all such situations would run somewhat as follows, if anything further happens, in a particular conceptual, mechanical, psychological, social system imbedded in the historic process, it will be one of several alternative events, inventions, ideas, or it will fall within the limits of a certain range of possibilities.

Similarly with the concept of accident. In an absolute sense, there are no accidents, that is, events without causes, or incompletely determined, or falling outside of natural determination. Such events would be miracles which the scientific view rejects. In a relative sense, on the contrary, the concept of accident seems to me to be not only illuminating but necessary whenever the context, whether human or otherwise, is historical. In everyday life we constantly speak of accidents, by which the commonsense of the layman means not an event without a cause but an unexpected one or one falling outside of advance determination or, possibly, even of \textit{ex post facto} analysis. Among technical thinkers, it is pretty generally agreed to refer as accidental to an event which represents the crossing of two or more mutually independent processes or systems. The event is accidental with reference to each system. For example, two automobiles start from their respective garages taking different highways. At a certain point the highways cross. The two cars reach the crossing simultaneously and collide. We call this an accident. There is no inclination in the minds of either of the two drivers to regard the incident as uncaused. On the contrary, they are very much concerned about ascertaining the responsible party and usually find it,—in the other fellow. The technical thinker, similarly, will say that
the event was accidental with reference to the proposed itinerary of either car. It was not in the calculations of either driver. It cut into the plan and behavior of each as an unanticipated intrusive event. It is in this sense that it was accidental. To take an illustration of a different order, green-corn in Africa. This food plant was originally unknown in Africa. After the discovery of America, the whites adopted the plant from the Indian and presently brought it to Africa. There it thrived remarkably and soon became one of the staples of the agricultural districts. Now from the standpoint of African culture history, as a system, maize or its introduction was an accident. There was nothing in the economic or agricultural history of the dark continent from which the corn could be deduced as a to-be-anticipated sequel,—it just came, as an intruder, and in this case, a welcome one.

It will be observed in addition that from this standpoint any thing or event can be regarded either as a link in a deterministic chain or as an accident, depending on the context.

Summary. Among primitives we find two concepts of causality, one overt, the other submerged. The first is mystical, the second, matter-of-fact. In science, where this duality persisted for a long time and to a degree still persists, the modern causal concept of the theoretical sciences has become purely functional in the mathematical sense. The factors that have led to the elimination of causality here are: (1) quantification; (2) mechanization; (3) continuity. In history: (1) a merely behavioristic record is insufficient (for meaning and understanding); (2) abstraction is limited; (3) wholes must be preserved; (4) the historian must select (and does); (5) he emphasizes (reference to values); (6) there is a lack of continuity in every historic record (theory of missing causal links); (7) mental factors intrude. The social sciences (economics, politics, sociology) are historical in their subject-matter but interested in regularities, foresight, in at least limited control, in their point of view. Max Weber shows that by means of a "mental experiment" a degree of objectivity can be assured to the selected "causes." Finally, determinism, in a strict sense, does not belong in the historic picture, but limited determinisms can be discovered in application to systems of preferential relations. The concept of accident similarly is correlated with that of a system.

As a final conclusion, it may be added that in the exact (theoretical) sciences the career of the concept of causality, in a sense other than that of a mathematical function, may be regarded as closed; whether permanently or not, remains problematic. In the social sciences, on the other hand, including specifically history, the concept of causality continues to function usefully and illuminatingly. It is in this field that the causal concept has, in all probability, found its lasting home.
THE RELATION OF PERSONALITY STRUCTURE
TO THE STRUCTURE OF CULTURE*

JAMES W. WOODARD
Temple University

Just as astronomy smashed our geocentric illusion that our world was the center of the universe, just as biology undermined our anthropocentric reification of the specially created and divine nature of man, so cultural anthropology undermines our ethnocentrism, and shows us that our own institutions, ideals, and ways of life are quite as apt to be full of sanctified absurdity as those of other peoples. In the same way, psychoanalysis has undermined our naive egotism and has put the rational mind in the perspective of its co-acting irrational and unconscious elements. At present, pushing toward the limits of this general theory of relativity at its socio-psychological level, we are beginning to put the total structure of the personality into the perspective of individual difference, age level, sex and class membership, historic period, and culture.¹

Recognition of this relativity was inevitable. Even though psychoanalysis started from biological premises, it was evident from the first that some social (usually familial) factor produced the distortion or thwarting of the biological need or impulse. As evidence mounted, three very important further steps had to be taken: one was to see that the parents had gone through a similar process at the hands of others who had done likewise, and so on, until the network reached out to the total group milieu, whatever the culture, the subculture, or the historical setting; second, it became apparent that not only could the social-cultural milieu block or repress biological needs, but that it could also exaggerate some of those needs in turn and displace or distort their expression, indeed, in some directions, it

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* A paper, titled “Mental Hygiene and the Status Quo,” given at the 1937 meeting of the American Sociological Society.

¹ In addition to articles and papers too numerous to list here, the trend and the growing enlightenment can be seen in the following books: S. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and Its Discontents, New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis; Otto Fenichel, Outlines of Clinical Analysis; Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time; C. E. M. Joad, Ed., Manifesto: the Book of the Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals; Wm. A. White, Twentieth Century Psychiatry; R. Osborn, Freud and Marx; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; James W. Woodard, Intellectual Realism and Culture Change; W. W. Waller, The Old Love and the New, The Sociology of Teaching; J. Dollard, Criteria for the Life History; Class and Caste in a Southern Town; H. D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity; B. Malinowski, Sex Life among Savages, Crime and Custom in Primitive Society; Margaret Mead, Coming of Age in Samoa, Growing up in New Guinea, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies; Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture; A. I. Hallowell, Handbook of Psychological Leads for Ethnological Field Workers (forthcoming).
approached fabricating the specific needs themselves; and third, it became apparent that the parents, priests, teachers, and others, were not themselves free to deal with the individual growing up within the given culture on a purely person to person basis. Institutionalized roles are assigned to them by the culture; these roles they themselves are constrained to carry out. The resulting repercussions are important factors in producing the personality structure and the adjustment problems.

In looking at the last two items more leisurely, we can facilitate understanding if we see that the term "instinct" is no longer used by the psychoanalysts in its strict technical sense. Whatever their source, the so-called "instincts" of psychoanalytic theory can be taken only as dynamic complexes entering into the structure and the economy of the personality. Some, such as food and sex, pleasure seeking and pain avoidance, are biologically given, though not in their full specificity, and are more or less rooted in biologically appropriate modes of achieving individual satisfaction. Others, such as ego imperatives and aggressiveness, are inescapable situational emergents from the conflicting interests, traumas, advantages, and disadvantages involved in group living. Others, such as the so-called "herd instinct," are explicable even in terms of a strict behavioristic conditioning. Others, such as the so-called death instinct or the idealistic demands of the Super-ego, have little or no basis in the individual's direct biological equipment. They represent a fabrication of the demands, idealizations, cajoleries, and threats of the surrounding group which have become reified and introjected. Alien though their ultimate source may be, they are now more or less integrated into the structure of the personality itself.

This redefinition of the term makes much easier the task of integrating the psychoanalytic contribution with that of its adjacent sciences. Sociologists can remember that "instinct" is here used similarly to Thomas' "wishes," as a useful tool, representing a functional reality of a significant sort, but leaving much to further research. Possibilities of further analytic processing, relative, say, to the Ego and the Super-ego, readily can be seen by recalling Cooley's brilliant analysis of the development of the sense of self. Thus, bridges to academic psychology are not limited to MacDougall and the instinct theories. All may agree on basic drives thus conceived.

Indeed, a priori analysis of the contained imperatives leads precisely to the conditions which research and clinical experience have shown to obtain, viz., in order to survive, an organism must have ready-at-hand be-

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2 According to Hendrick, Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis, 87, "instinct" is an inexact translation of the German word Trieb, whose connotation is actually closer to that of "urge," or "dynamic pressure," whether or not inherited. Freud says, "The theory of instincts is, as it were, our mythology. The instincts are mythical beings, superb in their indefiniteness," New Introductory Lectures, 131. He also speaks of the ontogenesis of a given instinct, Group Psychology, etc., 85-86. We can scarcely believe him to be so ignorant of biology as to do that in the strict meaning of the term.
behavior patterns. This follows from the necessity for economy of time and effort in the general run of behavior choices and for promptness of action in critical situations. The lower animals have them in the form of tropisms, reflexes, and instincts. The higher in the animal scale, the more it is possible to achieve a wider range and plasticity by building them into the organism through habit formation during the constantly prolonged period of infancy. The rigid structuration of the most basic patterns of behavior when the organism is ready for mature action is inescapable. It is imperative that such structures must follow the same general self-preservative and species-preservative lines as do instincts in the lower forms. Hence derives the theoretical confusion relative to instincts in the higher animals and the helpfulness, despite their verbal realism, of the instinctivists' theories.

It follows that in animals with a high intellectual development, such as man, the same underlying comprehensive rigidity of structuration has to apply, both to motor habits and to the area of meanings, emotions, feelings, and other preliminaries and accompaniments of action. This is the situational inescapability (a) for the dynamic structuration of the personality; (b) for the pristine tendency to the reification of a dynamic subjective world of meaning; and (c) for the assignment of vast ranges of emotionalized meaning to areas of the personality outside the focus of conscious thought.

Now precisely the same imperatives are operative on a group. If a group is to survive as a group, it must have ready-at-hand action patterns such as the practices, folkways, usages, conventions, mores, laws, and other prescriptive institutions; and it must have ready-at-hand, automatic, and unquestioned frameworks of objective and emotionalized meaning such as the systems of knowledge and belief, the ideologies, religions, philosophies, moral systems, ceremonial elaborations, etc. These must achieve a consistent integrative workability (the strain for consistency in the mores) and a cooperative division of labor among themselves, if a stable period of internal group adjustment and an "order of predictability" is to ensue. This they do in the culture pattern, ethos, or Weltanschauung of a culture or period. Thus, the situational imperatives and the involved processing in personality structuration and in cultural structuration are homologous.

Further, since historically the biological function of conditionability coupled with the prolongation of infancy, is to enable the individual to work out those adjustments appropriate to the external world of his own generation, and since the social-cultural milieu is a most important part of that environment, it follows that, just as the general world of common-sense material reality gets represented in the individual's automatic systems of behavior and configurations of meaning, so will the social-cultural order be introjected, reified, and structured into the personality itself. Mutual imperatives are interactive here, it is true, but it is one against a hundred and twenty-three million; the end result in any single
generation is that the individual personality structure reflects in micro-
cosm the structure of the culture.

Now if all things in the culture were self-evident or justified themselves
to the individual reason or to the commonsense consensus of individual
reason, and if there were no oppositions of vital, emotionalized interest, all
would be simple. The Id and Super-ego would not be differentiated from
the Ego to set up strains, blockings, and repressions within the personality,
and the control culture would not need to be differentiated from the inductive
culture. Instead, an all inclusive and completely integrated Ego would
be quite harmoniously integrated with an all-inclusive and completely
integrated inductive culture.

However, since there are drastic conflicting interests, since in these the
opposing viewpoints for evaluation render impossible the substantiation to
the individual Ego, on inductive or selbstverständliche grounds, of the
group’s requirements of him, the appearance of a control culture is situa-
tionally imperative for the very existence of a group. It is embryonically
evident even among apes, or in the pecking order of a hen house.

This control culture interferes with the rational freedom of the inductive
culture just as the Super-ego interferes with the integrative activity of the
Ego, hampering and restricting intellectual freedom, reason, science, and
technology in direct proportion to their threat to it. It represses the full
potentiality of the aesthetic-expressive culture, and treats it just as the
Super-ego treats the Id. It permits full expression only to such impulses as
are innocuous from its viewpoint, such as pure art, innocent recreational
forms, platonic friendship, or sex and love values within the prescribed
family form. Or, as the Super-ego accepts Id-impulses when sufficiently
cloaked in disguising symbolism, the control culture permits cultural ex-
pression to unacceptable impulses when disguised and symbolized so that
their real nature is not apparent; as in much of symbolic art, myths, fairy
tales, some dance forms, certain overtones of religious symbolism, unrecog-
nized overtones of melodrama, gossip, pruriency, humor, and the like.
Again, as the Super-ego turns the aggressive tendencies inward and uses
them to its own ends but destructively for the total personality, so here,—
as in war, moral bigotry, moral sadism, class and race prejudices, etc.
Finally, just as the Super-ego permits partial expression to objectionable
Id-impulses so long as the net result is a further strengthening of itself, as
seen in many neurotic mechanisms, so here,—the permissible courtship
laxity of some groups so long as it leads to marriage; self-conscious use of
vice, gambling, “bread and the circus,” etc., as sops in social control;
mechanisms which indirectly permit tabooed expression by providing
means of reinstatement so long as these latter reavow the validity of the

\[3\] See James W. Woodard, “A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the
taboo itself, such as forgiveness, confession, absolution, fines, etc.; mesaliances such as those of petty legitimate business with racketeering\(^4\) and of the staunchest exponents of law and order with vigilantism; or the “latent culture patterns” of Chapin, e.g., the tolerated, but unadmitted structuration of vice (sex) and crime (aggressiveness) into the culture as an extensive culture complex through the known but unacknowledged graft of political rings. Thus we find the same weird assortment of blockings, distortions, disguises, and mesalliances in culture which occur in personality.

Since at early points in cultural evolution it yet remains for the further cultural evolution to bring any considerable areas of the culture within the possibility of inductive proof, and since the imperatives for a working order are not thereby relinquished, the result is that in the earlier periods, and among many contemporary primitive groups, the naive, emotional integration of the control culture comprises most of the culture as a whole. But it is acceleratively eaten away by, and absorbed into, the inductive culture, at the same time releasing the aesthetic-expressive culture more and more from its ties to religion, class status, and control ceremony, to achieve its spontaneous expressive forms. This is reflected alike in the history of art, religion, the class struggle, and science.

Meanwhile, because of the same dynamics which produce the defensive and compensatory cosmic grandiosity of the individual Super-ego, the control culture must overassert that which in the nature of the case it cannot substantiate to clear-eyed reason, yet which, driven by internal forces which it does not itself understand, it must cling to as the only workable “way of life” it as yet knows. Hence, it buttresses its prescriptions with rationalizing ideologies; alters rational goals into absolute ideals; demands absolute belief and abject obedience; posits its institutions and ideals as too sacred even for critical scrutiny; invokes gods and devils, heavens and Hells; breathes the fire of moral indignation from its nostrils; and holds the culture as a whole, so far as it can, under its authoritarian sway.

Any sociologist will agree that this describes at least the unlovely aspects of the control culture. Any psychoanalyst will see that it also describes the same aspects of the Super-ego! That is the point. All through some five hundred thousand years of this sort of thing the control culture Weltanschauung is so implicit in the permissible action and verbalization of all the group members that a consistent stimulation assails the new generation of the group. This is true of all its informal contacts with the tribe; and to this is added the self-conscious and unself-conscious carrying out of delegated control functions on the part of the medicine men, priests, chieftains, teachers, and parents. Inevitably, the prescriptions of the control culture are reified and introjected into the Super-ego, together with their

concomitant fictions, moral feelings, stigmatizations, apprehensions, fears, guilt feelings, and the like. Thus, the Super-ego is the consolidation into the structure of the personality itself of the group's control culture.

Since the contained imperatives of the Super-ego are thus essentially extraneous to the purely individual impulses, an internal dissociation tends to occur. The Super-ego takes on the control culture's cosmic grandiosity; it banishes the Id-impulses by repression; and it continually distorts the (by themselves) rationality-tending processes of the Ego. The further development of the weird assortment of dislocations, mesalliances, and the like, which psychoanalysis has shown us, go on from there.

It is with this background in mind that the writer has elsewhere stated that, while sheer inhibition, compartmentalization, and intellectual bewilderment may occur as purely individual psychological mechanisms, or purely biological derivatives, it is questionable if repression and dissociation, strictly defined, ever occur except at the hands of an essentially extraneous and group-given value pronouncement which has been reified. These need not be moral in their nature, but almost universally they are.

Freud has apprehended, but apparently not fully comprehended, all of this. He delineates the process quite clearly, yet in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in his later works as well, he flies back to his biological concepts, here the death instinct, so that one wonders if his reference to instincts as a self-consciously held mythology is not a belated covering up of an earlier exposure of himself, the error itself still persisting. This need not hold us here, so long as it is corrected. However, it would seem that psychoanalysis, starting out, in Comte's terms, with almost a daemonic framework of reference, with its almost animistic endopsychic censor and its subterranean monsters, has now advanced, very rapidly to be sure, only to the ontological stage of reified instinct-entities, and that its further progress is blocked until it goes beyond this.

Horney's emphasis on process and the cumulative effect of "vicious circles" and so-called "lucky circles" is a major step forward. The present writer regrets that he has not yet published those portions of his own work on methodology which deal with "situational imperatives," "situational emergents," "contained processes," and "constant factors." These concepts are significant in large areas of scientific research in their ability to reduce to a positive basis the still persistent chasing after entity-causes for correlation with entity-effects. This is often a mere wasting of time at the ontological level of conceptualization when "processes" and "products" are the real game. Certainly the foregoing processing of the origin of the Super-ego and the finding of the nature of its function in its own raison d'être obviates much of the hindering mystical verbiage, and rescues psy-

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* Intellectual Realism and Culture Change, Hanover, N. H., 1935.
choanalysis from its former esoteric cultism by giving it an initial commonsense in the perspective of its adjacent sciences.

Certainly, too, Horney’s contribution is a great one in pointing out that it is not the infantile wish, fixation, trauma, or conflict, per se which complicates things for the neurotic. The earliest experience only provides a pattern through which, in the absence of achieving further maturity, the further experiences may be filtered, or back to which, being blocked, they may regress; or it may form the unassimilated nucleus for a “vicious circle,” whose cumulative working carries on to neuroticism in later life because of further irreconcilable experience drawn into its orbit. When the further life experience and social-cultural status quo of mature years are themselves livable, sheer infantilism is normally assimilated, and, by itself, proves quite harmless. Likewise, the task of analysis is not performed by the mere uncovering of the childhood traumas and conflicts, but by securing assimilation at many points in the ensuing course of the vicious circle and by starting a contrary circularity of positive adjustment and achievement within the framework of the adult’s relationships to his associates and his status quo. In such terms, it is readily seen that psychoanalysis and mental hygiene must eventually come to grips with the problem of what kind of “status quo” will best aid this.

That Freud apprehended the cultural source of Super-ego viciousness is well shown in Civilization and Its Discontents. Aggressiveness is “introjected,” “sent back where it came from,” “directed against the Ego”; and, “as the Super-ego,” “in the form of conscience,” it “exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the Ego that the Ego would have liked to enjoy against others.” There results the sense of guilt, even a need for punishment; and civilization obtains the mastery over the dangerous love of aggression in individuals by “setting up an institution within their minds to keep watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.” The rigor of conscience simply carries on the severity of external authority which it has succeeded. . . . Originally, renunciation is the consequence of a mere dread of external authority; one gives up pleasures so as not to lose love, and should be quits with authority. No feeling of guilt should remain.

But when the authoritarian pronouncements are absolutized, reified, and structured into the Super-ego, the case is different:

In spite of the renunciations made, feelings of guilt will be experienced and this is a great disadvantage economically of the erection of the Super-ego, or, as one may say, of the formation of conscience. Renunciation no longer has a completely absolving effect; virtuous restraint is no longer rewarded by the assurance of love; a threatened external unhappiness—loss of love and punishment meted out by
external authority—has been exchanged for a lasting inner unhappiness, the tension of a sense of guilt.

Thus, the moral masochism of the Super-ego is nothing else than the introjected threats of the aggressiveness of others, instrumented by the culturally crystallized idealizations and stigmatizations of the control culture, assigning the individual, his Ego and his Id, to their place. Begin with hand-slappings, shaming, bogey men, recording angels and black marks, the resulting guilt and apprehension, the moralizing and God-invoking idealizations and anathemas, and you have the midwifery for the Super-ego's birth. To see its potential destructive ruthlessness toward the Ego, go to the control culture, to the torturing racks of its inquisitions, the boiling oil of its heresy huntings, its political prisons, lynchings, and vigilante bands, or the never-to-be-ended torture by fire of its religion. This is the external source of the internalized death wish.

But (Horney has only partially clarified the matter), important as are guilt feelings as such, they are derivative from both sides of the ambivalence and by themselves strengthen the maladjustment itself, since they reavow the cogency of the Super-ego's demands. Thus, like some of the cultural mechanisms we have mentioned, they do win a livable accommodation (only) for the Id-impulses by giving them a status quo definition which thereby cloaks Ego, Super-ego, and even guilt feelings, per se, with respectability. Hence, like the neurosis itself, guilt feelings are capable of being clung to as an accommodative crutch which still supports the basic dissociation. It is not until a more nearly ultimate insight is gained into aggressiveness directly, i.e., not until the demands of the Super-ego are clearly seen as the congealed hostility of others toward one's self, and not until one's own abject moral masochism is seen as a substitute for legitimate aggressive expression on the part of the self, that basic integrational insight is achieved. That the general realization of this will drastically affect attitudes toward a given status quo, is profoundly important.

By the same token, the moral sadism of the Super-ego toward others, the neurotic's "Woe unto you if you are not perfect," draws its dynamics from the same control-culture, moral-authoritarian source. It is augmented, however, by affording the individual's aggressive impulses a seized-upon chance for compensatory, permissible, and morally sanctioned expression. Thus, the cheap catharsis and subjective feeling of spiritual regeneration from participation in a great group hate: war, crusades, lynchings, class war, vigilante activities, or revolutionary action. That is why wartime is in a sense accompanied by the subjective feeling of spiritual regeneration and why the internal solidarity which is in part fairly achieved by the glaring contrast between ingroup and outgroup morality is subjectively felt as a "spiritual" value. It is this situational precipitation of repressed aggressiveness which provides the tinder which the spark of war or class struggle
may so easily ignite, rather than a simple instinct of pugnacity which, when not thus complicated, might be expected to have some biological appropriateness to the situation calling for pugnacious action.

Since the more the aggressiveness is repressed, the more exhorbitant its subconscious pressure becomes, this is also why the self-consciously most peaceful and humble of men, the priests and preachers, go to the most cruel extremes when a "morally permissible" expression of aggressiveness is at hand. Witness the Crusades and the Inquisition; or see Abrams' description of the fulminations of the ministry in the World War. Hence is seen the importance for adjustment of the fact that the culture can progressively take over the more workable "plain reasoning" and the amoral and merely prudential Weltanschauung of science and the inductive culture.

Thus the abundant clinical evidence that there do exist in the personality impulses to self-thwarting, relinquishment of the self, and even self-destruction does not therefore mean that there is a death instinct. For adequate results, it is necessary that the real connotation of such literary similes and their involved processing be clear to theorist, practitioner, and patient alike. This is shown by Horney, who, however, falls just short of clinching the matter. Seeing that guilt, per se, is not quite the nub of the neurotic's difficulties; seeing that guilt feelings and neurosis do not so much represent the patient's wishes as the price he has to pay for such a "way of life" as is open to him; seeing the aggressiveness is "turned inward" (we have reexamined that half-truth) so that the individual would destroy himself; seeing that one alternative way of life with the individual is to embrace his own hardships and lose himself in the masochistic ecstasy of pain (just as it is one possibility for the cultural Weltanschauung, as in the ascetic cults, some religions, Puritanism, Stoicism, and certain aspects of modern Fascism and other 'neurotic cultures'); seeing all this, she takes this losing of the self and this potential ecstasy as the nub of the matter of moral masochism in the sense that these are the real satisfactions at which the individual is aiming.\(^7\)

This comes from still taking the death instinct too literally. For the nub of the matter is the impossibility of escape from necessarily incompatible and conflicting demands. The death wish, the neurosis, and even the relinquishment of the self, despite its greater positive emotional resonance, all are accommodations, modes of going on living in spite of the fact that life has become basically unlivable. What the individual really wants is rest and peace and surcease and release from the interminable conflict within himself and between himself and his group. Death offers this, to be sure; so, momentarily, do sleep, excessive sexual participation, alcohol, and drugs; some illnesses do; insanity might; losing the self might help, as

might a hysterically exaggerated masochistic ecstasy; and so would a return to the mother's womb. But not all are even possible, and all, including the relinquishment of the self, which we here see as only one more thing which the group's aggression demands of the individual, are in final analysis more unwanted than wanted. In none of them is the whole personality behind the wish. What the individual wants is freedom and at the same time undiminished love; security and also undiminished freedom; the full retention of his individuality without thereby having to lose the sacred affectional bonds to his group; a rational cultural milieu that, without compromising his individuality, will integrate him smoothly into its smoothly flowing order. Only when his internal conflict has been so drastic and so prolonged as to make living meaningless does he resort to death, sadistic ruthlessness, complete phantasy, or abject surrender of the self.

Returning now to the relation of the Super-ego to the control culture, we should like to point out the striking similarity between the total structure of the personality and the total configuration of the culture. The Super-ego and the control culture both epitomize the moral imperative; both display aggressiveness introverted as moral masochism, extraverted as moral sadism; both assume the dominant role in the objective adjustment of the individual and the culture, hoodwink the rational Ego and inductive culture, and stultify their attempts at rationality; both banish overt expressions of the Id except such as are innocuous, effectively disguised, or circuitously strategic to themselves; both are authoritarian in the derivation and application of their absolutized ideals; and both are dominated by the imperatives to moral order and resistant to those of rational change.

On the other hand, the Ego and the inductive culture are alike in that both are based on the reality principle; both go beyond the sheer immediacy of the unalloyed pleasure principle; yet both are finally its instrument and could very well incorporate the pleasure and the reality principles into a livable integration but for the intrusion of the intolerant morality principle. Despite these difficulties, (both in the normal individual's achievement of maturity and, culturally, slowly down through cultural evolution) both of them do steadily undermine the tyranny of the authority principle and bridle the impatient directness of the pleasure principle. For the reality principle, since it is sensitive to both the internal and external reality, is integrative in contrast to the divisive Super-ego and the chaotic Id. It is thus ultimately more powerful in determining the specific integration of personality and of culture than the pleasure principle, or the morality, or authoritarian, or death, principle. A look at the situational imperatives on the first unicellular organism would show this. All ensuing biological evolution bears it out, with its throwing up of more and more elaborate sense organs, cognitive functions, and integrative centers; and so does the cultural evolution with its steady eating up of the control culture by the
inductive culture and the accelerative rapidity with which science, once thrown up, begins to absorb the total universe into its integration.

The Id epitomizes the pleasure principle, as does the aesthetic-expressive culture, the realm of immediately selbstverständliche values, of ends rather than means. Both would carry that principle out with irresponsible immediacy were it not for the refinements, restraints, and repressions which the other two effect. So that only innocuous, disguised, and indirectly exploitable expressions achieve overt structuration in either the personality or the culture complexes.

Finally, these three divisions epitomize the deepest ancient yearnings of mankind: the "Good," in the moral Super-ego and the control culture; the "True," in the rational Ego and scientific-inductive culture; and the "Beautiful," in the selbstverständliche pleasures, the ends rather than the means, of the Id and the aesthetic-expressive culture. Exceeding these three yearnings in meaning-resonance, however, is the more deeply underlying desire to find all three merged in a single all inclusive and all consistent configuration of all sufficing emotional meaning. This is usually symbolized in the individual subconscious by the desire for the earliest and "completest" rapport with the all sufficing parent. In the culture, it is usually symbolized by the desire for union with "God." Its reality basis, however, is in contrast to both these symbolisms. It is the desire for the actual achievement of an inclusive, consistent, and richly meaningful configuration of the universe and the individual's relation to it that shall resolve the age-long internal and external conflict and permit the full, harmonious realization of all internal potentialities and their smooth merging in undisturbed communion with the omnipresent, sustaining, and nurturing Group.

In addition to the conflicting situational imperatives already delineated which postpone achievement of this happy eventuality, is the further fact that the three divisions of the personality also take on a relationship to the stratifications of domination and exploitation in the group, and to the class structure, once this has arisen. For the control culture and the Super-ego have to conform the individual not merely to the legitimate demands which the total group welfare imposes upon him, which conceivably could be justified to his reason, but also to the demands which the vested interests and ruling classes make upon the submerged tenth and the lower classes. This adds devious further complexities. The slave, the woman, and the child must be persuaded to repress their aggressive tendencies and to want to obey; the vassal must be made to consider it his duty and privilege, at least so far as his conscious thoughts go, to die for his lord; and sex must be confined within those forms of chastity, courtship, and marriage which will support that familial form which the modes of economic production and governmental structure require. So that the Super-ego safeguards more interests for the upper classes than for the
lower. Thus, rational balance is more apt to be found in the Ego of the middle class liberal, who is in a position to weigh the unreasonable extremes against each other, than in the moral sadism of crusading upper class vigilantism on the one hand or, on the other, in the abject servitude of a submerged tenth or the revolutionary immediacy of the radical.

Freud caught glimpses of all this, too, but with odd inconsistencies, doubtless caused in part by his own class-centrism, in part by the drag of his biological conceptualism. He saw it clearly, relative to religion, but, like Benjamin Kidd\(^9\) and Walter Bagehot,\(^10\) who, with Marx, long preceded him here, failed to see that religion was only one of the instruments of the control culture, and that the criticisms made of its social function apply to the control culture as a whole. For the whole control culture is authoritarian, dogmatic, moral, inflexible, and closed to critical scrutiny only slightly less than religion itself. Of this, all modern sociology since Bagehot and Sumner is quite aware. To show its implications, we cite Freud's remarks on religion and apply them to the whole control culture, which, if it avoids demonism, still retains ontological absolutism.\(^11\)

It would be an indubitable advantage to leave absolute values and ideals out of the question altogether, and to admit honestly the purely human origin of all cultural laws and institutions. Along with their pretensions to sanctity the rigid and immutable nature of these laws and regulations would also cease. Men would realize that these must be made, not so much to rule them, as, on the contrary, to serve their common interests; they would acquire a more friendly attitude to them, and instead of aiming at their abolition they would aim only at improving them. This would be an important advance on the road which leads to reconciliation with the burden of culture. . . . For, in its development through the ages mankind as a whole experiences conditions that are analogous to the neuroses, and this for the same reasons, because in the ages of its ignorance and intellectual weakness it achieved by purely affective means the instinctual renunciations, indispensable for man's communal existence. And the residue of these repression-like processes, which took place in antiquity, has long clung on to civilization. Thus both religion and the grandiose emotional absolutism of the total control culture would be the universal obsessional neuroses of humanity. . . . According to this conception one might prophesy that the abandoning of both must take place with the fateful inexorability of a process of growth, and that we are just now in the middle of this phase of development. . . . Man cannot remain a child forever; he must venture at last into . . . 'education to reality.'

In his *Intellectual Realism and Culture Change*,\(^12\) the present writer made an analysis of some of the psychological aspects of this process as follows. The reificatory tendency is universally present, not as a direct biological entity, but as a situational emergent from the nature of mental processing. Pristinely all pervasive, then, when given social interaction, there result

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\(^9\) Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*.
\(^10\) Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*.
\(^11\) See S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, 73, 75–6, 86. The quotation is verbatim except for portions in italics, which make the wider application mentioned.
\(^12\) Hanover, 1935.
group-wide and culturally carried reificatory systems, magic, religion, the
ethnocentric relativity of conscience and the Super-ego, cultural impera-
tives, freely floating universes of meaning which set the present problems
for Wissenssociologie and semantics, etc., but there also result the begin-
nings of the processes of refinement and correction. These processes, aided
by changes in transporation, communication, group size, division of labor,
and the general accumulating cultural heritage, tend, in the course of fur-
ther cultural evolution, to release reason, science, ethics, the inductive
culture, the aesthetic-expressive culture, the lower classes, and the Ego
and Id, on the one hand, from the ancient restraining bonds of individual
naïveté, external authority, religion, morals, the control culture, the vested
exploiting groups, and the Super-ego, on the other.

From the angle of contained imperatives, the culture, like the individual,

must have an integration. A rational, and thereby a complete, integration
is not possible until much experience has been accumulated. Hence, in
both cases, the first integration cannot escape being an incomplete, incon-
sistent, and emotional one. As an emotional integration, it resists the
necessary transitional break-ups incident to achieving a mature and
rational integration, and, as an incomplete and inconsistent pattern, it
achieves general workability of a sort by compartmentalization, rationali-
ization, the development of subintegrations, and the achievement of only
accommodative mechanisms between these, rather than reaching the full
adjustment of a single, all inclusive integration. Precisely this same mecha-
nism produces the three subintegrations within the personality (Super-ego,
Ego, and Id) and the three divisions of culture (Control, Inductive, and
Aesthetic-expressive culture) and the various merely accommodative
mechanisms between them. Blocking at the hands of the dominant sub-
integration; exaggerated pressure from the blocked impulse; defensive over-
protection and repression; further exaggeration and consolidation of the
repressed elements; still further overprotestation, consolidation, and pro-
tective severity: this is the contained process which forges the threefold
structure both of personality and of culture. Make it only a little more
severe than usual and it is the vicious circle of neuroticism and psychotic
dissociation (social disorganization and revolution at the social level) ex-
pressed in its broadest terms.

Individual psychoanalysis consists in modifying the exaggeration in the
demands of the extremes by getting them into each other's perspective
on the rational plane of the Ego. This accomplished, as the excessive re-
pressive demands of the one side die down, the excessive, overrebellious
demands of the other also diminish and full perspectived, all-inclusive inte-
gration is approached. A rational, functionally appropriate adjustment
rather than an accommodative crutch begins to become possible. Within
narrower limits, the same thing happens of itself to the individual in
response to the intensification or easing of the social-cultural pressures. Therefore, the building of a social-cultural order which will minimize these conflicting pressures becomes a problem of profound import for social psychiatry, at both its social and its individual angles of approach.

Likewise, at the cultural level itself, as the inductive culture slowly assimilates the control culture into itself, the areas of rational behavior are expanded, and, as in individual analysis, the vicious circles are slowly reversed. Each gain in provability and understandability makes the next gain easier, because, as defensive over-dogmatism gives way, rebellious over-demands lessen also, which still further reduces the necessity for the first, etc., etc. We have not come far on this path as yet, and there are many ups and downs of historical vicissitude, but a careful reading of cultural history yields a profound appreciation of the long run adjustive significance of the well substantiated fact that the inductive culture steadily assimilates the control culture into itself and progressively tends to rationalize, in the strict sense of the word, the culture as a whole.

Osborn, possibly reflecting his particular class-centricity, but apropos of our own analysis of personality structure and class structure, writes:

The struggle against the irrational authority of the super-ego finds its most rational expression in the class struggle. . . . And if it is true that the struggle against the super-ego is objectively a struggle against outworn social institutions, a struggle of "sons" against "fathers," then the class war is the only way which utilizes aggressiveness for progressive purposes.13.

We would agree with him that, if there came a time when a liberal position was no longer tenable, when academic and scientific freedom were repressed as in the present dictator countries, when the social scene was so chaotic that one was forced to choose between one or another "united front," the interests of psychoanalysts, mental hygienists, and scientists generally, along with those of the middle classes also, are with the lower classes rather than with the sixty families.

Until then, however, to our mind the legitimacy and efficacy of corrective tools for effecting both social and individual adjustment are in the following order. First, pure-science research in the social and psychobiological sciences. This quietly and unobtrusively keeps exposing the full social reality to the light of reason and will eventually undermine authoritarian irrationality in this area more thoroughly than any forceful struggle ever could, with its contained Thermidorian pendulum-swings and transitional dictatorships. It has already done so in the physical and biological realms. Fearless and functionally oriented scientific research is the most insidious and irreversible of the instruments of change, and it is the most nearly self-corrective as to the appropriateness of its goals, for there is never completely absent the hazard of lingering authoritarian dogmas leading to

futile sacrifices for the wrong ends. Second, participation in, and retention of, liberal democracy in the political institutions of the group, with its correlates of intellectual and academic freedom. Third, affiliation with middle class interests in constantly tempering and slowly assimilating into a single integration the compensatorily extreme demands of the two directly hostile groups. Fourth, only when identification with some united front is imperative, should there be active participation in the class war on the side of the lower classes.

We would place our main hope for the future on science because it is so like the rational Ego in contrast to the tyrannous Super-ego or the erratic Id. This relationship, if you have followed the argument closely, is more than an analogy or a homology; it involves some genuine organic-causal relationships. We share with Freud belief in the adjutive efficacy of a functionally oriented science. This is the more true since, with some methodological heterodoxy, the present writer believes that science, once freed of "moral" clutterings, can enter the field of the inductive analysis of value judgments, that it has already done so in medicine, hygiene, and psychoanalysis. The inductive culture displaced the control culture at a snail's pace for five hundred thousand years. Once it came to its flower in the disciplined and systematic reason of science, it has in a scant century or so undermined it and assimilated it into itself at an amazing rate, sweeping all things into the orbit of its dynamic integration. Mankind cannot escape getting over its authoritarian moral absolutism, the obsessional neurosis of its exaggerated control culture demands, any more than it can escape getting over its religious and magical neuroses, as Freud puts it, as a part of the sheer process of growing up.

With these impediments removed, a livably just and harmonious social order, sustaining personality integration rather than wrecking it, will be visibly nearer, just as the dissociations within the personality undergoing analysis eventually cannot escape merging under the steady assimilative action of the rational Ego. So optimistic a conclusion admits of endless trials and errors, to be sure, but the constant pressure is directional, and the whole argument follows logically from the almost axiomatic statement that the culture process is an extension of the learning process. It eventually masters the problems of men's adjustment to each other, just as it has so brilliantly already mastered adjustment to the external reality. The human race and its culture, unlike the individual patient, does not have the alternative of breaking off the analysis.

Apropos, however, of the chaotic trials and errors of the present generation, it might be fitting to end with the same quotation with which Freud ends his Beyond the Pleasure Principle:

"Whither we cannot fly, we must go limping."

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15 Ruckert in the Markamen des Hariri.
THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN SOCIAL ACTION

TALCOTT PARSONS
Harvard University

The subject of this paper has given rise to much controversy which has on the whole, turned out to be strikingly inconclusive. It may be suggested that, in part at least, this is a result of two features of the discussion. On the one hand, sides have tended to be taken on the problem in too general terms. Ideas in general have been held either to have or not to have an important role in the determination of action. As opposed to this tendency, I shall attempt here to break the problem down into different parts, each of which fits differently into the analytical theory of action.

On the other hand, the discussion has, for the taste of the present writer, been altogether too closely linked to philosophical problems and has seldom been brought fairly into the forum of factual observation and theoretical analysis on the empirical level. This paper is to be regarded as a theoretical introduction to attempts of the latter sort.

I am far from believing that social or any other science can live in a kind of philosophical vacuum, completely ignoring all philosophical problems, but even though, as I have stated elsewhere, scientific and philosophical problems are closely interdependent, they are nevertheless at the same time independent and can be treated in relative abstraction from each other. Above all, from the fact that this paper will maintain that ideas do play an important part in the determination of action, it is not to be inferred that its author is committed to some kind of idealistic metaphysics of the sort from which it has so often been inferred that ideas must arise through some process of “immaculate conception” unsullied by social and economic forces or that they influence action by some automatic and mysterious process of self-realization or “emanation” without relation to the other elements of the social system.

The paper, then, will be devoted to the statement of a theoretical framework for the analysis of the role of ideas on an empirical, scientific basis. Without apologies, I shall start with an explicit definition of my subject matter. Ideas, for the purposes of this discussion, are “concepts and propositions, capable of intelligible interpretation in relation to human interests, values and experience.” So far as qua ideas, they constitute systems, the relations between these concepts and propositions are capable of being tested in terms of a certain type of norm, that of logic.

The definition just given is so stated that it can serve as the definition of a variable in a system of interdependent variables. That is, it is a combi-
nation of logical universals to which many different particulars, the values of the variable, may be fitted. Since the present concern is wholly scientific, the sole important questions to be asked are three. 1. Do differences which are accurately ascertainable obtain between the specific content of the ideas held by different individuals or groups in social systems at different times? 2. Is it possible to establish important relations between these differences and other observable aspects of, or events within, the same social systems? 3. Are these relations such that the ideas cannot be treated as a dependent variable, that is, their specific content deduced from knowledge of the values of one or more other observable variables in the same system? If all three of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, it may be claimed that ideas play an important role in the determination of social action in the only sense in which such a claim has meaning in science. Ideas would be an essential variable in a system of theory which can be demonstrated to "work," to make intelligible a complex body of phenomena. Whether in an ultimate, ontological sense these ideas are real, or only manifestations of some deeper metaphysical reality is a question outside the scope of this paper.

Ideas obviously could not be treated as a variable in systems of social action unless their specific content varied from case to case. But besides the variations of specific content from case to case, it may be possible, as has been suggested, to divide them into certain broad classes which differ appreciably from one another in their relations to action. How these classes shall be defined, and how many there are, are pragmatic questions in the scientific sense; the justification of making a distinction between any two classes is that their members behave differently in their relations to action. Whether this is the case or not is a question of fact. I shall outline such a classification and then present an analysis of the role of each so as to demonstrate the importance of making the distinctions.

The first class may be termed "existential" ideas. The concepts which comprise such ideas are the framework for describing or analyzing entities, or aspects or properties of them, which pertain to the external world of the person who entertains the ideas, the actor. These entities either are or are thought to be existent at the time, to have existed, or to be likely to exist. The reference is to an external "reality" in some sense. The ideas involve existential propositions relative to some phase or phases of this reality, real or alleged. The most general type of norm governing existential ideas is that of "truth."

Of existential, as of other ideas, it is convenient to distinguish two subclasses, the distinction between which is of cardinal importance. The one are empirical ideas, the concepts and propositions of which are, or are held to be, capable of verification by the methods of empirical science. All other existential ideas, on the other hand, I shall class together as nonempiri-
The second main class are what may be called normative ideas. These refer to states of affairs which may or may not actually exist, but in either case the reference is not in the indicative but in the imperative mood. If the state of affairs exists, insofar as the idea is normative the actor assumes an obligation to attempt to keep it in existence; if not, he assumes an obligation to attempt its realization at some future time. An idea is normative insofar as the maintenance or attainment of the state of affairs it describes may be regarded as an end of the actor. The states of affairs referred to may also be classified as empirical and nonempirical according to the above criteria.

The first set of problems to be discussed concerns the role of empirical existential ideas. I think it fair to say that no branch of social science has been subjected to more thorough and rigorous analysis than this, so it forms an excellent starting point. The context in which this analysis has taken place is the range of problems surrounding the concept of the rationality of action in the ordinary sense of the maximization of “efficiency” or “utility” by the adaptation of means to ends. It is the sense of rationality which underlies most current analysis of technological processes in science, industry, medicine, military strategy and many other fields, which lies at the basis of economic theory, and much analysis of political processes, regarded as processes of maintaining, exercising, and achieving power.

The common feature of all these modes of analysis of action is its conception as a process of attaining specific and definite ends by the selection of the “most efficient” means available in the situation of the actor. This, in turn, implies a standard according to which the selection among the many possible alternative means is made. There is almost universal agreement that the relevant basis of selection in this kind of case involves the actor’s knowledge of his situation which includes knowledge of the probable effects of various possible alternative ways of altering it which are open to him. One of the necessary conditions of rationality of his action is that the knowledge should be scientifically valid.

This residual category is formulated for the immediate purposes in hand and its use is not to be held to imply that no distinctions between subclasses of nonempirical ideas are important for any other purposes.

There is a third class of ideas which may be called “imaginative.” The content of these refers to entities which are neither thought to be existent nor does the actor feel any obligation to realize them. Examples would be a utopia which is not meant as defining a program of action, or the creation of an entirely fictitious series of situations in a novel. At least the most obvious significance of such ideas in relation to action is as indices of the sentiments and attitudes of the actors rather than as themselves playing a positive role. To inquire whether indirectly they do play a role would raise questions beyond the scope of this paper and they will be ignored in the subsequent discussion. They are mentioned here only to complete the classification.

Much of this analysis is discussed in The Structure of Social Action. See esp. chap. 4, 161 ff.; chap. 5, 180 ff.; chap. 9, 344 ff.

“Efficiency” involves choice among two or more alternative ways of attaining an end. The validity of knowledge alone is not a sufficient criterion to determine the relative efficiency
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Valid empirical knowledge in this sense is certainly a system of ideas. It consists of concepts and propositions and their logical interrelations. Moreover, in all the above analyses of action, this knowledge is treated as a variable in the system of action; according to variations in its specific content, the action will be different. In explaining, above all, failure for the actual course of action to conform with a rational norm describing the “best” course, we continually refer to features of the store of knowledge of the actor. We say “He did not know . . .” with the implication that if he had, he would have acted differently, and “He supposed erroneously that . . .,” with the corresponding implication that if he had not been in error on the level of knowledge, he would also have acted differently. Thus, two of the coordinates of variation of knowledge which are relevant to its role in action are that in the direction of ignorance and of error. There is, for the attainment of any given end in any given situation, a certain minimum of valid knowledge which is adequate. If the knowledge actually falls short of this, if the actor is ignorant of any important features of the situation, or if his ideas are invalid, are in error, this is an adequate explanation of the failure of his action to be rational.

The analytical scheme in which the role of valid empirical knowledge in this sense has been most highly elaborated and conceptually refined is economic theory. Knowledge is a basically important variable in the system of economic theory, and he who would radically deny a role in action to ideas must find a satisfactory alternative explanation of all the uniformities of human action which have been established by two centuries of economic analysis, or demonstrate that the supposed uniformities do not exist.

But exactly the same thing is true of what we ordinarily call technology. The very processes of technological change to which many of our “materialists” assign so fundamental a role are in part a function of knowledge, i.e., of ideas, in exactly the same sense in which economic processes are. And there, far more than in the narrowly economic realm, knowledge has become a variable which we think of as to a high degree autonomous. For it takes, to a large extent, the form of theoretically systematized scientific knowledge rather than common sense. Surely the development of modern aniline dyes, the radio, or alloy steels, cannot be understood without reference to the essentially autonomous developments of science on which they depend.

Marxian theory has, however, classed technology among the “material” factors in social change, while “ideas” form part of the superstructure. Whence does this peculiar procedure derive? Two important sources of it may be noted. In the first place, Marxian theory has neither a rigorous con-
cept of ideas, nor a classification of different kinds of ideas. Hence, when those ideas which Marxians habitually term "ideologies" behave differently from the scientific basis of technology, they tend to ignore the fact that the latter is also made up of ideas, and generalize the behavior of the former into that of ideas in general. Secondly, Marxian theory rests on an analytical basis essentially different from that which is the starting point of the present discussion. For it, the total concrete structure of the industrial enterprise is a "factor," technology, social organization and all. The present attempt is to break down entities like this into simpler elements, the classification of which cuts across the Marxian dichotomy of "ideal" and "material" factors. There is no inherent reason why the Marxian choice of variables should be ultimate. The only scientific test as between it and another, such as that under discussion here, is the pragmatic one, which is the more illuminating in the understanding of certain empirical problems.

Every human society possesses a considerable stock of empirically valid knowledge, both of the nonhuman environment in which its members act, and of themselves, and of each other. That this knowledge is empirical and not theoretically systematized in the sense of modern science does not alter the fact. Moreover, a very large part of the action of the members of all societies is to be understood in terms of this knowledge. Lévy-Bruhl's theory that primitive men do not think logically has, so far as it bears upon this point, been definitely discredited.®

But in addition to ideas which will stand the test of scientific validity, there are current in every society many ideas which in one respect or another diverge from this standard. So far as their reference is existential rather than normative or imaginative, the question arises as to what is the basis of this divergence. In answer to this question, a certain positivistic bias is very widely prevalent, and must be guarded against. It is the view, implicit or explicit, that divergence from the standard of empirical verifiability is always and necessarily a matter of empirical shortcomings in the sense that the ideas in question are not only, negatively, not verifiable, but that they can be shown to be positively wrong, that is, that the basis of their unverifiability is ignorance or error, or both. This judgment clearly implies that there is available an adequate positive scientific standard by which to judge them.

At least in the field of empirically known systems of existential ideas, it can be stated with confidence that this class, which may be called unscientific ideas, does not exhaust the departures from empirical verifiability, but that, in addition, there is a class of concepts and propositions which are unverifiable, not because they are erroneous, but because, as Pareto put it, they "surpass experience." Such ideas as that the universe is divided be-

between a good and an evil principle, that souls go through an unending series of reincarnations, that the only escape from sin is by divine grace, are in this category. They are nonscientific rather than unscientific.  

What, then, can be said about the role of such nonscientific ideas? So far as they are existential rather than normative or imaginative in character, there are certain formal similarities with empirical, scientifically valid ideas. The latter may, in one aspect, be considered as mechanisms of orientation of the actor to his situation. Insofar as man is treated as a purposive being, attempting rationally to attain ends, he cannot be considered as fully oriented to his situation until, among other things, he has adequate knowledge of the situation in the respects which are relevant to the attainment of the ends in question, or other functionally equivalent mechanisms.

But the role of existential ideas has so far been considered only in one context, that of the basis of choice of means to given ends. There is in addition the necessity of cognitive orientation of another sort, an answer to the problem of justification of the ends which are in fact pursued.  

If the justifications men give of why they should pursue their ultimate ends are systematically and inductively studied, one fact about them stands out. One very prominent component of all known comprehensive social systems of such justifications must be classed as nonempirical. The more the attempt is made to state the explicit or implicit major premises of such arguments clearly and sharply, the more evident it becomes that they are metaphysical rather than scientific propositions. This, I maintain, is true of all known social systems; whether it is ultimately possible to eliminate these nonempirical elements is not a relevant question in the present context.

But the mere demonstration that a certain class of phenomena exists does not prove that their description involves, for the purposes in hand, important variables. The question is not whether nonempirical existential ideas are always to be found in social systems, but whether important

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7 I do not wish to maintain that this distinction possesses ontological significance. To do so would be to alter the plane of the discussion of this paper, which has set out to adhere to the scientific level. Inevitably, the basis of the distinction must be found in current standards of scientific methodology. From this point of view, a nonempirical proposition is one, not only which cannot, because of practical difficulties, be verified with present techniques, but which involves, in the strict operational sense, "meaningless" questions, questions which cannot, in the present state of our scientific and methodological knowledge, be answered by a conceivable operation or combination of them. Whether, at some future time, a completely positivistic philosophy will be capable of demonstration is another question. But I should like to point out that objection to this distinction usually involves the positivistic philosophical position; it is arbitrarily laid down that all departures from the standard of empirical verifiability must be in terms of ignorance and error. The position taken here is such that the burden of proof is on him who would object to the distinction. It is his task to show empirically that what have here been called unscientific and nonscientific ideas in fact do not stand in different relations to action. This shifts the argument from the methodological to the factual plane.

8 On this problem, see Structure of Social Action, chap. 5, 205 ff.
features of these social systems can be shown to be functions of variations in the content of these ideas. How is this problem to be attacked?

Most attempts in this field have been couched in terms of the historical or genetic method alone. Of course the only possible causal factors in the genesis of any particular state of affairs are components of particular antecedent states of affairs in the same sequence. But even then causal relationship can be demonstrated only by the use of general concepts and generalized knowledge of uniformities. The question here at issue does not touch the explanation of particular facts, but the establishment of uniformities. The only possible procedure by which this can be done in our field is comparative method which permits the isolation of variables. It is the strict logical counterpart of experiment. One important reason for the unsatisfactory character of the discussion of these problems revolving about Marxism is the fact that it has been almost uniformly couched in genetic, historical terms, as the Marxian theory itself is, and analytical generalizations as to the role of ideas cannot in principle be either proved or disproved by such a method. Hence the indeterminate issue of the controversy.

By far the most significant empirical studies available in this particular field are those of Max Weber in the sociology of religion. Weber was interested in a particular problem of historical imputation, that of the relative role of "material" factors and of the religious ideas of certain branches of Protestantism in the genesis of what he called rational bourgeois capitalism. But Weber's methodological insight showed him that, in the absence of well established general uniformities touching the role of ideas, it was hopeless to attack the problem by more and more elaborate genetic studies of the immediate historical background of modern capitalism. So he turned to the comparative method, the study of the influence of variations in the content of religious ideas.

A variable cannot, of course, be isolated unless other possibly important variables can, within a relevant range of variation, either be held constant or their independence demonstrated. Weber attempted to deal with this problem by showing that, in the different societies he treated, before the development of religious ideas in which he is interested, the state of the material factors and their prospective autonomous trends of development was, in the relevant respects, essentially similar. That is, for instance, in his three best worked out cases, those of China, India, and Western Europe, he attempted to estimate the relative favorableness or unfavorableness of the economic situations, the "conditions of production," to a capitalistic

9 "Factors" in the sense of concrete events or states of affairs, or parts or aspects of them, not of generalized, analytical elements like "mass" or "ideas." The two are often confused. See Structure of Social Action, chap. 16, 610 ff.

10 Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie. 3 vols. The most comprehensive secondary accounts in English are in L. L. Bennion, Max Weber's Methodology, and Structure of Social Action, chaps. 14 and 15.
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development. The outcome of his studies in this respect was the judgment that there is a high degree of similarity in all three societies in this respect, with, if anything, a balance of favorableness in favor of India and China. But the fact remains that only in Europe did the development of capitalism actually take place. What accounts for the radically different outcomes in the three civilizations? It is a fact that the development of religious ideas in the three cases took a quite different course. In relation to this variable, an adequate range of variation to account for the differentiation is demonstrable, whereas in the case of the material factors it is not. This places the burden of proof on him who would advance a materialistic explanation. He must show that differentiating elements on this level were present of which Weber did not take account.

However, Weber did not leave his account of the role of religious ideas at this point. In terms of a more generalized conceptual scheme, the “theory of action,” or his “Verstehende Soziologie,” he analyzed certain mechanisms by which ideas can and do exert an influence on action. On the basis of this analysis, he worked out what is the probable effect on certain aspects of secular social life of adherence to each of the dominant systems of religious ideas, Confucianism, Hinduism and Protestantism, and found these deductions verified in that the actual facts corresponded, as seen in comparative perspective, with expectations in terms of reasoning from this hypothesis.

He further strengthened his case by working out, in an elaborate analysis of evidence from various sources in terms of his conceptual scheme, an understanding of many of the specific mechanisms of the process by which this influence has probably been exerted and verified this analysis in considerable detail.

The result of this very comprehensive comparative study in all these phases was not only to build up a strong case for his original historical thesis, that the ideas of ascetic Protestantism actually did play an important causal role in the genesis of modern capitalism. It also resulted in the formulation of a generalized theory of the role of nonempirical existential ideas in relation to action. It is this which is of primary interest here.

It was not Weber’s view that religious ideas constitute the principal driving force in the determination of the relevant kinds of action. This role is rather played by what he called religious interests. A typical example is the interest in salvation, an interest which has in turn a complex derivation from, among other things, certain stresses and strains to which individuals are sometimes subjected in social situations where frustration of their worldly ends seems inevitable and founded in the nature of things. But the mere interest in salvation alone is not enough. The question

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11 This part of Weber’s work was not methodologically completely rigorous, but allowance for this does not affect his general conclusions.
arises as to what kinds of specific action it will motivate. This, Weber’s comparative analysis shows, will be very different according to the structure of the existential religious ideas according to which the individual achieves cognitive orientation to the principal nonempirical problems he faces in his situation.

For example, on the basis of the generally immanent, pantheistic conception of divinity of Indian philosophy, and more specifically of the doctrines of Karma and Transmigration, to seek salvation in a radical sense through concrete achievement in worldly spheres would be meaningless. If such action contravened the traditional order, it would be reprehensible for that reason and set the actor back on his quest for salvation; if not, it could only generate more Karma and lead to endless rebirths. The only meaning of salvation is escape from the “wheel of Karma” in completely otherworldly mystical and ascetic exercises. For the Calvinist, on the other hand, mystical union with the divine is entirely excluded by the absolute transcendentality of God. He has been placed in this world to do God’s will in the building of the Kingdom. His eternal fate is settled by Predestination, but he can become certain of salvation through proving his faith by active labor in the vineyard, by doing God’s will.

The function of religious ideas is, in relation to the interest in salvation, to “define the situation,” to use W. I. Thomas’ term. Only by reference to these ideas is it possible to understand, concretely, what specific forms of action are relevant to attainment of salvation, or certainty of it. Weber succeeded in showing that rational, systematic, workmanlike labor in a worldly calling has had this significance to ardent believers in Calvinism and related religious movements, whereas it would be totally meaningless to a believer in Karma and Transmigration on a pantheistic background no matter how strong his interest in salvation. In this sense, the content of the religious ideas is a significant variable in the determination of the concrete course of action.

So far discussion has been confined to the role of existential ideas. These have been dealt with in two quite different contexts. Empirical ideas have been analyzed in their relation to the problem of selection of means according to the norm of rationality. Nonempirical ideas, on the other hand, have been treated in relation to the teleological problem of orientation of the actor, the justification of selection of ends to pursue. There is a gap between these two treatments which must now be filled. Selection of means has no significance except in relation to ends, while what has been called teleological orientation is equally meaningless unless there is, facing actors, a problem of choice between alternative ends.

Indeed the whole analytical procedure which has here been followed implies that a fundamental role in action is played by normative elements.12

12 The problem of the significance of normative elements in action is extensively treated throughout the Structure of Social Action.
In the first place, analysis of the underlying assumptions involved in treatment of empirical knowledge as an independent variable in the choice of means has shown that both a positive role of ends, and the existence of determinate relations of ends in a more or less well integrated system are essential to the attribution of causal importance to knowledge. Rational action, in the sense of action guided by valid knowledge, is at the same time action which is normatively oriented. Similarly, the definition of the situation with reference to religious interests could have no meaning apart from the contention that it made a difference to the course of action what ends, among the various alternatives, were chosen.

Not only is action normatively oriented in the sense of pursuing ends, it is also subject to certain normative conditions, to rules which guide it. For instance, in pursuing the end of closing a profitable deal, a businessman may consider himself subject to the condition that it shall be done "honestly." From some points of view, such rules may be considered themselves as ends, but they are not the immediate ends of the course of action under analysis. They appear rather as considerations limiting the acceptable range of alternative means, choice among which is to be guided by considerations of rational efficiency.

Now both ends and guiding norms involve a cognitive element, an element of ideas, however little the normative pattern may be exhausted in these terms. That such an element is involved may be brought out by considering the implications of the questions which are inevitably asked when we try to understand action in terms of such normative elements. "What is the end . . ." of a given course of action; for instance, what is meant by making a profitable deal, or "what do you mean . . ." by the norm to which a course of action is subject, for instance, by honesty in making a deal? It is obvious that the answers to all questions must be in the form of propositions, that is, of ideas. But in this case, ideas are in some sense imputed, not only to the sociological observer of action, but to the actor himself. It is a question not of what honesty means to the observer, but to the actor. It means, for instance, among other things, that he should not attempt to get the other party's consent to the deal by making statements about his product as true which he knows to be false.

The essential point for present purposes is that, in so far as analysis of action in terms of orientation to ends and norms is scientifically useful at all, it implies two things. 1. That it is possible to impute to the actor with adequate precision for the purposes in hand, not only a "will" to attain certain ends or conform with certain norms, but a content of those ends and norms which is capable of formulation as a set of ideas. 2. That variations in this content stand in functional relations to the facts of the system of action other than the system of ideas of the actor.

Whether normative ideas constitute a variable independent of others in the system of action, is to be tested by essentially the same kind of proce-
dure which was outlined in the case of Weber’s treatment of religious ideas. Weber himself showed that it is a variable in part dependent on non-empirical ideas. This would make it, insofar, relatively independent of “material” factors. But at the same time, there is no essential reason why an important range of variability independent in turn of metaphysical and religious ideas does not exist.

The foregoing analysis of the role of ideas in action has been presented in general terms, with appeal to generally known facts, and to two bodies of technically specific evidence, that employed in economic and technological analyses of rational action, and in Max Weber’s studies of the role of religious ideas. It is impossible within the limits of such a paper to detail any significant sample of the enormous mass of empirical evidence, from these and other sources, which supports the main lines of the analysis. I should not, however, like to close without mentioning one other set of considerations which seem to me greatly to strengthen the case for my thesis.

It has already been remarked that demonstration of causal relationship in any particular historical sequence cannot be derived from observation of the facts of that particular sequence alone; it is necessary to be able to apply to these facts generalized theoretical knowledge derived from comparative analysis of a series of different particular situations. Only by this procedure can variables be isolated and the functional relationships of their values be worked out and verified.

Hence the problem of the role of ideas cannot be treated adequately in terms of ad hoc recitation of the facts of certain examples. It involves systematic theoretical analysis of action, of the relation of the same variables to many different concrete situations. In both the two cases which have been most fully analyzed above, the theorems relative to the role of ideas are not isolated, but are an integral part of more comprehensive bodies of theory. Thus the analysis of the role of empirical ideas in rational action may be regarded as an application to this particular problem of one of the most highly developed bodies of generalized theoretical knowledge in the social field, economic theory. This has the effect of greatly strengthening the evidence for the particular theorem, for it is verified not only directly with reference to the kind of facts here discussed, but indirectly in that it is logically interdependent with all the other theorems of economic science. So far as they are mutually interdependent, the facts which support any one serve also to verify the others.

In the case of religious ideas, there is no such generally recognized and used body of theory into which the results of Weber’s empirical studies can be fitted. But it has already been remarked that Weber himself did in fact develop a body of such theory to a high degree of systematization in the course of his studies. The theoretical structure he developed is, in his own work, applicable to, and verified in terms of, many other problems
than that of the role of ideas. But more than this. My own recently pub-
lished analysis of certain phases of the development of social theory in the
last generation has shown that in these theoretical results Weber con-
verged with remarkable exactitude and detail on a structure in all essentials
like that developed by other theorists with quite different starting points
and empirical interests. In particular Durkheim, whose interest was not
specifically in the problem of the role of ideas at all, but in the basis of
social solidarity, arrived at a set of categories in the field of religion which
corresponds point for point with that of Weber. Weber's theoretical analysis
of the role of nonempirical ideas is in fact part of a much broader system of
analytical social theory, the emergence of which can be traced in a number
of sources quite independent of Weber.

Moreover not only did Weber, Durkheim, and others converge on this
particular part of a theoretical system, dealing mainly with religion, but as,
among other things, very important parts of the work of both men show,
this common scheme of the sociology of religion is in turn part of a still
broader theoretical system which includes the economic and technological
analysis of the role of empirical knowledge in relation to rationality of
action. Both sets of problems belong together, and are part of the same
more generalized analysis of human action.14

13 The Structure of Social Action. See esp. chaps. 17 and 18.

14 The case of Pareto is particularly interesting in this respect. Pareto has been very widely
heralded as one of the major prophets of anti-intellectualism, as one of the principal social
thearists who radically denied an important role to ideas. Did he not lay particular emphasis
on "nonlogical action"?

To those who have followed the above argument closely, two facts should make one
suspicious of this interpretation. First, Pareto was well trained in economic theory, and in so
far as he attributes importance to the elements it analyzes, to the "interests," he must,
ibso facto attribute importance to ideas. But not only this; he makes the conception of ration-
ality in precisely the technological-economic sense the starting point of his own broader
analysis of action. Nonlogical action is precisely action insofar as it cannot be understood in
terms of this standard of rationality.

It turns out on analysis that his main theoretical scheme as such involves no theorem at all
as to the role of ideas, except empirical existential ideas. His actual thesis is, not that other
ideas have no role, but that beyond the range of applicability of this kind of conception of
rationality or logical action, the ideas which do have a role cannot claim empirical scientific
validity. But in his actual treatment there is much evidence that he attributes a very impor-
tant role to nonempirical existential and normative ideas. This conclusion is strongly confirmed
by the circumstance that Pareto's general conceptual scheme converges in all essential respects
with the broader more general theoretical structure of which I have spoken, which may also be
found in the works of Max Weber and Durkheim. It would indeed be strange, in the light of
this fact, if there were a radical disagreement between them on so basic a theorem as that of the
role of ideas.

The interpretation of Pareto as a radical anti-intellectualist appears to arise mainly from
two sources. On the one hand, there is, in the formulation of his approach to the analysis of
action, a source of anti-intellectualistic bias (Structure of Social Action, 272, Note 1), which
does not, however, play any substantive part in the main theoretical structure. This is indicative
of the fact that his own theory was imperfectly integrated, and there are, underlying this,
currents of thought which tend in this direction. But more important than this basis in
Pareto's own work is the fact that the great majority of Pareto's interpreters have ap-
To conclude. The actual controversy over the role of ideas has been much more a battle of the implications of rival philosophical and other extrascientific points of view than it has been the result of careful, empirical analysis of the facts. I suggest that leaving these philosophical considerations aside and embarking on such careful study will very probably result in much reduction of the difference of opinion. The thesis put forward in this paper seems to me not only to fit very important bodies of well established and carefully analyzed facts. It also fits in with a body of generalized theoretical knowledge of human social action, which has already accumulated a heavy weight of scientific authority behind it in a large number of different factual fields. This seems to me to justify taking the positive role of ideas as a working hypothesis for further empirical research. The result of such research will, as always, be to modify the formulations of the problem, and of theorems which appear to be verified, from forms which seemed acceptable when the research process began. But such modification is not “refutation” of a theory; it is the normal course of scientific progress to which the superseded theory itself makes an essential contribution.

proached his work with an interpretive bias which enormously exaggerates the importance of these tendencies. The source of this bias is the fact that interpretation has been predominantly in terms of a positivistic system of general social theory. See Structure of Social Action, chaps. 5–7.
THE MEANS-END SCHEMA IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY*

ROBERT BIERSTEDT
Columbia University

In an intellectual climate where philosophers clamor for the ab- lutes of medieval metaphysics, where astronomers turn from the stars to peer into their own souls, and where physicists compare notes on the intimations of immortality, it should perhaps elicit no surprise that many sociologists too have renounced the positivistic tradition and have attempted to converse in more intimate terms about the nature of social man and his social action. These sociologists seldom deny that the human individual is a biological organism, but they contend that it is much more important to consider him as an enduring self or mind, an evaluating creature who strives to satisfy his heart's desires and his ego's ambitions. The history of humanity to them is the story of the strife of ideals, of a perennial quest for attainable and unattainable ends, of efforts to discover or invent means to attain these ends, and of a participation in social action whose structure, accordingly, can best be read and interpreted in terms of means and ends. Those who revolt against the positivistic tradition believe that these concepts possess an inner meaning for sociology and that sociologists who neglect them altogether commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, 1 surrender the only task which justifies the independent existence of sociology, and shirk a responsibility which gives social significance to the study of social science. Consequently, they substitute voluntaristic theories of social action for the deterministic facts of physiological psychology, and supply conceptual schemata which reputedly help sociologists to understand social meanings, social values, and social relationships in a manner to which positivistic theories can only unsuccessfully aspire. Among these nonpositivistic conceptual schemes which now pervade the analytical recesses of sociological theory, probably none plays so prominent a role as the means-end schema, the conceptual core of a voluntaristic theory of action which, it is claimed, emerged from the positivistic tradition in the work of Pareto and Durkheim and from the idealistic tradition in the work of Max Weber. This paper is an attempt to examine the efficacy of this schema for a scientific investigation of human behavior.

It must be emphasized first, however, that no criticism of the use of

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* The writer expresses his appreciation to Read Bain, George A. Lundberg, and, paradoxically, Talcott Parsons for helpful suggestions.

1 For a discussion of this "fallacy" see A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 73-75, 81-86; L. J. Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology, 118-119; and Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, 29, 589, 753.
means and ends is implied insofar as they relate to problems of social welfare. If the science of sociology attains sufficient growth to enable it to dictate purpose, policy, or program in the sphere of practical affairs, no one can question that its recommendations will be expressed in terms of means and ends. In these cases, the end usually will be given and it will be the function of the sociologist to discover the most efficient means for attaining it. Questions such as the following, for example, belong in this category: Is isolation or collective security the better means for attaining the end of peace for the United States? What is the best means for attaining the end of rehabilitating juvenile delinquents? Is the capitalistic system the best means to achieve an equitable distribution of wealth? Is sterilization the best means of eliminating the biologically unfit? These examples, and many more without limit, indicate that insofar as sociologists minister to the needs of an American culture and insofar as their recommendations may help to alleviate its stresses and strains, means and ends will be utilized implicitly or explicitly, and rightly so. At the same time, probably few sociologists would contend that the effective use of such words as "means" and "ends" in this sphere has much in common with a means-end schema constructed as a conceptual tool for the theoretical analysis of social behavior. The same consideration applies to problems of scientific policy. For example, no inconsistency would appear in the statement that the means-end schema is not the proper "means" to attain the "end" of scientific objectivity in sociology, the very proposition, in fact, which this paper attempts to demonstrate.

The postulates which underlie the means-end schema may be enumerated briefly. Most of its apologists insist, as rigidly as any positivist, that social science use all of the observational and mensurational techniques available. They claim that they respect the necessity for the objectification of social data and that their results are derived in such a way as to be consistent with the most stringent methodological criteria. They resist attempts to indict them as opponents of whatever objective instruments have been developed for the advancement of sociological research, whether these instruments be observation, measurement, statistics, symbolic logic, or anything else.

They do, however, break away from the positivistic tradition when they contend that objective categories do not suffice for the analysis of social action and that additional subjective categories must be employed. The difference may be illustrated most conveniently, perhaps, by suggesting that to protagonists of the voluntaristic theory of action, man is a rational agent endowed with a mind which has the power to choose one of a number

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2 For an excellent account of the role of the social sciences in contemporary American culture, see the Stafford Little Lectures, delivered at Princeton University, March 21-24, 1938, by Robert S. Lynd. The lectures will be published by the Princeton University Press.
of alternative means to attain a given end of action. To a protagonist of a positivistic theory of action, on the other hand, man is a biological organism endowed with a nervous system which responds to the extra- and intra-organic stimuli which motivate the organism to behavior. The difference between voluntarism and positivism in these terms is the difference between a "science" of action which employs both objective and subjective categories and a science of behavior which restricts itself to objective categories. Voluntarists regard the inclusion of subjective categories as a prime requisite on the ground that the subjective aspects of action are so important that one neglects them only at the price of an unwakened methodological self-consciousness and of a pallid and anaemic sociological theory. Positivists concede the importance of the subjective aspects of action but assert that insofar as they are legitimate objects of scientific investigation they must be studied objectively in terms of observable, verifiable behavior and without recourse to such subjective categories as "mind." Indeed, in the interests of objectivity, communicability, and all the other canons of scientific method, positivists contend that subjective categories must be rigorously excluded from the analysis of behavior.

The means-end schema comprises subjective categories in this sense. According to a recent systematic exposition of the voluntaristic theory,\(^3\) human action must be regarded in some degree and under certain conditions as rational, and a rational act becomes, by definition, one in which the chosen means serves adequately to attain a given end. In other degrees and under other conditions, human action departs from this defined norm of rationality but in all cases the capacity for a rational choice of means is involved. Unit acts become the basic elements of analysis and they possess, as minimum characteristics (1) an end, (2) a situation to be analyzed in terms of means and conditions, and (3) a norm toward which the action is oriented. "Conditions" is the only objective category in this schema. The other three, end, means, and norm, are subjective by definition; that is, they refer to the point of view of the actor rather than to that of the observer, and they have meaning only on the postulate that a human individual has a mind, is a free agent, and can choose one of a number of alternative means to attain his end. "Means," of course, as sharply distinguished from "conditions," refers to the active agency of the actor. The actor, however, is to be considered not as an organism or as a spatio-temporal configuration, but as an "ego" or "self":

A still further consequence follows from the 'subjectivity' of the categories of the theory of action. When a biologist or a behavioristic psychologist studies a human being it is as an organism, a spatially distinguishable separate unit in the world. The unit of reference which we are considering as the actor is not this organism but an 'ego' or 'self.' The principal importance of this consideration is that the body of the actor forms, for him, just as much part of the situation of action as does the 'external environment.' Among the conditions to which his

\(^3\) Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action. See esp. chap. 2.
action is subject are those relating to his own body, while among the most important of the means at his disposal are the 'powers' of his own body and, of course, his 'mind.' The analytical distinction between actor and situation quite definitely cannot be identified with the distinction in the biological sciences between organism and environment.  

An end is an intrinsically subjective concept and bears only a residual application to the actual result of a unit act. Indeed, as recently defined, it is, in the concrete sense, "the total anticipated future state of affairs, so far as it is relevant to the action frame of reference," and, in the analytical sense, "the difference between the anticipated future state of affairs and that which it could have been predicted would ensue from the initial situation without the agency of the actor having intervened." All of these definitions deserve notice because they throw the whole means-end schema unequivocally over to the subjective pole of action where it becomes correspondingly vulnerable. Various other characteristics should perhaps be discussed, such as, for example, the exclusion of the space category, but these will suggest its general nature.

One of the first considerations to arouse the scepticism of a critic of the means-end schema is its excessively deductive character. From a few well assorted though questionable premises about human nature and the human mind, a general system builds itself by conceptual accretion into a voluntaristic theory of action. The system generates its own concepts which require further clarification; this clarification, in turn, generates more concepts, and so on, ending in a relatively autonomous congeries of deductive propositions whose nexus with the empirical world grows proportionately more vaporous. No one questions the impossibility of divorcing induction from deduction in sociological theory. At the same time, it may perhaps be permissible to question the utility of long chains of deductive reasoning by the recall of certain historical illustrations. Hegel, for example, proved with incontrovertible logic that seven was the only possible number of planets,—and published his "proof" one week before the discovery of the eighth. Johannes Müller proved in exemplary fashion the impossibility of measuring the speed of a nerve impulse shortly before Helmholtz measured it. At the turn of the century, Henri Poincaré proved with impeccable mathematics that aviation was theoretically impossible, that men could not and never would be able to fly through the air.

At what point, then, does deduction become suspect? Precisely at the point where the concepts which comprise the propositions of deductive analytical systems cease to have referents in the empirical world or when they are not universals for particulars with such referents. One can have nothing but applause and encouragement for the processes of analytical

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4 Ibid., 46-47. 5 Ibid., 48. 6 Ibid., 49.
7 See ibid., 45, note, where Parsons states that relations in space are not relevant to systems of action "analytically considered."
abstraction, especially when they lead to integrated and systematic sociological theory. A surfeit of analytical abstraction, however, becomes a form of logical prestidigitation which destroys the nexus between an abstract schema and empirical content and leads ultimately to hypostasis and word magic.

If the means-end schema has any one defect more serious than others, it would seem to be the absence of empirical referents for its concepts, referents which have some form of existence in the empirical world and which are susceptible of sensory observation and measurement. The positivistic tradition, from which contemporary science has never severed its connection (except when careful scientists become careless philosophers) requires as the very minimum criterion of a concept that it be reducible to referents which can directly be related to sense-experience or be reached by empirical operations. Ends and means by definition fail to satisfy this criterion. They are not sensory objects to which an investigator can respond. They do not express relations between objects which can be verified independently by other observers. They cannot become a part of the sense-experience of a sociologist engaged in the study of social action. They are not universals the particulars of which are capable of sense-experience. They are not data because they never can be stimuli to sense-experience, and, in spite of all indictments of the positivistic tradition, sense experiences of nonsymbolic objects continue to be the data of science. It is true, of course, that an investigator can respond to the words "means" and "ends," just as he can respond to unicorns, angels, nonsense syllables, and round squares. It is also true that valid syllogisms can be constructed around such words. Without empirical referents, however, the words are merely symbols which play spurious roles in scientific intercourse. Although the manufacturers of these voluntaristic conceptual schemes protest that they "stand squarely on the platform of science," until they supply empirical referents for their concepts they have a "science" without concrete existential entities susceptible of the sense-experience which is the prime criterion of science.

Without laboring this point at greater detail, it may be suggested that translation of the concepts of the means-end schema into another conceptual scheme which does refer to an empirical content would facilitate its introduction into scientific discourse. If ends could be identified with psychological motivations or physiological drives or organic needs, they would at once become the proper objects of scientific study. No one, of course, and no science, has been able to perform this job satisfactorily up to the present time. The possibility of its performance, however, is extremely remote when an end is defined as "the difference between the anticipated future state of affairs and that which it could have been predicted would
ensue from the initial situation without the agency of the actor having intervened." Means, also, could have been construed synonymously with environmental and organic conditions, perhaps, but Parsons' exposition of the means-end schema blocks any such identification and contains instead a discussion of means in terms of the powers of the mind. It may be significant that both "powers" and "mind" appear in quotation marks. In fact, when the actor in a social situation is identified not with an individual human organism but with a nonemprical "ego" or "self" or "mind" which is not "a spatially distinguishable separate unit in the world," the reclamation of the means-end schema for scientific purposes grows exceedingly difficult.

All of these concepts and subjective categories could escape positivistic criticism if the proponents of the means-end schema would concede the desirability of translating them into objective categories consistent with the conceptual schemata of, for example, the biological sciences, or any others which retain the virtues of observability and verifiability. When, however, they define these concepts in such a way as to contradict the possibility of such consistency and when they state that "A knowledge of psychology is a knowledge of 'the mind' and not merely of behavior," they effectively eliminate the means-end schema from consideration both as a useful instrument for sociological research and as a valid generalization for sociological theory.

Sociology as a natural science can have no commerce with an "ego" or "self" which is not identical with the living biological organism, or at least which is not a symbol derived from sense experience of such an organism. To construct such a nontemporal, nonspatial, nonsensory "self" for the purposes of analytical abstraction is to remove "its" social action from the sphere of science. When subjective categories refer to this kind of an actor, they cannot evade the charge of invalidity because of the insuperable difficulty, not to say empirical impossibility, of dealing objectively with phenomena as they appear from the point of view of an actor who is not an organism and who is not in space. The attempt to know the mind of such an actor and to delineate its powers is an epistemological venture, not a sociological one. The social action of an individual can be dissociated from his social behavior only on metaphysical grounds and at the price of playing dialectical dominoes with concepts which died a natural and not unwelcome death with the demise of faculty psychology.9

Two or three other difficulties inherent in the means-end schema may be mentioned without elaboration. First, the extravagant emphasis upon the

9 Ibid., 85.

8 For a clear contrast between the social system criticized here and one unexceptionably free from any subjective or idealistic taint compare, for instance, the work of Max Weber and his disciples with the work of George Herbert Mead, especially the latter's Mind, Self, and Society, and The Philosophy of the Act.
question of the rationality of social action is not only scientifically irrelevant but it tends to obscure the fact that the more rationality is imputed to individuals, the more irrational the explanation of their behavior becomes. Second, the human penchant for post factum rationalization of the ends and means of action should give ample warning of the practical impossibility of explaining a given unit act in terms of the means which the actor says he has employed for the attainment of ends he says he had in "mind." What the actor says about his action is no better and is almost always less reliable than what the observer could have learned simply by watching the action.\textsuperscript{10} Even where the rationalized motives to which individuals attribute their action become important problems for investigation, as they do in many fields of sociological research, it is difficult to defend the application of a voluntaristic means-end schema. Finally, in spite of a highly complex superstructure, the means-end schema actually represents an oversimplification, an appeal to a popular rather than to a scientific psychology. When an individual reports to a sociologist that he has chosen certain means for the attainment of a certain end, the sociologist most urgently needs to know the factors which would cause large numbers of individuals to aspire to this end in the first place and to choose this particular means of attaining it in the second. Without this knowledge, sociology represents little more than popular or commonsense description of phenomena which require scientific explanation. Sociology thus surrenders the opportunity of disclosing valid generalizations about human behavior.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the conclusion seems inevitable that the means-end schema violates most of the canons and repudiates most of the criteria of objective scientific methodology. Certainly the time has come to cut the apron strings which in such schemata still bind sociology to her philosophic majesty, \textit{Mater Scientiarum}, and to replace these arid play-grounds of fancy with the fertile fields of fact. For sociologists to ignore the factual contributions of modern psychology and physiology and to attempt to analyze human behavior with antiquated conceptual instruments is to encourage the multiplication of conceptual schemes which, however logically impeccable, aesthetically irresistible, and methodologically inviting, give the lie to the unity of science and make impossible any objective study of social action.

\textsuperscript{10} E. B. Holt discussed this problem long ago in his \textit{Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics}, and came to a conclusion of which the above sentence may be regarded as a paraphrase.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ANOMIE

ROBERT K. MERTON
Harvard University

There persists a notable tendency in sociological theory to attribute the malfunctioning of social structure primarily to those of man's imperious biological drives which are not adequately restrained by social control. In this view, the social order is solely a device for "impulse management" and the "social processing" of tensions. These impulses which break through social control, be it noted, are held to be biologically derived. Nonconformity is assumed to be rooted in original nature. Conformity is by implication the result of an utilitarian calculus or unreasoned conditioning. This point of view, whatever its other deficiencies, clearly begs one question. It provides no basis for determining the nonbiological conditions which induce deviations from prescribed patterns of conduct. In this paper, it will be suggested that certain phases of social structure generate the circumstances in which infringement of social codes constitutes a "normal" response.¹

The conceptual scheme to be outlined is designed to provide a coherent, systematic approach to the study of socio-cultural sources of deviate behavior. Our primary aim lies in discovering how some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconformist rather than conformist conduct. The many ramifications of the scheme cannot all be discussed; the problems mentioned outnumber those explicitly treated.

Among the elements of social and cultural structure, two are important for our purposes. These are analytically separable although they merge imperceptibly in concrete situations. The first consists of culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests. It comprises a frame of aspirational reference. These goals are more or less integrated and involve varying degrees of prestige and sentiment. They constitute a basic, but not the exclusive, component of what Linton aptly has called "designs for group living." Some of these cultural aspirations are related to the original drives of man, but they are not determined by them. The second phase of the social

¹ E.g., Ernest Jones, Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis, 28, London, 1924. If the Freudian notion is a variety of the "original sin" dogma, then the interpretation advanced in this paper may be called the doctrine of "socially derived sin."

² "Normal" in the sense of a culturally oriented, if not approved, response. This statement does not deny the relevance of biological and personality differences which may be significantly involved in the incidence of deviate conduct. Our focus of interest is the social and cultural matrix; hence we abstract from other factors. It is in this sense, I take it, that James S. Plant speaks of the "normal reaction of normal people to abnormal conditions." See his Personality and the Cultural Pattern, 248, New York, 1937.
structure defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of achieving these goals. Every social group invariably couples its scale of desired ends with moral or institutional regulation of permissible and required procedures for attaining these ends. These regulatory norms and moral imperatives do not necessarily coincide with technical or efficiency norms. Many procedures which from the standpoint of particular individuals would be most efficient in securing desired values, e.g., illicit oil-stock schemes, theft, fraud, are ruled out of the institutional area of permitted conduct. The choice of expedients is limited by the institutional norms.

To say that these two elements, culture goals and institutional norms, operate jointly is not to say that the ranges of alternative behaviors and aims bear some constant relation to one another. The emphasis upon certain goals may vary independently of the degree of emphasis upon institutional means. There may develop a disproportionate, at times, a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of specific goals, involving relatively slight concern with the institutionally appropriate modes of attaining these goals. The limiting case in this direction is reached when the range of alternative procedures is limited only by technical rather than institutional considerations. Any and all devices which promise attainment of the all important goal would be permitted in this hypothetical polar case. This constitutes one type of cultural malintegration. A second polar type is found in groups where activities originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted into ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgotten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive. Stability is largely ensured while change is flouted. The range of alternative behaviors is severely limited. There develops a tradition-bound, sacred society characterized by neophobia. The occupational psychosis of the bureaucrat may be cited as a case in point. Finally, there are the intermediate types of groups where a balance between culture goals and institutional

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3 Contemporary American culture has been said to tend in this direction. See André Siegfried, America Comes of Age, 26–37, New York, 1927. The alleged extreme(?) emphasis on the goals of monetary success and material prosperity leads to dominant concern with technological and social instruments designed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as institutional controls become of secondary importance. In such a situation, innovation flourishes as the range of means employed is broadened. In a sense, then, there occurs the paradoxical emergence of "materialists" from an "idealistic" orientation. Cf. Durkheim's analysis of the cultural conditions which predispose toward crime and innovation, both of which are aimed toward efficiency, not moral norms. Durkheim was one of the first to see that "contrairement aux idées courantes le criminel n'apparaît plus comme un être radicalement insociable, comme une sorte d'élément parasitaire, de corps étranger et inassimilable, introduit au sein de la société; c'est un agent régulier de la vie sociale." See Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, 86–89, Paris, 1927.

4 Such ritualism may be associated with a mythology which rationalizes these actions so that they appear to retain their status as means, but the dominant pressure is in the direction of strict ritualistic conformity, irrespective of such rationalizations. In this sense, ritual has proceeded farthest when such rationalizations are not even called forth.
An effective equilibrium between the two phases of the social structure is maintained as long as satisfactions accrue to individuals who conform to both constraints, viz., satisfactions from the achievement of the goals and satisfactions emerging directly from the institutionally canalized modes of striving to attain these ends. Success, in such equilibrated cases, is twofold. Success is reckoned in terms of the product and in terms of the process, in terms of the outcome and in terms of activities. Continuing satisfactions must derive from sheer participation in a competitive order as well as from eclipsing one's competitors if the order itself is to be sustained. The occasional sacrifices involved in institutionalized conduct must be compensated by socialized rewards. The distribution of statuses and roles through competition must be so organized that positive incentives for conformity to roles and adherence to status obligations are provided for every position within the distributive order. Aberrant conduct, therefore, may be viewed as a symptom of dissociation between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means.

Of the types of groups which result from the independent variation of the two phases of the social structure, we shall be primarily concerned with the first, namely, that involving a disproportionate accent on goals. This statement must be recast in a proper perspective. In no group is there an absence of regulatory codes governing conduct, yet groups do vary in the degree to which these folkways, mores, and institutional controls are effectively integrated with the more diffuse goals which are part of the culture matrix. Emotional convictions may cluster about the complex of socially acclaimed ends, meanwhile shifting their support from the culturally defined implementation of these ends. As we shall see, certain aspects of the social structure may generate countermores and antisocial behavior precisely because of differential emphases on goals and regulations. In the extreme case, the latter may be so vitiating by the goal-emphasis that the range of behavior is limited only by considerations of technical expediency. The sole significant question then becomes, which available means is most efficient in netting the socially approved value? The technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process continues, the integration of the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues.

In this connection, one may see the relevance of Elton Mayo's paraphrase of the title of Tawney's well known book. "Actually the problem is not that of the sickness of an acquisitive society; it is that of the acquisitiveness of a sick society," Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization, 153, New York, 1933. Mayo deals with the process through which wealth comes to be a symbol of social achievement. He sees this as arising from a state of anomie. We are considering the unintegrated monetary-success goal as an element in producing anomie. A complete analysis would involve both phases of this system of interdependent variables.
Thus, in competitive athletics, when the aim of victory is shorn of its institutional trappings and success in contests becomes construed as "winning the game" rather than "winning through circumscribed modes of activity," a premium is implicitly set upon the use of illegitimate but technically efficient means. The star of the opposing football team is surreptitiously slugged; the wrestler furtively incapacitates his opponent through ingenious but illicit techniques; university alumni covertly subsidize "students" whose talents are largely confined to the athletic field. The emphasis on the goal has so attenuated the satisfactions deriving from sheer participation in the competitive activity that these satisfactions are virtually confined to a successful outcome. Through the same process, tension generated by the desire to win in a poker game is relieved by successfully dealing oneself four aces, or, when the cult of success has become completely dominant, by sagaciously shuffling the cards in a game of solitaire. The faint twinge of uneasiness in the last instance and the surreptitious nature of public delicts indicate clearly that the institutional rules of the game are known to those who evade them, but that the emotional supports of these rules are largely vitiated by cultural exaggeration of the success-goal. They are microcosmic images of the social macrocosm.

Of course, this process is not restricted to the realm of sport. The process whereby exaltation of the end generates a literal demoralization, i.e., a déinstitutionalization, of the means is one which characterizes many groups in which the two phases of the social structure are not highly integrated. The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth as a symbol of success in our own society militates against the completely effective control of institutionally regulated modes of acquiring a fortune. Fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscribed

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It is unlikely that interiorized norms are completely eliminated. Whatever residuum persists will induce personality tensions and conflict. The process involves a certain degree of ambivalence. A manifest rejection of the institutional norms is coupled with some latent retention of their emotional correlates. "Guilt feelings," "sense of sin," "pangs of conscience" are obvious manifestations of this unrelieved tension; symbolic adherence to the nominally repudiated values or rationalizations constitute a more subtle variety of tensional release.

"Many," and not all, unintegrated groups, for the reason already mentioned. In groups where the primary emphasis shifts to institutional means, i.e., when the range of alternatives is very limited, the outcome is a type of ritualism rather than anomie.

Money has several peculiarities which render it particularly apt to become a symbol of prestige divorced from institutional controls. As Simmel emphasized, money is highly abstract and impersonal. However acquired, through fraud or institutionally, it can be used to purchase the same goods and services. The anonymity of metropolitan culture, in conjunction with this peculiarity of money, permits wealth, the sources of which may be unknown to the community in which the plutocrat lives, to serve as a symbol of status.

The emphasis upon wealth as a success-symbol is possibly reflected in the use of the term "fortune" to refer to a stock of accumulated wealth. This meaning becomes common in the late sixteenth century (Spenser and Shakespeare). A similar usage of the Latin *fortuna* comes into prominence during the first century B.C. Both these periods were marked by the rise to prestige and power of the "bourgeoisie."
behavior, becomes increasingly common when the emphasis on the culturally induced success-goal becomes divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis. This observation is of crucial theoretical importance in examining the doctrine that antisocial behavior most frequently derives from biological drives breaking through the restraints imposed by society. The difference is one between a strictly utilitarian interpretation which conceives man’s ends as random and an analysis which finds these ends deriving from the basic values of the culture.10

Our analysis can scarcely stop at this juncture. We must turn to other aspects of the social structure if we are to deal with the social genesis of the varying rates and types of deviate behavior characteristic of different societies. Thus far, we have sketched three ideal types of social orders constituted by distinctive patterns of relations between culture ends and means. Turning from these types of culture patterning, we find five logically possible, alternative modes of adjustment or adaptation by individuals within the culture-bearing society or group.11 These are schematically presented in the following table, where (+) signifies “acceptance,” (—) signifies “elimination” and (+) signifies “rejection and substitution of new goals and standards.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture Goals</th>
<th>Institutionalized Means</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Conformity</td>
<td>+ m u s h c o m m o n +</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Innovation</td>
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<td>III. Ritualism</td>
<td>- y e t d e v o p d + n e w m a n t a i n</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV. Retreatism</td>
<td>- l e a s t v a d. -</td>
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<tr>
<td>V. Rebellion</td>
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Our discussion of the relation between these alternative responses and other phases of the social structure must be prefaced by the observation that persons may shift from one alternative to another as they engage in different social activities. These categories refer to role adjustments in specific situations, not to personality in toto. To treat the development of this process in various spheres of conduct would introduce a complexity unmanageable within the confines of this paper. For this reason, we shall be concerned primarily with economic activity in the broad sense, “the


11 This is a level intermediate between the two planes distinguished by Edward Sapir; namely, culture patterns and personal habit systems. See his “Contribution of Psychiatry to an Understanding of Behavior in Society,” Amer. J. Social., 1937, 42:662–70.

12 This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different from that of the others. It represents a transitional response which seeks to institutionalize new procedures oriented toward revamped cultural goals shared by the members of the society. It thus involves efforts to change the existing structure rather than to perform accommodative actions within this structure, and introduces additional problems with which we are not at the moment concerned.
production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services" in our competitive society, wherein wealth has taken on a highly symbolic cast. Our task is to search out some of the factors which exert pressure upon individuals to engage in certain of these logically possible alternative responses. This choice, as we shall see, is far from random.

In every society, Adaptation I (conformity to both culture goals and means) is the most common and widely diffused. Were this not so, the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained. The mesh of expectancies which constitutes every social order is sustained by the modal behavior of its members falling within the first category. Conventional role behavior oriented toward the basic values of the group is the rule rather than the exception. It is this fact alone which permits us to speak of a human aggregate as comprising a group or society.

Conversely, Adaptation IV (rejection of goals and means) is the least common. Persons who "adjust" (or maladjust) in this fashion are, strictly speaking, in the society but not of it. Sociologically, these constitute the true "aliens." Not sharing the common frame of orientation, they can be included within the societal population merely in a fictional sense. In this category are some of the activities of psychotics, psychoneurotics, chronic autists, pariahs, outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, chronic drunkards and drug addicts. These have relinquished, in certain spheres of activity, the culturally defined goals, involving complete aim-inhibition in the polar case, and their adjustments are not in accord with institutional norms. This is not to say that in some cases the source of their behavioral adjustments is not in part the very social structure which they have in effect repudiated nor that their very existence within a social area does not constitute a problem for the socialized population.

This mode of "adjustment" occurs, as far as structural sources are concerned, when both the culture goals and institutionalized procedures have been assimilated thoroughly by the individual and imbued with affect and high positive value, but where those institutionalized procedures which promise a measure of successful attainment of the goals are not available to the individual. In such instances, there results a twofold mental conflict insofar as the moral obligation for adopting institutional means conflicts with the pressure to resort to illegitimate means (which may attain the goal) and inasmuch as the individual is shut off from means which are both legitimate and effective. The competitive order is maintained, but the frustrated and handicapped individual who cannot cope with this order drops out. Obviously, this is an elliptical statement. These individuals may maintain some orientation to the values of their particular differentiated groupings within the larger society or, in part, of the conventional society itself. Insofar as they do so, their conduct cannot be classified in the "passive rejection" category (IV). Nels Anderson's description of the behavior and attitudes of the bum, for example, can readily be recast in terms of our analytical scheme. See The Hobo, 93–98, et passim, Chicago, 1923.
Defeatism, quietism and resignation are manifested in escape mechanisms which ultimately lead the individual to “escape” from the requirements of the society. It is an expedient which arises from continued failure to attain the goal by legitimate measures and from an inability to adopt the illegitimate route because of internalized prohibitions and institutionalized compulsives, during which process the supreme value of the success-goal has as yet not been renounced. The conflict is resolved by eliminating both precipitating elements, the goals and means. The escape is complete, the conflict is eliminated and the individual is asocialized.

Be it noted that where frustration derives from the inaccessibility of effective institutional means for attaining economic or any other type of highly valued “success,” that Adaptations II, III and V (innovation, ritualism and rebellion) are also possible. The result will be determined by the particular personality, and thus, the particular cultural background, involved. Inadequate socialization will result in the innovation response whereby the conflict and frustration are eliminated by relinquishing the institutional means and retaining the success-aspiration; an extreme assimilation of institutional demands will lead to ritualism wherein the goal is dropped as beyond one’s reach but conformity to the mores persists; and rebellion occurs when emancipation from the reigning standards, due to frustration or to marginalist perspectives, leads to the attempt to introduce a “new social order.”

Our major concern is with the illegitimacy adjustment. This involves the use of conventionally proscribed but frequently effective means of attaining at least the simulacrum of culturally defined success,—wealth, power, and the like. As we have seen, this adjustment occurs when the individual has assimilated the cultural emphasis on success without equally internalizing the morally prescribed norms governing means for its attainment. The question arises, Which phases of our social structure predispose toward this mode of adjustment? We may examine a concrete instance, effectively analyzed by Lohman, which provides a clue to the answer. Lohman has shown that specialized areas of vice in the near north side of Chicago constitute a “normal” response to a situation where the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary success has been absorbed, but where there is little access to conventional and legitimate means for attaining such success. The conventional occupational opportunities of persons in this area are almost completely limited to manual labor. Given our cultural stigmatization of manual labor and its correlate, the prestige of white collar work, it is clear that the result is a strain toward innovational practices. The limitation of opportunity to unskilled labor and the resultant low income

can not compete in terms of conventional standards of achievement with the high income from organized vice.

For our purposes, this situation involves two important features. First, such antisocial behavior is in a sense “called forth” by certain conventional values of the culture and by the class structure involving differential access to the approved opportunities for legitimate, prestige-bearing pursuit of the culture goals. The lack of high integration between the means-and-end elements of the cultural pattern and the particular class structure combine to favor a heightened frequency of antisocial conduct in such groups. The second consideration is of equal significance. Recourse to the first of the alternative responses, legitimate effort, is limited by the fact that actual advance toward desired success-symbols through conventional channels is, despite our persisting open-class ideology, relatively rare and difficult for those handicapped by little formal education and few economic resources. The dominant pressure of group standards of success is, therefore, on the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but by and large ineffective, strivings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, expedients of vice and crime. The cultural demands made on persons in this situation are incompatible. On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally. The consequences of such structural inconsistency are psychopathological personality, and/or antisocial conduct, and/or revolutionary activities. The equilibrium between culturally designated means and ends becomes highly unstable with the progressive emphasis on attaining the prestige-laden ends by any means whatsoever. Within this context, Capone represents the triumph of amoral intelligence over morally prescribed “failure,” when the channels of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed.

The shifting historical role of this ideology is a profitable subject for exploration. The “office-boy-to-president” stereotype was once in approximate accord with the facts. Such vertical mobility was probably more common then than now, when the class structure is more rigid. (See the following note.) The ideology largely persists, however, possibly because it still performs a useful function for maintaining the status quo. For insofar as it is accepted by the “masses,” it constitutes a useful sop for those who might rebel against the entire structure, were this consoling hope removed. This ideology now serves to lessen the probability of Adaptation V. In short, the role of this notion has changed from that of an approximately valid empirical theorem to that of an ideology, in Mannheim’s sense.

There is a growing body of evidence, though none of it is clearly conclusive, to the effect that our class structure is becoming rigidified and that vertical mobility is declining. Taussig and Joslyn found that American business leaders are being increasingly recruited from the upper ranks of our society. The Lynds have also found a “diminished chance to get ahead” for the working classes in Middletown. Manifestly, these objective changes are not alone significant; the individual’s subjective evaluation of the situation is a major determinant of the response. The extent to which this change in opportunity for social mobility has been recognized by the least advantaged classes is still conjectural, although the Lynds present some suggestive materials. The writer suggests that a case in point is the increasing frequency of cartoons which observe in a tragi-comic vein that “my old man says everybody can’t be Presi-
in a society which places a high premium on economic affluence and social ascent for all its members.\textsuperscript{17}

This last qualification is of primary importance. It suggests that other phases of the social structure besides the extreme emphasis on pecuniary success, must be considered if we are to understand the social sources of antisocial behavior. A high frequency of deviate behavior is not generated simply by "lack of opportunity" or by this exaggerated pecuniary emphasis. A comparatively rigidified class structure, a feudalistic or caste order, may limit such opportunities far beyond the point which obtains in our society today. It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain common symbols of success for the population at large while its social structure rigorously restricts or completely eliminates access to approved modes of acquiring these symbols for a considerable part of the same population, that antisocial behavior ensues on a considerable scale. In other words, our egalitarian ideology denies by implication the existence of noncompeting groups and individuals in the pursuit of pecuniary success. The same body of success-symbols is held to be desirable for all. These goals are held to transcend class lines, not to be bounded by them, yet the actual social organization is such that there exist class differentials in the accessibility of these common success-symbols. Frustration and thwarted aspiration lead to the search for avenues of escape from a culturally induced intolerable situation; or unrelieved ambition may eventuate in illicit attempts to acquire the dominant values.\textsuperscript{18} The American stress on pecuniary success and ambitiousness for all thus invites exaggerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses and antisocial behavior.

This theoretical analysis may go far toward explaining the varying correlations between crime and poverty.\textsuperscript{19} Poverty is not an isolated variable.
It is one in a complex of interdependent social and cultural variables. When viewed in such a context, it represents quite different states of affairs. Poverty as such, and consequent limitation of opportunity, are not sufficient to induce a conspicuously high rate of criminal behavior. Even the often mentioned “poverty in the midst of plenty” will not necessarily lead to this result. Only insofar as poverty and associated disadvantages in competition for the culture values approved for all members of the society is linked with the assimilation of a cultural emphasis on monetary accumulation as a symbol of success is antisocial conduct a “normal” outcome. Thus, poverty is less highly correlated with crime in southeastern Europe than in the United States. The possibilities of vertical mobility in these European areas would seem to be fewer than in this country, so that neither poverty per se nor its association with limited opportunity is sufficient to account for the varying correlations. It is only when the full configuration is considered, poverty, limited opportunity and a commonly shared system of success symbols, that we can explain the higher association between poverty and crime in our society than in others where rigidified class structure is coupled with differential class symbols of achievement.

In societies such as our own, then, the pressure of prestige-bearing success tends to eliminate the effective social constraint over means employed to this end. “The end-justifies-the-means” doctrine becomes a guiding tenet for action when the cultural structure unduly exalts the end and the social organization unduly limits possible recourse to approved means. Otherwise put, this notion and associated behavior reflect a lack of cultural coordination. In international relations, the effects of this lack of integration are notoriously apparent. An emphasis upon national power is not readily coordinated with an inept organization of legitimate, i.e., internationally defined and accepted, means for attaining this goal. The result is a tendency toward the abrogation of international law, treaties become scraps of paper, “undeclared warefare” serves as a technical evasion, the bombing of civilian populations is rationalized,

just as the same societal situation induces the same sway of illegitimacy among individuals.

The social order we have described necessarily produces this “strain toward dissolution.” The pressure of such an order is upon outdoing one’s competitors. The choice of means within the ambit of institutional control will persist as long as the sentiments supporting a competitive system, i.e., deriving from the possibility of outranking competitors and hence en-

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joying the favorable response of others, are distributed throughout the entire system of activities and are not confined merely to the final result. A stable social structure demands a balanced distribution of affect among its various segments. When there occurs a shift of emphasis from the satisfactions deriving from competition itself to almost exclusive concern with successful competition, the resultant stress leads to the breakdown of the regulatory structure. With the resulting attenuation of the institutional imperatives, there occurs an approximation of the situation erroneously held by utilitarians to be typical of society generally wherein calculations of advantage and fear of punishment are the sole regulating agencies. In such situations, as Hobbes observed, force and fraud come to constitute the sole virtues in view of their relative efficiency in attaining goals,—which were for him, of course, not culturally derived.

It should be apparent that the foregoing discussion is not pitched on a moralistic plane. Whatever the sentiments of the writer or reader concerning the ethical desirability of coordinating the means-and-goals phases of the social structure, one must agree that lack of such coordination leads to anomie. Insofar as one of the most general functions of social organization is to provide a basis for calculability and regularity of behavior, it is increasingly limited in effectiveness as these elements of the structure become dissociated. At the extreme, predictability virtually disappears and what may be properly termed cultural chaos or anomie intervenes.

This statement, being brief, is also incomplete. It has not included an exhaustive treatment of the various structural elements which predispose toward one rather than another of the alternative responses open to individuals; it has neglected, but not denied the relevance of, the factors determining the specific incidence of these responses; it has not enumerated the various concrete responses which are constituted by combinations of specific values of the analytical variables; it has omitted, or included only by implication, any consideration of the social functions performed by illicit responses; it has not tested the full explanatory power of the analytical scheme by examining a large number of group variations in the frequency of deviate and conformist behavior; it has not adequately dealt with rebellious conduct which seeks to refashion the social framework radically; it has not examined the relevance of cultural conflict for an analysis of culture-goal and institutional-means malintegration. It is suggested that these and related problems may be profitably analyzed by this scheme.

Since our primary concern is with the socio-cultural aspects of this problem, the psychological correlates have been only implicitly considered. See Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, New York, 1937, for a psychological discussion of this process.
INTELLIGENCE AS A FACTOR IN OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

CARROLL D. CLARK and NOEL P. GIST
University of Kansas University of Missouri

IN AN OPEN-CLASS society occupations tend to assume a hierarchical arrangement which represents ascending levels of socio-economic status and reflects somewhat roughly the varying degrees of prestige assigned to each type of vocation. There is, moreover, a widely prevalent notion that occupations are in some way related to personal talent, and, to harmonize this belief with the success philosophy so characteristic of our culture, the assumption is held that those occupations in the upper ranges of the hierarchy tend to be more highly selective of intelligence and perhaps other socially valued qualities than the occupational pursuits having less social prestige. Thus, according to this belief, individual capacity may be represented as a sort of continuum on the occupational scale, with the levels of intelligence increasing as one moves up the occupational pyramid.

Studies of measured intelligence as related to occupational status have provided a fairly strong evidential basis in support of the popular view. Haggerty and Nash, in a study of 6688 village children in New York state, found that the distribution of intelligence ratings (median I. Q.'s) of the group conformed closely to the prestige ratings of the fathers' occupations.1 The children whose fathers were in the professional category had the highest median I. Q.; below them, in the order named, the children whose fathers were in the business and clerical class, skilled and semiskilled wage-earners, farmers, and unskilled wage-earners. Similar studies, with corresponding results, were made by Dexter2 in Madison, Wisconsin, by Collins3 in Ohio, by Goodenough4 in Minnesota, by Jones and Carr-Saunders5 in England, by Pressey,6 by Bridges and Coler,7 and by Stoke and Lehman.8 The study

by Terman and his associates of the frequency of gifted children from different occupations shows a marked preponderance of talented individuals whose fathers belonged to the executive or professional class. Somewhat less uniform, however, are the findings of researches relating to the occupational backgrounds of defectives.

While pointing consistently to the conclusion that mental ability as measured by existing yardsticks bears a close relationship to parental occupation and income, most studies thus far made do not provide a satisfactory analysis of the specific role of measured intelligence as a factor in occupational choice. Almost without exception they have dealt not with the adults actually engaged in the various occupations, but with their children. Hence, they merely indicate that parents in certain types of occupations tend to produce children who rate better on intelligence tests than children whose parents follow a different line of economic activity. What they do not show is whether there is any relationship between the measured intelligence of children and the occupation they will later choose to enter. It is well known, of course, that the army intelligence tests, when classified according to civilian occupations, showed sharp gradations downward from the professions at the top to unskilled labor at the bottom, but even this evidence, so far as the selective influence of intelligence is concerned, is open to somewhat ambiguous if not conflicting interpretations. For instance, clerical occupations based on relatively little abstract knowledge ranked high, very near the intelligence level of the professions. Should one conclude that this result represents a true sifting of the occupational population in terms of intelligence, or should one attribute it to a bias in the nature of the test? A similar problem arises in connection with skilled artisans and laborers, who ranked considerably below clerical workers and not far above unskilled laborers.

The present study follows a somewhat different methodological procedure in attempting to determine the selection of intelligence in occupational choice. Instead of gauging the intelligence of occupational groups by the test scores of children whose parents are classified therein, or relating test data to the socio-economic background of the individual after occupational choice was made, the method has been to secure the intelligence quotients of school children and then to follow up this phase of the study by ascertain-
The details of the method may be stated briefly as follows. In the school year of 1922-23, standardized Terman intelligence tests were given under supervision of the School of Education at the University of Kansas to a large number of rural high school students in Kansas. The results of these tests, together with the names of the students and their home communities, were made available to the writers. In 1935 and 1936, approximately 13 years after the tests had been given, a survey was conducted to ascertain, among other things, the occupations in which they were at the time engaged and the rural or urban status of the communities in which they then lived. When the investigation was completed, information was secured for 2544 persons living in 40 different rural communities scattered over the state.

Research assistants visited the communities in the eastern and central sections of the state and interviewed either the former students themselves, if they were still in the community, or other responsible persons, such as school officials or postmasters, who were likely to have the desired information. For those communities so far removed as not to be easily accessible, information was secured directly from key persons who were willing to cooperate in the study. In securing the data the informants were requested to indicate the specific occupational activity of each of the persons about whom information was desired, thus avoiding any generalized and perhaps meaningless classifications such as "railroad man," "clerk," or "merchant." They were also asked to indicate present post office so that the group could be classified according to rural or urban residence.

At the time the tests were given in 1922-23, the median age of the students was approximately 16; when the study was conducted, 13 years later, the median age was therefore about 29. During this interim of more than a decade it seems reasonable to suppose that sufficient time had elapsed to permit those individuals intent upon gainful employment to enter some occupational activity. Since the cityward migrations tend to be most pronounced among younger persons, it is reasonable to assume that the movement from this group to urban areas had largely taken place before 1935.

Since the number of persons in specific occupations, with the exception of agriculture and teaching, was small and therefore inadequate for statistical analysis, it was necessary to work out a classificatory arrangement representing broad occupational types.

For a detailed statement of the methods of gathering the information, see our preliminary report of this study in the American Journal of Sociology, July, 1938.

Since information concerning occupations was incomplete for some of the individuals, the total number of persons in the occupational tables is 2423.

The Census Bureau's definition of "urban" as communities of 2500 or above was followed in the study. Most of the communities included in the study were small villages or hamlets, only four out of the forty having as many as 1000 population. Undoubtedly a considerable number of the sample of students were farm boys and girls, although the exact proportion was not known since no distinction was made between farm and village residence when the tests were given.
An effort was made to select major categories conforming to those generally used by other studies in this field, so that comparison of results might be possible. Care was taken to make sure that the specific occupation was assigned to a category whose general attributes it shared, functional as well as logical aspects being considered. In a few instances it was necessary to make a rather arbitrary assignment of cases presenting mixed or marginal characteristics. More than a hundred cases were discarded because the specific occupations listed did not fit clearly and unambiguously into any main category. As finally determined, the various categories reflect something as to the character of the work, the amount of training involved in it, the prestige it enjoys, and its pecuniary returns. Within each main category there is, of course, a fairly wide range of activities, time spent in training, and perhaps even income.

Since the number of persons in the specific occupation of teaching was large enough to permit of statistical analysis, the teachers were classified both with the professional group and separately as a distinct occupational category. In this way comparison could be made not only between teachers and "other" professionals, but also between the teachers and several different occupational groups. The majority of teachers were employed in rural one room schools, the remainder being in high school work. Included in the professional classification were 28 college students, most of whom were presumably preparing for professional careers. Virtually all of the proprietors and managerial group were engaged in some form of selling; consequently they were included in the same category as salespeople. The difference between semiskilled and unskilled work is usually not very great; even so-called unskilled work always involves a degree of skill. Accordingly, a single category was employed for those persons whose work could reasonably be classified as semiskilled or unskilled. Housekeepers were defined as unmarried women living at home with parents and not gainfully employed. While it is possible that a few of them did not desire or need to work and therefore could not be classified as unemployed, probably most of them were at home because they had found no gainful employment. For that reason they were classified with the unemployed group, which consisted mainly of men. Married women not gainfully employed were classified as housewives. This category obviously cuts squarely across the whole hierarchy of occupations and strictly speaking does not represent an occupational classification.

Our occupational categories were determined as follows:

1. Total professional: Teachers, physicians, lawyers, nurses, engineers, pharmacists, architects, social workers, auditors, ministers, journalists, students, etc.
2. "Other" professional: (Class 1, above, with teachers excluded.)
3. Teachers.
4. Clerical: Stenographers, typists, bookkeepers, telegraphers, office clerks, etc.
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND INTELLIGENCE

5. *Salespeople and proprietors:* Retail clerks, travelling salesmen, filling station attendants, ticket sellers, auctioneers, proprietors and managers of commercial enterprises, etc.

6. *Skilled workers:* Printers, linotype operators, electricians, automobile mechanics, bakers, telephone linemen, railway engineers, carpenters, barbers, sign painters, beauty parlor operators, telephone operators, etc.

7. *Semiskilled and unskilled workers:* Farm laborers, factory laborers, janitors, miners, truck drivers, taxi drivers, porters, waiters and waitresses, WPA workers, housemaids, etc.

8. *Farmers:* (Excluding farm laborers.)

9. *Housekeepers and unemployed.*

10. *Housewives.*

The next step was to classify the 2423 former students according to these major occupational categories, and then to show the frequency distribution of intelligence quotients for each of the vocational groups. In Table 1 the distribution of I. Q.'s for each of the 10 groups is presented.

**Table 1. Distribution of Intelligence Quotients of 2423 Former High School Students by Occupations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Q. Class Intervals</th>
<th>&quot;Other&quot; Prof.</th>
<th>Total Prof.</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Salespeople &amp; Proprietors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>75-84</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-94</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>25.75</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95-104</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>37.33</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>33.97</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-114</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21.65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115-124</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125-134</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                 | 158  | 100.0 | 365 | 100.0 | 166  | 100.0 | 207  | 100.0 | 233  | 100.0 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Q. Class Intervals</th>
<th>Skilled Workers</th>
<th>Housewives</th>
<th>Semiskilled &amp; Unskilled</th>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>Housekeepers &amp; Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-84</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>18.32</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-94</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.54</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>31.15</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95-104</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>30.81</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-114</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19.08</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>15.17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115-124</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125-134</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135-144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                 | 131  | 100.0 | 857 | 100.0 | 247  | 100.0 | 345  | 100.0 | 79   | 100.0 |
These data reveal fairly marked differences in the distribution of intelligence quotients. For the first six categories, that is, “other” professional, total professional, clerical, teachers, salespeople and proprietors, and skilled workers, the modal I. Q. class falls in the interval 95–104, whereas the modal I. Q. class for housewives, semiskilled and unskilled workers, farmers, and housekeepers and unemployed falls within the 85–94 interval. The summarized data in Table 2 bring out these differences even more significantly.

### Table 2. Percentage of 2423 Persons in Each of Three I. Q. Intervals by Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage in Each I. Q. Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Below 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Other” Professional</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>25.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Professional</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>32.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>34.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>38.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>44.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>45.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>49.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled &amp; Unskilled</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>58.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>58.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeepers &amp; Unemployed</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>63.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>*<em>2788</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Less 365 duplicates, the total number of cases being 2423.

At one extreme is the “other” professional group; with only one fourth of the number, 25.32 percent, having an intelligence quotient below 95 and approximately three eighths, 37.35 percent, having an I. Q. of 105 or over. Of the housekeepers and unemployed, the group at the other extreme, more than three fifths, 63.29 percent, have an I. Q. less than 95, while only one twentieth, 5.06 percent, are included in the superior class of 105 or over. Less than 40 percent of the number of persons in the “other” professional, total professional, clerical, and teacher categories have an intelligence quotient less than 95, whereas the semiskilled and unskilled workers, the farmers, and the housekeepers and unemployed have more than 50 percent of their number in the low I. Q. group. On the other hand, more than 30 percent of the persons in the four highest ranking categories fall in the superior I. Q. group of 105 or over, whereas less than 20 percent of the housewives, semiskilled and unskilled workers, farmers, and housekeepers and unemployed are in the same I. Q. class.

Table 3 gives the arithmetic mean, the standard deviation, and the probable error of the means of the intelligence quotients for the various occupational categories. It will be readily observed that pronounced differences
### Table 3. Arithmetic Means of the Intelligence Quotients of Former Students by Occupations They Later Entered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Mean I. Q.</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Probable Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Other” Professional</td>
<td>102.85</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>±.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Professional</td>
<td>100.82</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>±.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>±.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>99.28</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>±.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople &amp; Proprietors</td>
<td>96.61</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>±.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>96.18</td>
<td>10.45</td>
<td>±.616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>95.44</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>±.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled &amp; Unskilled</td>
<td>93.28</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>±.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>92.75</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>±.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeepers &amp; Unemployed</td>
<td>91.39</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>±.712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reliability of the differences between the mean I. Q.’s of the different groups is indicated in Table 4. In the first column is the observed difference of the two means; the figures in the second column are the ratio of the difference of the means to the standard error of the difference of the means; and in the third column is indicated the number of times in 10,000 the differences would occur due to chance alone. If the ratio, given in the second column, is more than 2, the chances are overwhelming that the differences are true differences and do not therefore arise from accidental conditions of sampling. Likewise, where the chance occurrences are less than 300 in 10,000, the differences may also be said to show a high degree of reliability.

It will be observed from Table 4 that out of 36 combinations in which the differences of the means are compared, the ratio of the difference of the

---

15 The formula here used for determining the ratio of the difference of the means to the
standard error of the difference of the means is $\frac{X_1 - X_2}{\sqrt{(sX_1)^2 + (sX_2)^2}}$ where $X_1$ and $X_2$=arithmetic means and $\sqrt{(sX_1)^2 + (sX_2)^2}$=standard error of the difference of the means. See Croxton and Cowden, *Practical Business Statistics*, 226.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Classes</th>
<th>Observed Difference Between Means</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Chance Occurrences in 10,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housekeepers and unemployed and Farmers</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>2628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>5754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>4472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>6456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>5352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

means to the standard error of the difference of the means is less than 2 in only 6 cases. Statistically unreliable, therefore, are the differences between
the mean I. Q.'s of (1) skilled workers and housewives, (2) skilled workers and salespeople and proprietors, (3) farmers and semiskilled and unskilled workers, (4) farmers and housekeepers, (5) clerical workers and teachers, (6) housekeepers and unemployed, and semiskilled and unskilled workers. On the basis of statistical probability the differences between the mean I. Q.'s of all the remaining combinations may be taken as reliable.

This analysis was carried further by classifying the persons in each occupational category according to rural or urban residence and then showing the frequency distribution of the intelligence quotients of the persons so classified. Table 5 summarizes the frequency distribution of the intelligence quotients of 2000 persons classified both as to occupation and rural or urban residence. In four of the eight vocational categories, namely, total professional, teachers, skilled workers, and housewives, the superiority of the urban residents over the rural persons is fairly apparent. However, the urban superiority of the total professional group is derived solely from the

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 2000 PERSONS IN THREE I. Q. INTERVALS BY OCCUPATION AND RURAL OR URBAN STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation and Residence</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Under 95</th>
<th>95-104</th>
<th>105 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>38.09</td>
<td>38.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>26.32</td>
<td>36.84</td>
<td>36.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>35.61</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>29.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>32.88</td>
<td>39.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>27.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>34.12</td>
<td>32.54</td>
<td>33.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>40.41</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>26.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31.37</td>
<td>25.49</td>
<td>43.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>43.23</td>
<td>32.42</td>
<td>24.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>45.09</td>
<td>32.78</td>
<td>22.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51.57</td>
<td>32.81</td>
<td>15.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40.30</td>
<td>32.84</td>
<td>26.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>54.18</td>
<td>29.87</td>
<td>15.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>42.78</td>
<td>32.39</td>
<td>24.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and unskilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>63.16</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>16.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>52.63</td>
<td>35.97</td>
<td>11.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Farmers are omitted from this table for the obvious reason that all of them are rural residents. Housekeepers and unemployed are not included because of the small size of the sample when the group is divided according to rural and urban residence.
inclusion of the teachers, since the “other” professionals reveal only a slight rural superiority. It may, therefore, be disregarded. Of the teachers, only one fourth, 26.26 percent, of the rural group had an I. Q. of 105 or over, whereas more than two fifths, 43.14 percent, of the urban group were in this class. Two fifths, 40.41 percent, of the rural teachers had an I. Q. less than 95, but less than one third, 31.37 percent, of the teachers living in the city were in the low range. Slightly more than half, 51.57 percent,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation and Residence</th>
<th>Mean I. Q.</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Probable Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>102.54</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>± .945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>103.05</td>
<td>12.23</td>
<td>± .846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>99.68</td>
<td>11.24</td>
<td>± .512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>102.53</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>± .659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>98.50</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>± 1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>100.48</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>± .726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>98.53</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>± .599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>101.57</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>± 1.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and proprietors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>96.76</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>± .745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>96.48</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>± .729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>± .856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>97.51</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>± .872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>94.36</td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td>± .311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>97.26</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>± .422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>92.63</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>± .731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>94.04</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>± .619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the rural skilled workers fell in the range below 95, while only two fifths, 40.3 percent, of the urban persons of this occupational category were in the same class. Approximately one fourth, 26.86 percent, of the skilled workers living in urban areas were in the superior I. Q. class (105 or over), but only one sixth, 15.62 percent, of the rural workers were in the same group.

The differences are even more striking for the housewives. More than half, 54.18 percent, of the rural housewives and slightly more than two fifths, 42.78 percent, of the urban married women were in the low I. Q. range of less than 95; in the upper range the ratios are about three to two in favor of the urban housewives. The semiskilled and unskilled class presents a mixed picture. There is a smaller proportion of the urban group in
the low range and also in the high range. In the two remaining categories, the clerical and the salespeople and proprietors, the differences are so small as to be almost negligible, with the margin slightly in favor of the urban residents in the former class and of the rural residents in the latter class.

In Table 6, a comparison is made of the mean I. Q.'s of rural and urban persons classified according to occupation. It will be noted that salespeople and proprietors is the only occupational category in which the rural residents have a higher mean I. Q. than those who reside in the city, but the observed differences between the means of rural and urban dwellers is too small in most instances to be clearly significant, particularly in view of the small size of the samples. The reliability of the differences between the means is indicated in Table 7. In only two cases is the ratio of the difference

TABLE 7. COMPUTED DIFFERENCES OF THE MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENTS, AND RELIABILITY OF THESE DIFFERENCES, OF RURAL AND URBAN PERSONS CLASSIFIED OCCUPATIONALLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Computed Difference Between Rural and Urban Means</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Chance Occurrence in 10,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>Less than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Professional</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>2996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled and Unskilled</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>3124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Other&quot; Professional</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>7872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople and Proprietors</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>8572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the means to the standard error of the difference of the means in excess of 2, or large enough to afford assurance that the results are highly reliable. These are the housewives and the total professional group. For the rural and urban teachers the ratio is 1.72, with a chance occurrence of 854 in 10,000, which indicates a considerable degree of reliability. Rural and urban residents classified under the other occupational categories have ratios so small as to make the differences of the means insignificant.

The findings of this study tend to confirm those of other studies which have shown a positive relationship between measured intelligence and occupational level. So far as this sample of Kansas rural youth may be taken as typical, it appears that intelligence acts as a selective factor influencing occupational choice. More specifically it seems clear that in the environment from which this sample was taken, the professions and the clerical vocations (white-collar occupations) are attracting a larger proportion of young men and young women with superior intelligence ratings than are the manual types of occupation, including farming. The chief contribution of the present study lies not so much in the nature of the results as in the intro-
duction of a methodology which removes some of the chief objections raised against most previous studies of this problem.

Likewise of confirmatory significance is the fact that a large degree of overlapping occurs in the distribution of test scores among the various occupational classes. Each class draws both upon those having relatively high and those having relatively low scores, though in different proportions. No class can be said to skim off the cream, and only the cream, of mental ability as measured by the tests. The highest score in the entire sample, for example, was made by one classed as an unskilled laborer.

The findings concerning the relation of measured intelligence to rural and urban residence of workers within the several occupational categories are not altogether conclusive. The size of the samples available for comparison was not large enough to insure statistical reliability in the majority of the cases. So far as they may be safely interpreted, the results indicate that the cities are drawing a marked preponderance of those having superior ratings in the teachers and housewives categories. In all other classes the workers of rural residence made a better showing than might have been anticipated on a priori grounds. Since cities are centers of dominance exercising executive controls and organizing specialized functions in major spheres of economic activity, thus enabling them to offer greater scope for vocational development and more lucrative compensation, it seems natural that they should maintain considerable advantage in the competition for workers of superior intelligence in most vocations which are both urban and rural.

If a genetic selection could be demonstrated to follow from the selective processes disclosed in this study, the social consequences would be far more profound. However, no such significance is attributed to any of the results herein presented. The results are based on intelligence tests, which measure responses that have been conditioned by a wide variety of cultural factors and individual experiences, as well as by heredity. Nowhere has the assumption been made that they isolate and measure innate intelligence.

A further difficulty in the way of a genetic interpretation arises from the fact that the selection here traced operates presumably upon individuals rather than upon groups of siblings. The brightest child in a rural family may enter a profession and move to the city, but there is no evidence that his genes will be superior to those of his brothers and sisters who remain in rural environs and follow humbler callings.

Other studies employing the same general method but using different and statistically more adequate samples should prove of value in further clarifying the problem of selective factors in occupational choice.
REMARRIAGE OF DIVORCEES TO EACH OTHER

Paul Popene

Institute of Family Relations

Los Angeles, California

Divorce as a means of rectifying a mistake in marriage has been widely discussed. Remarriage as a means of rectifying a mistake in divorce has been given less attention. Instances of such remarriage are commoner than is sometimes supposed.

My attention was drawn to the subject by a number of clients of the Institute of Family Relations who got divorces, afterwards decided that they were happier together than they were apart, and remarried each other successfully. I began to tabulate these cases, to collect others from the newspapers, and to ask my students at University College, University of Southern California, to contribute information about such marriages known to them. This paper reports on 200 such cases.

Some of these are decidedly complicated, various other marriages having served to embroider the main pattern. Four histories will illustrate some of the more extreme possibilities.

1. Mr. and Mrs. A. were married two years and had a child. Mr. A. went to live with Mrs. B. and was divorced by Mrs. A.; he then married Mrs. B. (a widow) but divorced her after six months and remarried Mrs. A. They lived together for five or six years until she divorced him again; he remarried Mrs. B. and lived with her two years, then divorced her a second time after persuading Mrs. A. to take him back again as soon as he was free. His third marriage to Mrs. A. lasted only a year; then she decided he had merely been trying to recover the community property, and divorced him the third time.

2. Mr. C. married young and after three years got a divorce. Shortly he remarried the same woman, got a divorce two years later, and married her again in a short time. In about two years, another divorce was granted. This time each married someone else. After about a year, both of these marriages soured and the original couple wanted to remarry, which they did after the necessary divorces. After due consideration of the matter, they remarried each other in a fifth ceremony, i.e., their fifth marriage for each but the fourth marriage to each other. In spite of the adage that "practice makes perfect," this latest venture was in distress at the last report. One lawyer "handled the entire transaction."

3. Mr. D. married and divorced the same woman four times. Since then he has married three other women, seriatim. His seventh venture ("the lucky number"?) appears to be a success. My informant adds, "All his women were remarkable for beauty, culture, or other attainments and the last was a success in business like himself."

4. Somewhat similar is the history of Kid McCoy, one-time pugilist, who last year announced his ninth marriage. Three of these experiments were with the same woman, Julia Woodruff, whom he first married in 1897. She divorced him twice, he divorced her once. The third divorce, in 1901, was the final for that series.
Although such histories could be multiplied indefinitely, the commoner case is that in which a couple practices intermittent marriage,—monogamy with vacations, so to speak. Such a situation is obviously comparable with that so common among the poor, in which the husband from time to time takes a vacation by desertion, coming back when he feels like it. The following clipping from a Los Angeles newspaper, which could be duplicated many times over, illustrates this type of mating:

Because they couldn’t, or thought they couldn’t, get along together, Mr. and Mrs. Fred McIntosh, St. Louis, got a divorce. Then they discovered living apart wasn’t so good either, so they remarried. A second time they failed to get along and separated again. Now both aged 56, they have been remarried the third time and in hopes of bettering their luck, had their third wedding on a Friday.

A more tragic illustration is furnished by the following clipping from 1937:

LAWTON, OKLA., Nov. 13. (U. P.)—Roy and Ruby Lowry loved each other but they couldn’t get along. They were married and divorced three times. Last week they married again. Tonight their bodies were found, and officers said Lowry had killed his wife and then himself. “Ruby knew I loved her but she drove me to this,” read the suicide note left by Lowry. “See that Ruby is put away nicely. I want an American Legion funeral with a firing squad.”

Of the 200 cases here reported of remarriage of the same persons, 96 (48 percent) were happy on the second attempt; 29 (15 percent) were doubtful and 75 (37 percent) definitely unhappy.

The mean length of first marriage was 5.1 years, nearly one third lasted less than two years, while nearly one fourth were of at least ten years’ duration before the divorce.

The mean length of intermission was three years, with one third of the separations for only a year or less. Some of the separations, however, are dramatically long, as in the two following taken from newspapers of 1937:

John McHaley, 62 years of age, and Mrs. Mary Virginia McHaley, 60, today are man and wife again after thirty years of separation. Mr. and Mrs. McHaley were divorced thirty years ago.

Divorced nearly fifty years ago, Miss Parmelia E. Burgess and William Abbott remarried at the ages of 72 and 77, respectively.

There is very little relationship between the length of marriage prior to divorce and the length of intermission prior to remarriage. A short marriage may be followed by long separation or vice versa. One might suppose that those longest married would require the shortest time to discover that their divorce was a mistake; that there would be, in other words, a negative correlation between first marriage and intermission. This is not found. The correlation is positive, though small.

About one half of the remarriages were listed above as “happy.” Since the partners are in most cases still alive, how can one be sure that the remarriage is permanently happy, that it will not end in another divorce?

The data do not afford an entirely satisfactory answer to this question.
However, the length of time since remarriage was stated definitely in 130 cases. The mean duration (up to date of report) of the happy remarriages was 3.5 years, that of the unhappy ones 2.2 years. Inspection of the case histories shows that this difference is due mainly to the rapid break-up of the unhappy second marriages. In other words, when the partners remarried and did not make a success, they lost little time in again resorting to the divorce court, nearly half of these unhappy remarriages terminating after less than one year of the second round.

Since all these couples have been through the divorce court previously, they have proved that they have no prejudice against divorce. If they were unhappy the second time, the expectation is that they will be more ready than the average couple to go to court again. If so there should be a high correlation between happiness and length of second marriage. The correlation is, in fact, rather low (bi-serial $r = .29 + .07$). This might be explained by the supposition that some unhappy couples tend to prolong their marriage for reasons of convenience or economic necessity.

The failure of half these couples at the second marriage calls for no explanation. The fact that half succeeded the second time, after a failure on the first trial, involves a question of practical importance because its answer should throw light on the way in which they might have succeeded the first time and thereby have saved themselves trouble and expense. Study of the case histories suggests some fairly distinct categories.

1. Sometimes one, if not both, suffered from emotional immaturity and instability. This led to the divorce. The passage of time, and perhaps bitter experience, promoted emotional maturity, with the result that on the second trial the couple were better prepared to make a success. Socially, it would have been preferable to give them a different education. At their first marriage, then, they might have been mature personalities instead of social infants or marital morons.

2. Sometimes the break-up was due to the wife's longing for "freedom," self-expression, or an independent career. The intermission deflated her conceit and brought her down to earth. She found that the world did not yearn for her talents in art or business; that it was not easy to make a living; and that a home was really much more attractive than she had previously supposed. This again points to the need of a different type of education for some young women, which will enable them to find more satisfactory self-expression in marriage.

3. Sometimes a middle aged infatuation of one partner led the other to get a divorce. The wife may suddenly find, after twenty years of marriage, that her husband is "keeping" an adventuress. Righteously indignant, she terminates her marriage. Such middle aged infatuations usually blow over. When this one is finished, the husband comes back, poorer but wiser, pleads for forgiveness, and his former wife remarries him. These infatuations of the middle years, of which either husband or wife may be the vic-
tim, are fairly well understood psychologically. They can be dealt with much more rationally than by divorce, particularly through the adoption in marriage of an intelligent regime which will make them impossible.

4. Occasionally the divorce was due to pressure from the outside, and remarriage followed the removal of this pressure. Miss W., by way of illustration, was an orphan; her money was in a trust fund of which her uncle was the guardian. The uncle picked out an older man as a suitable husband for the girl, and tried to force the marriage. The girl revolted and married a clerk whom she had known in high school. They lived together only a few days when the uncle, backed by the law (since the girl was a minor) forced her to return home and had the marriage annulled. He then put financial pressure on Miss W. to marry his candidate, which she finally did, but with a pre-nuptial agreement that she should not be responsible for any housework and that she should have a separate suite of rooms. After a year of this sort of matrimony she came of age, got her inheritance, and asked her husband for a divorce which he willingly gave. The clerk whom she had previously married then began a courtship which lasted a year. Presumably the young woman felt that she had been cheated out of her natural rights in having had two marriages but never a courtship. They then remarried and had a successful family life.

5. Sometimes the children are responsible for bringing the father and mother together again, though this is less common than might be supposed because the majority of divorcees have no children. Sometimes it is the pleading of the children that brings about a reconciliation; sometimes the spouse who got custody of the children (usually the mother) marries again, finds that the children are a cause of disharmony, that the stepfather is dissatisfied, and concludes that the easiest way to bring up the children is to dissolve the second marriage and take them back to their own father. Sometimes the remarriage is partly motivated by the desire to avoid legal difficulties in the inheritance. It is occasionally motivated, when there are no children, by difficulties over the community property.

6. Finally, many couples remarry because they really never wanted the divorce in the first place. From this point of view, it is a misfortune that so many people have no idea of what to do in marital disharmony, except to consult a lawyer. Some lawyers are good at conciliation, although lawyers generally have no professional training for this job, and help straighten out affairs even though it means loss of a fee. Many lawyers, however, either seize eagerly on the possibility of a divorce, even promoting it, to get a fee; or perhaps more frequently, merely lack imagination, have not been taught anything else, and take it for granted that a divorce is the proper solution. Hence, when a woman consults a lawyer, whether in a spirit of bewilderment or of bravado, she is sometimes hurried into the divorce court when actually neither partner wanted a divorce but both are victims of circumstances and neither one wants to "lose face" by demanding a reconciliation.
at all costs. It is obvious that unnecessary and harmful divorces of this sort can be reduced by better education of the public to seek other solutions of marital disharmony and by the provision of more institutions or individuals equipped to counsel effectively in conjugal disputes.

There are a number of cases not easily classified, e.g., one couple, after long separation, remarried on the man’s deathbed and he died happy to think that an obstinate and disgraceful quarrel had at last been ended, but most of those I have studied will fall in one of the preceding six categories.

The interlocutory period offers many comparable cases which, however, have not been taken into account in this study. California makes a decree of divorce interlocutory for a year after it is issued. At the end of that period, it is made final if either party applies for such action. In the interim, the interlocutory decree is voided if the parties resume cohabitation. In many instances, the divorcees repent within a few months, go back to living together, and never apply for the final decree. What proportion of interlocutory decrees are thus abandoned by reconciliation is unknown. The subject richly deserves study, since there is a wide difference of opinion as to whether any interlocutory period is socially useful, and if so, whether a period as long as one year is desirable.

Of all divorces in the United States, probably only a minority ever remarry. There is no satisfactory statistical study on this point but data collected by the Institute of Family Relations indicate that the number of divorcees who ever remarry may not be more than 25–35 percent among the women and 40–50 percent among the men. Of this minority, only a small fraction remarry each other. While the subject of this study is therefore of slight importance quantitatively, it offers some points of interest to those who are investigating the means by which marriage can be made more successful. The fact that some people who have been through the divorce court nevertheless remarry and live happily ever after gives rise to the following reflections:

1. Even a very moderate improvement in the present education for marriage would prevent many divorces.

2. Counselling facilities should be more widely available so that people would not have to rush into the divorce court with relatively trivial problems, just because they do not know what else to do with them.

3. Judicial procedures concerned with divorce should be changed. Instead of being treated so much like a police court trial with lawyers ranting at each other and bullying the witnesses and newspapers spreading the details before the public, divorce should be treated much as juvenile delinquency is now treated. The court should refer the case to competent investigators and counsellors, and furnish a legal termination of the marriage only as a last resort.

4. The preliminaries to, and attainment of, divorce should not be allowed to engender so much animosity as to prevent reconciliation.
THE FRENCH-CANADIAN FAMILY CYCLE

Horace Miner
Wayne University

The French-Canadian farmer of Quebec has maintained to a striking degree the family structure which became stabilized in New France two centuries ago. In the industrial centers, and even in large rural towns, there has been some alteration of the system in response to new types of economy. In this discussion, we shall be concerned with the family system in the agricultural parishes and such structural changes as have occurred even in these most traditional regions.

The basis of rural life in Quebec is close family cooperation. All members of the family share in the responsibilities. The grandmother, mother and daughters do the spinning, weaving, knitting, making of clothes, vegetable gardening and milking in addition to the usual cooking and housework. The men raise the crops, tend the animals, cut the timber, do any construction work and attend to business contacts. The families of brothers often cooperate in the work of both farms. The unity of the immediate family was shown, until very recently, by the custom of turning over to the head of the family all money earned by the members. The father’s responsibility for establishing all of his children economically was basic to this type of economy.

Not only is unified family effort necessary but a large family is essential. The short cultivating season of four months makes it impossible for a family to farm large acreages with the traditional methods. The economic balance has been evolved on farms of about a hundred acres. Such lands can be farmed by two or three able males. Female labor is necessary to feed and clothe these men and boys and to help with the farm work. Both male and female labor is provided by large families. All of the children cannot marry and raise families on the parental farm because it will support but one immediate family of parents and children. The particular family system affords a means of exploiting the natural resources by keeping the proper relation of individuals to the land. It is through the operation of the family cycle that this number of individuals is not greatly augmented or decreased at any time.

The following family analysis is based on the study of St. Denis, one of the oldest Quebec settlements, a parish which has maintained to a large degree the traditional ways of life. It is a relatively small parish but lacks none of the characteristics of the larger ones. It has seven hundred parishioners distributed in one hundred and twenty households. When sterile and

1 The material is drawn from a year’s field work in Quebec made possible by the Social Science Research Council.
incomplete families are excluded, the average number of children per family is found to be ten. Marriages in the parish follow a pattern consistent with the relative immobility of the population, the limited scope of personal contact, and the strong family solidarity even between distant kin. Marriages involving brother-sister exchange, two brothers marrying two sisters, and marriages between brothers and their cousins are not uncommon. Fifteen percent of all marriages during the last forty years has been between third cousins or closer. Eighty-four percent of the marriages in St. Denis were with men from within twenty miles of the parish and twenty-nine percent of the husbands were taken from St. Denis itself.

The average age at marriage is twenty-six for men and twenty-five for women. Sons who inherit farms do not tend to marry earlier than their brothers because the advantage in security of position is offset by the necessity of waiting until most of the siblings have left home and made room for a new ménage. Inheritance of the paternal farm does not follow primogeniture. Generally, the inheritor is chosen from about the middle of the sequence of children. Many female or sickly children or mortalities in the middle of the sequence may cause a child nearer either end to be selected, depending upon the age of the father. The difference in age between the father and the inheritor is about thirty-four years and the father tends to be around sixty years old when his inheriting son marries.

The foregoing material is now ready to be put in cultural context as the average sequence of events in the family cycle. A young man of twenty-six marries a girl of twenty-five and in his marriage contract he receives the title to the paternal land. His father is sixty years old now and, since he cannot work as he used to, has been planning for several years to turn over the farm to his son. The bride comes to live with her parents-in-law and her husband moves down from his room with his brothers on the second floor to take one with his bride on the ground floor where his father and

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2 The average number of procreative married years is 15.8 for women. The average age of mothers at last childbirth was drawn from a group of mothers over 49, or over 40 whose last child was at least 4 years old. The average age at last childbirth was 40.8 with a maximum of 48 and a minimum of 34.

3 Marriages always take place in the parish of the bride.

4 For men, the maximum age at marriage was 34; the minimum, 19. For women, the maximum was 33; the minimum, 17.

5 Generalization from a score of genealogies in which the inheritor was the fifth child most often.

6 A quarter of the children born in the parish die before they are a year old; a third, before they are five years old. Data consist of 480 deaths, stillbirths included, over the past 39 years. The infant mortality rate is now being regularly reduced throughout the Province of Quebec.

7 These average ages are drawn from too small a sample to claim statistical exactitude. The manner in which they integrate with the more precise material, however, shows that they give a true conception of the actualities.
mother and grandparents sleep. The young husband manages the farm now, aided by his father and younger brothers who are still at home. It is his obligation to use part of the first earnings of the farm for the establishment of his brothers not yet economically independent. The amount to be paid is stipulated by the father in the grant. This money may be used either to send them to college, to buy them land, or to support them in the city or lumber towns while they look for work. The father does less and less of the manual labor and the mother shifts her responsibilities to her daughter-in-law, who is aided by the unmarried sisters of her husband who are still in the household.

All of the siblings of the inheriting son are expected to leave the paternal home. A young man would not consider it honorable to live with his brother. The father is responsible for the establishment of his children. If there are any of his sons or daughters still in the house at the father's death, he will leave them small amounts of money to enable them to establish separate households with the help of what they can earn individually.

By the time the young couple have been married eight years they have had five children, one of whom has died. The eldest child is seven years old, the youngest, a babe in arms. The regularity of the family cycle is expressed by the common native remark, "He is just a young man,—he only has four or five children." At this point, the man still has the vigor of his thirty-four years to carry him over the hardest period of the cycle. Until recently, he has had the partial aid of his father and the help of his brothers who were still at home. His father is dead by this time and the last brother has left the house to establish himself elsewhere. The oldest son is but seven and will not be an able farm worker for as many more years. During this time, there will be only one adult male on the farm. This is where the solidarity of the scattered family is important. If one of the brothers is farming in the same or one of the neighboring parishes, he will be confronted with an identical situation. The two brothers give each other mutual aid on their two small farms until their children are old enough to do a full share. If there is not a brother farming near-by, some related unestablished young man may be persuaded to help for a wage. In the final event, help may be hired, but this is undesirable. The only two tractors in the parish were bought to tide over a protracted period of this sort when there were insufficient mains d'oeuvre.

In eight more years, the father is forty-two and the couple has had ten children, three of whom have died. The eldest sons are helping in the field and there is no labor problem. By this time, the father has begun to think seriously of plans for the future of his children for whom he is responsible.

8 Parish death records over past 39 years show that the further life expectancy of persons who have lived to be 24 years old is 41.3 years. In other words, they will achieve an age of 65.3 years on the average.
He will ultimately have to arrange for six children. Obviously one of these, a boy, will inherit the parental land. The selection of the inheriting son is a serious matter. Above all, he must be physically fit and intelligent; he must be capable of the eventual management of the farm. Also, the father wants to choose a boy who will be ready to marry about the time the father wants to withdraw from full time activity on the farm. The farm should never be turned over to an unmarried son. His choice of a wife is too important. A spendthrift daughter-in-law is the perpetual bugaboo of every prospective father-in-law. If a father has acquired additional land and has two farms, he usually will wait until both the sons chosen to inherit are married before he designates which farms they will receive. The parents will select the most congenial daughter-in-law to remain in the old home with them. By their mere likes or dislikes, the parents thus exert great influence on their son’s choice of a wife.

In selecting which son will remain at home, it must be remembered that the choice of one of the eldest boys would be unwise as his own children would soon overcrowd the house when he married. This would also put an additional strain on the economy at a time when money is needed to help establish the siblings of the inheriting son. For these reasons, a son near the middle of the sequence of children is chosen to inherit the farm so that he can help with the establishment of his younger brothers. This selection is a gradual procedure, a feeling out of the children’s possibilities and of the necessities and limitations of labor, age and health, capital, and housing space. The son chosen is usually informally told of the fact by the time he is eighteen or twenty. Long before this, however, his activities have been directed definitely to the farm, its work and its management. Sometimes this orientation falls down, so that the inclinations of the boys must be considered in the choice. When the young man inherits, the cycle recommences.

There remain five children unestablished, two boys and three girls. One of the latter will normally marry a local farmer. After they complete the local schools which include six school years, the girls, as far as is financially possible, are sent to near-by convents for two or even three years to secure their diplômes. There is occasional opportunity for girls with such education to get teaching positions in local schools. Such work pays very little but assures an independent livelihood. Girls with convent educations are also more marriageable. A girl may go on and become a nun if she so desires. If the family has sufficient money, one or more of the boys will be given some schooling beyond the local schools. This, however, is a more expensive matter. To complete the course at the religious college twelve miles away takes eight years at two hundred dollars a year. Of those who

Forty-three percent die before 25 years of age according to parish records.
do finish, 56 percent go on to seminaries to become priests and 31 percent go on to train for law or medicine. The others follow other professions.

On the average, in each family half of the girls who do not die in infancy are sent to convent schools. Only one fifth of the surviving boys are sent to college for any period whatsoever. One child out of every family becomes a nun, priest, doctor, lawyer, or notary, every other generation. The boys the father selects to go to college must show some interest in their studies in the parish schools because the father is unwilling to risk heavy investment in a possible failure. A child who does show sufficient interest and who is not destined by circumstances to work the farm will be directed toward educational and religious interests by the whole family. The family attitudes concerning the proposed role of the boy find constant expression in word and act. Thus the child is oriented toward his future. Children are never told they must become priests, for such a life comes only by divine call. They are, however, oriented in that direction, and once at college, where they decide their future with priest advisers, over half enter the priesthood. The obvious function of the religious life in the social structure is to make certain individuals nonprocreative. In return for this, they are given a role of great social prestige.

Thus far the ten children have the following outlook: four die before reaching 25 years, one inherits the paternal land, one marries a farmer, one enters convent, priesthood or profession, one becomes a school teacher or marries a professional man. There are still three children unaccounted for. Their father, during his management of the farm, while gradually giving the responsibility to the inheriting son in the latter’s first years, tries to buy another farm or save the money for a son to get a farm somewhere. A local informant estimated that one quarter of the farmers established two sons on farms. This failing, the farmer gives the boy some technical training or sends him to cities or industrial centers where he can get work.

The family cycle can be shown diagrammatically using average ages of individuals at various stages and crises of life.

This cyclical procession of events finds expression in the philosophising of a man whose son has taken over the management of the farm and is momentarily expecting his first child: “Life is like a turning wheel. The old turn over the work to the young and die, and these in turn get old and turn over the work to their children. Yes, life is like a wheel turning.”

10 College records—Collège de Ste. Anne de la Pocatière, P.Q.
11 Computed from verbal information on parish children for past 25 years and parish records for past 80 years, the two coinciding.
12 This is only possible because of movement from marginal farms to cities, as new lands and those of childless farmers can not absorb this many new farmers. There are only two or three childless farmers in the parish.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage Number</th>
<th>Years Between Stages</th>
<th>Family Composition</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$A\circ{26} = \varphi 25$</td>
<td>Marriage of couple.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$A\circ{42} = \varphi 41$</td>
<td>Last of ten children born. Child who will inherit (B) is 8 yrs. old.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[10 children]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$O \ B\circ{8} = 15$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$A\circ{60} = \varphi 59$</td>
<td>Son (B) marries and inherits farm. Three of his siblings have died. Elder siblings have left home. Younger ones are still there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[4 children]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$18 \ B\circ{26} = \varphi 25$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$A\circ{76+} = \varphi 75+$</td>
<td>Original parents have been dead ten years and all siblings of inheritor have been out of household for a similar period. Inheritor's last child born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$B\circ{42} = \varphi 41$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[10 children]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$O \ C\circ{8} = 15$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$B\circ{60} = \varphi 59$</td>
<td>Third inheritor marries and receives farm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[4 children]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$18 \ C\circ{26} = \varphi 25$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above scheme carries the family through two generations of thirty-four years each. Checking this against three families which have been on the same lands for eight generations, the cycles of these families average 30, 32 and 34 years with no tendency for shorter cycles in the earlier generations.

The following family demonstrates the principal features of the cycle as described and diagrammed. It would be placed between stages III and IV in the scheme. A more typical family could have been chosen but the following one was selected to show how actual cases vary from the ideal built up on averages. This family is felt to be a widevariant both by the parishioners and members of the family itself. The differences from normal which they consider worthy of comment are those which we would remark upon, viz., the presence of so many generations together, the youth of the grandparents, the large size of the family and the lack of infant mortality. The family is thus composed:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Relationship and Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marie</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Greatgrandmother, mother of J. Bte., living with him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Baptiste père</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Grandfather, still living on and working the farm he has passed on to his son.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Wife of J. Bte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Berte</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Their children and grandchildren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertine</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Local school teacher until her death at 37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucie</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Gray Nun, Quebec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isadore</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Single and living at home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celanire</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Day laborer at Quebec, married.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Paule</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Gray Nun, Quebec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Married and living in St. Denis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Living with widowed aunt and looking for employment in Quebec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Baptiste fils</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Inheriting son; in charge of farm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therèse</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>His wife, mother of five children, all living.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeleine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Local school teacher until her death at 37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gray Nun, Quebec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Luce</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Single and living at home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Day laborer at Quebec, married.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gray Nun, Quebec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Jean</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Married and living in St. Denis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Teacher at Levis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julienne</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Living at home and helping on farm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At home.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jean Baptiste père gave all of his daughters two years' convent education. He started giving Thomas a college course but the boy had to stop because of a tubercular leg. Hospital expenses used up the money intended for his education. Now he is thrown on his own to find means of support.

The whole social system and the family system upon which it is dependent are based upon large families and the eventual establishment of all the children, save one, outside the paternal home. To function properly there must be a continual outlet for this surplus. In France, from whence the system came, the disappearance of the outlets resulted in decreased birth rate. During the first two centuries after the French came to Canada, there was always unopened land on which the noninheriting sons could establish themselves. When these lands in Quebec were taken up, there were industrial opportunities both in Quebec and New England to absorb the surplus. Most of these openings are closed now so that the surplus has little means of establishing itself. The decreasing death rate, due to provincial public health activity, is complicating the problem by increasing the

---

13 Kin terms are used as by the youngest member of the household.

14 There is inertia on the part of both French and English toward settlement of western Canada by the French. The problems presented by such Catholic minorities in the west are distasteful to both groups.
number of children to establish. The result has been the creation of a new economic group, as yet small. These are day laborers and consist of families of men who inherited no land and could find no positions. They live by odd jobs, peddling, and provincial road work. Their families are as large as the farming families but, having little economic security, the children know they must live by their own endeavors. The members of such families are more individualistic, less under paternal dominance and tend to be less faithful Catholics. As soon as the "right" ways of life cease to be successful ways, the social system is due to shift, trying to get adjusted. In the cities, the birth rate has been falling markedly but this tendency is much less noticeable in rural regions.\textsuperscript{15}

Another effect has been to make marriage more difficult because of economic uncertainty. There are numerous unmarried men and women to attest this fact.\textsuperscript{16} The old system still holds to such an extent that these persons are obliged to leave the home of their inheriting brother.

An analysis of the 120 households in the parish reveals both this situation and the normally functioning family cycle. By reference back to the diagram of the family cycle, it can be seen that on the average there are three generations in the household for six years and two generations for twenty-eight years. Out of all the households in the parish, ninety-one fit into the family cycle described. Variations in longevity extend the picture somewhat from the average. The following distribution shows the composition of 91 typical households:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Elementary family,—husband and wife, or parent(s) and children (and sibling of father in 2 cases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>3 generations,—grandparent(s), parent(s), their children (and unmarried sibling(s) of the male parent in 12 cases).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 generations,—great-grandparent, grandparent(s), parents and unmarried siblings of the male parent, his children.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these households, the "grandparents" may be the parents of either spouse. It may be clearly seen how the household moves from one stage to another following the cycle. The death of the older generation moves the household type up in the list. On the other hand, the marriage of inheriting sons increases the number of generations. The proportion of three generation households is slightly more than would be expected from the cycle diagram.

The remaining twenty-nine households are divided between seven variations on the typical cycle households and twenty-two which are utterly

\textsuperscript{15} Annuaire Statistique, Province de Québec, Québec, 1935.

\textsuperscript{16} 34.1 percent of the women and 23.4 percent of the men over forty years of age are unmarried.
different and demonstrate the effect on the social structure of the altered conditions due to lack of opportunity for establishment. The variations on the typical households consist of additional persons added to them. These again are persons who in most cases should be living elsewhere but who have been forced back on the family. Six households are of the elementary family type but have added to them a niece, brother-in-law, sister of the wife, hired man, aunt of the husband, related hired boy, blind boarder. The seventh case is a chance anomaly including several interrelated families. It consists of the sister of deceased maternal grandfather, maternal grandmother and her second husband and their daughter, daughter by the first marriage and her husband, the mother of the husband, his four children.

The other cases are made up for the most part of households of unmarried people such as sisters living together, brothers together, brother(s) and sisters together, men alone, women alone. Other single cases are brothers living together, one married; a man, his sister and three nieces; an old woman and her nephew; a man, his niece and hired girl; a man, his married nephew and wife. These are all obviously makeshift households formed in an effort to live on smaller incomes.

For centuries the family cycle in rural French-Canada has functioned so that all children were given the opportunity to earn a livelihood, marry and propagate. The cycle has not changed, but the social structure of which it was an integral part has become altered so that children no longer are assured a full social life. There are structural conflicts which can only be resolved by a return to old conditions made possible by a new outlet for surplus children or a change in the family composition itself.
French-Canadian Quebec is one of several strongholds of stable rural and town culture recently invaded by modern industry. The native population of Quebec is thoroughly used to the basic institutions and philosophy of capitalism, but is not habituated to their more extreme forms. This paper deals with a formerly quiet French-Canadian country town, now transformed into one of the leading Canadian centres of textile manufacture. Specifically, it will describe the present competitive position of the various classes in the town and relate the relevant facts to traditional life-objectives and expectations. Since but one case is presented, the treatment cannot be considered comparative in the full sense. A similar analysis could be made profitably in any community undergoing this type of change.

The paper makes explicit use of the concept of position and implicit reference to the concept of status. Position is an individual's place in a competitive system. Status is an attribute of a person in society. Subjectively, it consists of his own definition of his place within a system of recognized duties and privileges; objectively, it is the recognition that the person occupies in fact, such a place. In a well integrated system of life, status and position tend to correspond. Each type of position in the existing competitive system would, in the logically ideal case, be defined as a status.1

French-Canada has long had a system which approaches this degree of integration. Its basis, in rural parishes, is the family which owns its farm, exploits it by the labor of parents and children, and passes it on intact to one of the several sons. The town ideal has been that of the small entrepreneur and rentier, with special prestige and authority accorded the traditional professionals, the priest, the physician, the lawyer, the notary and the pharmacist. The system has not been self-contained, for it has produced in each generation a large surplus of population.2 Emigration from the territory has facilitated undisturbed operation of the system. Recently, industrial expansion has allowed the excess population to remain

1 R. E. Park is, to the best of my knowledge, the author of this distinction in the form here given. It is relevant to all sorts of disturbances which either dislodge individuals from the social systems which bred them or which change systems themselves.

2 The rural and village population of Quebec has increased by only 29 percent since 1871, while the urban population has increased by 524 percent. In the counties where the land is most tillable, the farm population has generally not increased at all or has actually decreased. Meanwhile, a high survival rate and heavy emigration have existed.

Dr. Horace Miner has recently described in detail the working of the rural system in one of the parishes which most closely approaches the ideal-type. His study, "St. Denis: a Quebec Rural Parish," is in the library of the University of Chicago; see also his article in this issue.
in the province, but outside the system. A new system within the old has affected the positions of various classes of people differently.

In 1911, the town had an almost completely French population of 2605. The traditional culture and institutional organization of French-Canada held undisputed sway. The leading class of business and professional men lived off the custom of the surrounding farming country. They disputed among themselves for places of honor and authority in parish and civic institutions. The community offered no greater prizes than these.

In 1937, the population was 19,424, of whom approximately 4,400 were employed in eleven industries. Only two of the eleven, with a total of seventy employees, are in any sense locally owned; these alone are managed by French-Canadians and correspond to the traditional type of personal and family enterprise. The others, as shown in the accompanying table, are of outside origin. They sprang into the town with fully formed managerial and technical staffs, machines, and all the institutional forms necessary for efficient exploitation of local water power and labor.

**Table 1. Origin and Management of Industries in a Quebec Industrial Town**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin of Company</th>
<th>Nationality of Manager</th>
<th>Number of Plants</th>
<th>Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Old-country English</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>American</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>English-Canadian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>French-Canadian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number of employees is exact for the first industry in the table; the other figures, given orally, may be a little too large. The largest industry (600 employees) reported as Canadian in origin was established by a New England cotton spinning concern. Since it is now affiliated with an old Canadian textile combine, it is listed as of Canadian origin. This plant has a resident American technical adviser. One of the American industries has also some connection with a concern in Alsace; the manager, although Alsatian in origin, came here from the United States and by order of the American company. The companies are all incorporated in Canada, but are closely connected with parent companies abroad.

The managerial staffs were sent here to establish and operate industry. Every manager came from the country in which the parent company has its seat. The old-country English manager of the largest industry exerts great authority in the town. He is the patron of such arts as flourish and is honorary president of most local organizations which are not purely French and Catholic. Other managers are important in the same manner, but only in such measure as befits the contributions of their respective concerns to the town payroll. No local business man is capable of making decisions so fate-

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3 In this analysis it is unnecessary to consider the remnant of an earlier English settlement still present. "English" is used generically, with qualification where necessary.
ful to the town as those executed, if not made, by these managers. This, in itself, is a change in the position of the local business men.

The managers operate the plants in which people earn the money spent in the town. The merchants compete for a share of the industrial payroll; collectively, they are concerned to keep industry operating without allowing it to escape altogether the tax burden of a growing town. No industrial manager is in competition with any local business man.

The managers acquired outside the town, or even outside the country, the skills and connections pertinent to their present positions. They constitute a sort of higher civil service of industry. Individually, they are technicians and agents with varying degrees of authority. Any one of them could be recalled by a board of directors of whom no member lives in the town and few live in Canada. If recalled, some of them would leave Canada; one or two would probably leave America. The orbit in which they compete is separate from that of local business men, and of different magnitude. To be sure, each manager must "make good" in the town, both as a technician and as a diplomatic superintendent of labor.

In addition to the managers, each industry brought a nucleus of technical and office men and of skilled workers. These, too, have generally come from the country of origin of the company. Some of the skilled workmen and foremen thus imported have risen to more important positions. English-Canadian engineers and office workers have been added.

Managers, departmental superintendents, engineers and the more important office workers occupy a special position in the town. Although they are salaried people, it is they who enliven the town with the secular, enterprising spirit of an industrial civilization. Their way of working stands in sharp contrast to the thrifty, shrewd, small scale personal and family enterprise of the French-Canadian, who is a traditional entrepreneur.

This managerial class, outwardly at least, has the highest standard of living in town. Their houses are bigger and fewer people live in them. They belong to the golf club and set the fashions in sports and amusements. Small families and cheap maids allow the women leisure for sports and afternoon social life. They can and do go to Montreal to shop, see the shows and consult city medical specialists. The upper class French families are larger, and have, generally, lower cash incomes, although they may own more real property. A few of the French families join in the more expensive social life of the English managerial class but most of them do not try it. An outside observer, however, does hear occasional expressions of envy at the easier and freer life of the new group.

The public relations of the managerial class with local French entrepreneurs and workers are diplomatic and forbearing. When local political issues arise involving taxation and labor problems, they exert their influence by diplomatic negotiation with the traditionally accepted leaders of
the native population. Publicly, they say nothing. Nor do they ever run for local office. Privately, they may complain, for there is much in the local culture to annoy these secular minded, active men who are accustomed to speak their minds on all matters. It was this imposed forbearance of the dominant stranger that R. E. Park may have had in mind when he remarked that his heart went out to the oppressors in India.4

Below this group stand the English speaking foremen, skilled workers and minor office workers. Since they lack the prestige of their superiors, but are as completely outside the local French social life, they are a complaining, marooned group. Some of them are being displaced by French-Canadians who are becoming more skilled and more used to the demands of minor executive work in industry. At this point alone is there effective competition of French with English. The French-Canadian is finding a line of modest advancement at a level where technical education and wider experience are not required.

This bottom class of industrial English population shares, however, with its superiors a fundamental lack of root in the community. An English person, of any grade of skill, would be foolish to move family and baggage to the town in the hope of subsequently peddling his services at the employment gates. He would be even more foolish to come to town to set up an independent business. In this respect, the English live under conditions characteristic of company towns and colonies.

The French-Canadian workers, the most numerous class, are, like their English superiors, new to the town. Unlike them, they were born near-by and are in the midst of their own culture. They now live in a larger, stranger and more exciting community than ever before. True, the familiar parish church and school are at hand; their native tongue is current; but movies, commercial sports, city fashions and newspapers, and the English language are also present. Even the parish is less a group of long associated, equal families closely bound by kinship, and more a large city institution with subsidiary organizations which deal with people in the mass along class lines. The English industrial group sojourns here in a small town among strange people, but it works and lives in a familiar system. The French workers live in a, to them, big town and work in a new system, although in a familiar cultural setting.

4 If the leaders of industry in a strange land find the local legal and policing institutions favorable to their purposes, they will remain diplomatic and forbearing; missionaries, carpet-baggers and agitators will not be welcomed. In the town in question, the investigator finds it amusing to hear American managers speak with heat of “foreign agitators,” i.e., slightly emancipated French-Canadians from New England. If the local institutions are not satisfactory, or if the people will not work for wages, the case may be differently handled.5

5 Fifty-nine percent of a large sample of male heads of families were born within 35 miles of the town; three-quarters, in a compact group of counties in which this town is the largest centre. The sample included 1345 of the 3426 families shown in the annual census taken by the Catholic parishes in 1936. Since most of the English industrial families came from a distance, the percentage of French from near-by is probably greater than the figures given.
Uninitiated and unskilled, the French-Canadian comes to town with his family to take a chance in the labor market. He is familiar with wagework, private property and the general institutional forms of industry. The rural capitalism of hard work and thrift he knows well; the rational, impersonal and ruthlessly efficient capitalism of industry is strange and somewhat frightening. Although he cannot and does not aspire to the more lucrative jobs in industry, he is completely severed from the farm which bred him. He must adjust his objectives to what is attainable in the new system.

The people of this group have a competitive advantage over strangers at their own level. Their standards of comfort are rural. Their families are large and it is normally expected that several members will work while remaining under one roof. The unmarried have relatives or friends with whom they may live and who will help them find work. They have, in short, a tenacious hold on life in the community.

This group is freer than any other in the town to speak its mind on matters of politics, economics and morals. Since they seek status only among their peers, they need not inhibit their speech or manners to keep face before either their own upper classes or the English. Although they recognize fully the authority of their English employers, they owe them no spiritual allegiance. The kind of success incarnate in these foreign leaders is both unattainable and outside the French-Canadian system of aspirations. Even the higher ambitions of the local culture are pointed toward the church, liberal professions and politics. Hence, technical and managerial success has no symbolic value which may be exploited for social control.

The classes thus far described live directly from the industrial payroll. There remain for consideration those who sell them goods and services. An accompanying table shows the number of business and service units.

Business and services are effectively in French hands. The few exceptions are marginal cases of which analysis is pertinent. Three of the five independent businesses and services are in the hands of locally born, bilingual English-Canadians who have roots in the community and are accustomed to dealing with the French population. They represent a once numerous but now nearly extinct group. All of the three sell or service automobiles. The local English people, who have great need of such services, are convinced that French-Canadians are indifferent mechanics. Some French-Canadians think so, too. Hence, these individuals have the confidence of both groups. The salesmanager of the largest French-owned automobile agency is also an English-Canadian of a once locally important mercantile family.

One of the remaining English service units is a hair dressing shop run by two American women. In this town, as in Canada generally, the United States has prestige in matters of fashion. The one English professional is a

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6 Of the 2168 employees in operating departments of the largest textile plant, 76 percent had no previous industrial experience. This does not include the engineering, maintenance and office staffs, among whom is a large proportion of experienced and trained people.
TABLE 2. BUSINESS AND SERVICE UNITS IN A QUEBEC INDUSTRIAL TOWN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Businesses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-managed</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired managers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>237</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi professional</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service shops</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Agents”</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Omitted from the table is one grocery and meat store, the only business in which an English-Canadian and a French-Canadian are in partnership. From the professional services are omitted clergymen, teachers and nurses. There is no competition between the nationalities in these fields. For the French of all classes, these services are performed by priests, brothers and nuns; for the English, by lay teachers and clergymen. A few English people make use of the local Catholic hospital; they generally patronize Montreal hospitals. The few English Catholics are in a marginal situation as there is no English speaking Catholic teacher or priest.

The trades of the table are carpenters, etc., who have shingles up offering their services to the public. The “agents” are people who measure customers for suits, corsets, etc., to be ordered by mail, take orders for and deliver medicines, spices and other articles. Such “agents” are common in rural Quebec as well as in the towns. Insurance agents are listed among the “quasi professionals.” In the professional group, the individual practitioner is the counted unit; in the other service categories, it is the office or shop.

** Some doubt about one or two but most of them are Jewish.

physician recently come to build up a practice among the English industrial population. He apparently gets but little practice which might otherwise go to the thirteen French physicians. At the same time, his practice is circumscribed by his English potential clients’ frequent use of the specialized medical services of Montreal.

All of the English businesses and services seem to trade upon the local variant of a probably common human trait, viz., a feeling that the mysteries of one’s own people are more to be trusted than those of ethnic strangers. The local mysteries attended with some such pathos are those of religion, education, the human body, hairdressing and of one’s automobile. The feeling circumscribes competition between the two ethnic groups.

In business, but not in the services, Jews compete. Twelve of the fifteen Jewish businesses were established after the coming of industry. The Jewish trader is the only stranger who, with small resources and no friends, has established himself as competitor of the local French businesses.7

While strange individuals have not given effective competition, the in-

7 The only Jew, a music teacher, who offers a service is married to a local French Catholic woman, whose religion he has taken. Nearly all Jews in Quebec towns quickly learn French.
corporated chain-store business has been able to do so. The local units of such businesses are operated, as is industry, by hired managers who are more or less itinerant. Twenty-five of the thirty-two persons in such positions are French-Canadian, as are all of the representatives of insurance companies. Knowledge of the vernacular is obviously more important in the voluntary manager-customer relationship which may be terminated by the customer on slightest provocation, than in the industrial manager-employee relationship which may be so fatefully terminated by the manager. Of the seven bank branches, only the two which carry the heavy accounts of English owned industries and utilities have English-Canadian managers.8 The others, primarily savings branches, have French help.

The small group of French who previously occupied the preferred places in business and the professions is still practically intact. Few have left or changed their occupations. One, as a company physician, has found a place in industry. One lawyer often acts for the electrical power company. Some sell minor supplies to the industries. Otherwise, industry has profited them, if at all, only indirectly. The more enterprising of them encouraged the industries to come. So great was their faith in the resultant increase of their businesses and of the value of their real estate that they allowed the incoming industries large exemptions from taxation for long periods.

Some realized their hopes by successful speculation in land or by aggressive adaptation of their businesses and services. The outstanding success story of the town is that of a native who combined these two methods. For the English and better-off French, he enlarged his garage and automobile sales agency, for which he hired a local English-Canadian as sales manager. For the new French working classes, he developed a large furniture store in charge of a French-Canadian sales manager who is very shrewd in gauging the tastes of the poorer newcomers.9 This man has not tried to compete in the same realm as the industrial English; he has only exploited their presence. Others have emulated him in a smaller way. One won the confidence of the English and a monopoly of their milk trade by installing modern pasteurizing equipment. Others built houses and apartments. Still others went bankrupt on bad guesses about the direction of growth of the town. Some of the children of families of the local upper class have taken industrial white-collar jobs, respectable but of no great promise. No son of such a family is, so far as can be discovered, being trained in engineering. A few of the daughters of such families have married young English industrial men, whom they evidently believe to have great futures.

The evidence about the industrial accounts of the banks is not quite above doubt.

This sales manager has successfully pushed sales of a type of bed that can be used as a settee in the daytime. French people, he says, always have such large families and so many visitors that an extra bed is wanted; yet, no matter how poor, they insist on a salon. Since they pass most of their time in the kitchen, and therefore want a kitchen stove that gives heat, and since electrical power is cheap and coming to be coveted by housewives, he pushes sales of a combination cooking stove which burns wood in winter and uses electricity in summer.
On the whole, however, these older local men have not profited as much as they hoped. Many of them own, live and do business on property in the older part of town. Meanwhile the centre of population has moved and a new business street is growing some distance away. The very stability which is represented by proprietorship thus limits the ability of some of the older people to take full advantage of the new conditions.

A more significant change in their relative position lies in the great increase in the number of businesses and service units. Table 3 shows the increase in the number of professionals. Exact information as to the former number of businesses is not available, but it is evident that the increase has been great. Formerly there were two hardware stores, owned by old families; now there are nine, of which two are large branches of outside companies. Some of the new units are as large or larger than the older ones; some are more advantageously situated. Several of the new physicians are specialists, as are none of those who were practicing before industry came. Nevertheless, the newcomers of their own level and culture are accepted as fellows by the older people, with whom they join in professional association and in the Chambre de Commerce.

Fairly sharply distinguished from this class are the owners of numerous small enterprises and services. The ideal of the French-Canadian is to have a modest business, financed by savings. He is full of projets for himself or his son. Pressed by the size of their families and by the limited opportunities, such people have swarmed to this boom town. Any enterprise will do, so long as it does not require much capital or experience. The French-Canadian, like the Jew, loves an independent enterprise; he trades, however, not with strangers, but with friends and relatives upon whom he presses his claims to patronage. The stranger in the town, if he speaks French, finds that his landlady is a plugger for a laundress, a small grocer, a cleaner and a taxidriver with one old car and no phone.

These marginal enterprises, invariably in the quarters occupied by the family, may combine groceries with drygoods or soft drinks with hardware. Many sell cheap silk remnants bought from the local mills with the stipulation that they be not offered for sale. Dressmakers by the dozen make up the remnants into dresses or even into suits for small boys. Often the owner works in the mills while his wife keeps shop, or the children work while the parents keep house and shop. The wholesalers say that most of them were
never in business before and they do not make a living at it. These marginal entrepreneurs do not feel any solidarity between themselves and the larger merchants. They will not “play the game” of supporting public improvements and movements for the regulation of business. Living at the subsistence level of the mass of workers, their only concern is to dig in by whatever means they can. With stubborn peasant independence, they tactlessly applaud nationalistic talk about foreign corporations which do not pay their share of taxes and give their best jobs to strangers.

In summary, the old competitive structure had its apex in a merchant and professional class, whose members had, as if by right, the highest status in town. This class is intact and is, in comparison with its own past, well enough off. A group of alien managers and technicians, competing in a larger sphere, now has greater power over the fate of the town and enjoys a more conspicuously attractive standard of living which sets the fashions. The old top class is in competition with a relatively large number of newcomers of their own level and nationality; in addition, they feel the competition of a large group of marginal entrepreneurs who do not fully recognize traditional leadership. The main new class is made up of the workers native to the region but strange to the competitive system in which they must now struggle for existence. The points of competition between French and English are few, but it is obvious that the shifting in relative position of the existing classes and the evident advantageous position of English people have made the native French self-conscious. They are restless and inclined to listen to attacks on the strangers and the new system.

It is further evident that, in the new system, the traditional objectives of the French-Canadian, viz., small enterprise, ownership of real estate, and, for the upper classes, practice of traditional professions, will not yield the security of position they gave in rural Quebec. It is one thing to have traditional ambitions questioned in a strange land but quite another to have them frustrated in one’s own territory and in the midst of one’s own people. It is also clear that the competitive assets which the hitherto stable French-Canadian culture gives those bred to it, are not mobile and liquid. They can be realized only at home. The only French-Canadian who can move out into the big, secular world without loss is he who has nothing of position or status to lose. This makes it but the more disturbing to have these same assets nullified in one’s own bailiwick. The elements of this situation probably are found, in varying combinations, wherever a solid, local, sacred culture is disturbed by a more secular and expansive system introduced by rational minded, eager aliens.
UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY DATA FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Dorothy Swaine Thomas
Yale University

T he situation in America with regard to statistical sociology is probably unique. The postwar decades have seen the development of a group of sociologists who have defined their research problems in realistic terms which call for empirical tests; who are convinced that these tests must, in the long run, assume a quantitative form; who are fairly well trained in theoretical and applied statistics; but who find themselves faced with a dearth of sources which might yield the data they so urgently need. That real progress has been made in spite of defective sources is clear to anyone who has followed this development.

That there have been dangers inherent in proceeding too far and too fast in the application of refined statistical techniques to data derived as administrative by-products has, however, been recognized by some of the more thoughtful sociologists, among whom Frank Ross and Thorsten Sellin may be mentioned. As Ross has said, "Our greatest danger lies in defining our phenomena in terms of the most available series, thereby stultifying our entire theoretical concepts." The unwise application of statistical methods and the resulting stultification of theoretical concepts has made the statistical sociologist peculiarly vulnerable to attack by those theorists who have neither the inclination nor, often, the technical competence to attempt any empirical, quantitative tests of their generalizations, but whose intellectual acuity enables them to show the weakness in this approach.

Another danger in the concentration on the most available sources is that the very nature of these sources has limited the field of sociological investigation. Sociology includes the field of human interaction, as conditioned or modified by environmental situations. Its problems are largely concerned with defining, measuring and evaluating differentials. But by far the greater part of existing sources provides data only on extreme deviates from "normal" social functioning (e.g., crime, vice and poverty), just because it has been necessary for purposes of administration to keep record of the underprivileged, the dependent, and the delinquent classes. It is not surprising, therefore, that sociological research has been overdeveloped (in quantity if not in quality) on the pathological side and underdeveloped on the normal side even though it is recognized that differentials can be determined only by a comparison of these deviates with an adequate control group of the socially normal. It is as though the economist studying the development of industry were limited to bankruptcy data.

1 Fields and Methods of Sociology, 463, L. L. Bernard, ed.
Now, in examining the new and rich source of data afforded by Social Security statistics we can do much to further the development of sociological use of these data if we can minimize these two dangers through a constant awareness of their existence by the following procedure:

(1) Becoming thoroughly acquainted with the source as it now exists, paying particular attention to the definitions and method of data collection;

(2) Stating such of our problems as require data of the general sort afforded by this source regardless of the immediate limitations of the source;

(3) Deciding how well the existing data apply to our problems.

I. In this paper, it seems best to concentrate on the data available in connection with compulsory old age insurance rather than unemployment compensation, since the old age system is organized on a strictly federal basis, whereas unemployment compensation is state-decentralized. The feature of centralization gives us greater assurance of comparability of data than is possible under a decentralized system. Also, with a view to future uses of the data, it seems more likely that the coverage will be extended in the case of old age insurance than in the case of unemployment compensation, and, indeed, it already covers certain classes specifically excluded from the unemployment compensation scheme.

The 40 million or more records of individuals who are, at present, registered under the old age insurance system, give us the following information about each person included: his date of birth, place of birth, parentage, color or race, and sex; his location at time of initial registration; and his industrial connection at that time. These 40 million records include all persons who have been gainfully employed at any time since November 1936 with certain notable exceptions, among which are persons employed in agriculture, those in domestic service in a private home, the self-employed, etc. Similar data will be obtained for all persons entering the covered industries at any time in the future.

The most important feature of these records is their continuous nature. There will be entered on every record for every quarter, the quarterly earnings received at every covered industrial establishment at which the individual has worked, with, however, an arbitrarily fixed upper limit of the record at annual earnings of $3000. Thus we will eventually have an authenticated record of the earnings and industrial connections throughout the whole career of a large number of individuals.

II. It is clear that a wide variety of sociological research problems call for an accurate record of earnings or income. Sociologists have long been impressed with the important role played by economic factors in determining behavior. It is claimed that the incidence of births, deaths, marriages, divorces, crimes, and migrations is, to a greater or less extent, determined by the economic situation in which the individuals concerned
find themselves, but it must be admitted that the evidence behind this conviction is not of the sort that bears directly on the implied hypotheses. Most of the evidence is indirect and much of it is in fact conflicting. We have, for example, correlated the cyclical fluctuations of various behavior series, e.g., the birth rate with the fluctuations in various economic series; e.g., wholesale prices and percentage unemployed (inverted); and we have also correlated the birth rate in various regions with an index of the average economic well-being in these areas, e.g., average rent or percentage of domestic servants. The results of such studies show considerable uniformity for each type of study, but are contradictory as between the two types, viz., birth rates are positively correlated with temporal variations in economic well-being, but negatively correlated with regional variations in economic well-being. Thus, instead of a "conclusion" we find ourselves with two conflicting, untested hypotheses. More direct evidence, by which we can compare the experience of various groups segregated according to their economic development, is obviously called for. This segregation must be so ordered that we have continuous time-series for each group, representing each of the two factors whose relationship we are testing, namely, economic well-being on the one hand and births on the other. For this purpose, we need an adequate measure of the amount and direction of change in measurable economic well-being over a period of time. Up to the present, however, most of our direct studies have, of necessity, related what is essentially a time-series (births over the childbearing period, or births for a specified period of marriage) to a static measure of economic well-being such as income for the year preceding the investigation or some other narrow interval. So far as the writer knows, the only investigators who have been able adequately to use a more dynamic approach are Edin and Hutchinson in their Stockholm studies\(^2\) where, through the admirable cooperation of the census bureau and other administrative agencies with the investigators, it was possible to compare the ten-year fertility of groups having specified income in 1920 and showing favorable or unfavorable change in income by the end of the decade, holding constant age and education. This analysis showed "a uniformly higher fertility for the families with 'favorable' income change"\(^3\) compared with those having "unfavorable" income change. The numbers involved in this study were necessarily small, and we have no assurance that the Stockholm situation would hold in other areas. Here is a sociological research problem of great importance calling for at least a repetition and if possible an improvement\(^4\) of the Stockholm approach with American data. Through other sources and by


\(^3\) *Op. cit.*, 84.

\(^4\) The Swedish investigators were limited to records of income at the beginning and end of the decade, and hence to a figure representing net change between the terminal points. What is needed, of course, is a time-series for the ten-year period.
field studies of various sorts, we can obtain the other relevant data, but only through the eventual cooperation of Social Security can we hope to obtain the authenticated record of favorable or unfavorable changes in earnings. If these data can be made available at the appropriate time, let us say at the end of ten years, we can look forward to disentangling the economic factor in a situation the sociological implications of which are obvious but the complexities of which have been so great and the sources so defective that we have as yet little precise knowledge about the operation of economic factors in stimulating or inhibiting reproduction.

The same need for a continuous record of the earning and income fluctuations of groups segregated in terms of certain defined characteristics is felt for an adequate analysis of all the phenomena included in the study of social aspects of the business cycle; for example, marriage, divorce, crime and migration. We have long since reached diminishing returns in respect to the correlation of indexes of these phenomena, whether these correlations are in terms of temporal or regional units. It was important to clear the ground by showing that in general the fluctuations in these behavior series correspond to the fluctuations in economic series, but until we can analyze time-series which indicate (a) the temporal variations in economic well-being of a group with specified characteristics and, (b) the variations in behavior of the same group, and repeat these analyses for groups of various defined characteristics, we shall not get very far in our attempt to demonstrate the relationship between economic and social differentials.

The type of study just described obviously requires the collation of data from several sources, of which Social Security is unquestionably the key-source. There are, in addition, a number of sociological problems which can be partially or wholly solved by the use of Social Security data alone. Among these, the following may be mentioned.

1. Sex Differentials in Respect to Earnings and Employment. How do the earnings of women compare with those of men in the same industry, holding age and time constant? Does the trend of women's earnings rise as rapidly with age as the trend of men's earnings? What is the relative position of the sexes with respect to earnings during the different phases of the business cycle? Stouffer suggests, in regard to this last point that "if the woman tends to fare relatively better than the man in depression employment (as, in my opinion, was the case in 1930-35) this means presumably that the relative prestige of men tends to suffer more in depression than prosperity." All these questions of the relative economic success of the sexes have profound implications for the analysis of the changing family situation, and, thus, even though Social Security statistics provide no data on the family as such, they may aid greatly in fundamental family research and serve as a background for more detailed sociological studies.

Communication to the writer.
2. The Age Differential in Respect to Earnings and Employment. Two long-time trends which are important for sociological analysis and which are closely interrelated are the progressive aging of the population and the operation of technological change in the direction of replacing men by machines. Social Security data should throw light on the time at which occupational obsolescence occurs in various industries, on the trend of earnings with increasing age, and, again, on how persons of various age levels fare in times of depression and prosperity. The extent to which light can be thrown on these questions, again, has profound implications for the analysis of the changing family situation, e.g., the extent to which dependence of parents on children may be increasing, and the resultant loss of prestige of the dependent father, as well as for the analysis of the individual's means of adjustment to a changing social situation.

3. The Race Differential in Respect to Earnings and Employment. Unless, as seems improbable, the restrictions on immigration are relaxed, differentials between foreign born whites and native born whites will become less and less important. The Negro-white differentials, on the other hand, are likely to become increasingly important if the trend of urban and northward migration of the Negro persists, as seems probable. Here again, any light that can be thrown on the relative earnings of the races in specified industries and regions, holding time, sex and age constant, and on their relative economic well-being during periods of depression and of prosperity will be welcomed by the sociologist.

4. The Extent and Nature of Internal Migrations. The particular aspect of migrations which can be studied most appropriately with the aid of Social Security data is labor mobility. We know from recent Swedish, German, and Dutch studies that internal migration does not consist of a single, one-directional stream from country to city, or from agriculture to industry, but that a large, and apparently increasing proportion is from one city to another or from one industry to another. So far as America is concerned, we are almost completely ignorant of the nature and extent of this process, its temporal variations, its regional span, or its selectivity. If, as is widely assumed, the fundamental cause of these migrations is a desire to better themselves on the part of the individuals concerned, the extent to which migration is followed by an increase in earnings is a problem worth investigating. Some light can be thrown on this and also on the extent of age and sex selectivity of these migrations by utilizing Social Security data. It is, indeed, probable that the data can be utilized to throw light on other important aspects of selective migration, two of which may be

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mentioned: (1) The relative economic success, as measured by earnings, of migrants and nonmigrants in the same industry (holding age, sex, race, etc. constant); and (2) The relative mortality from various causes, e.g., tuberculosis, of migrants and nonmigrants. This can, of course, be studied only after the records of enough death claims become available.

III. Several points should be held in mind as to the applicability of existing Social Security data to the research problems outlined above.

(1) A few of these problems could be enlightened by analysis of the data already accumulated, but most of the problems outlined require time-series. This means that, if Social Security data are to be serviceable to the social scientist, measures must be taken to safeguard the comparability of the data over a period of time. If, for example, coverage is extended to other groups of employees than those now included, the comparability of the data will be destroyed unless the new groups are clearly identifiable.

(2) As long as coverage is incomplete, the number of usable records for sociological research is bound to thin out rapidly with time. The various research problems outlined in the preceding section require continuous records of the earnings of each individual making up various groups or classes. It will be impossible to evaluate gaps in the records of these individuals without access to other sources. These gaps may mean unemployment or they may mean employment in some noncovered field, such as agriculture. The total number of cases covered by old age insurance are, in the first instance, a selection. The usable records, after a lapse of time, will be a selection of a selection. It is essential that we know what sort of selection we are getting and what sorts of cases are being excluded.

(3) It should be remembered that the present form of the records will determine the limits of their research usefulness for a long time to come. The records would be of much greater service for research purposes if they included occupation as well as industry, if they indicated the periods of employment of the individuals concerned in noncovered fields, particularly agriculture, domestic service and self-employment, and if there were no arbitrarily fixed upper limit of recorded earnings. It is not impossible that these factors will be considered sufficiently important for administrative purposes to be eventually included in the records, but the original records of the basic 40 million, which are being increased at the rate of about half a million a month at the present time, can never be altered in terms of any changes that may subsequently be introduced.

In conclusion then, we have a new and rich source of data, but a source that is by no means perfectly adapted to sociological research problems. Our desire to exploit this source should not blind us to its limitations. If, keeping these in mind, we can organize the data so as to produce continuous time-series of the fluctuations in economic well-being of various carefully defined groups and collate with these series, data from other sources, we may open up a new and important type of sociological research.
THE LIFE HISTORY IN COMMUNITY STUDIES

John Dollard
Yale University

The use of the life history in community studies has been initiated and elaborated by Thomas and Znaniecki¹ and effectively continued by Shaw.² Their work has provided a new orientation on the individual, that is, a view of him as a member of a community and bearer of culture. It is proposed here to carry on this line of research by asking the following question: If all one knew about a community was what one got from a specific life history, what kind of perspective on it would one have? If there is realism to the dictum that the "individual and society are aspects of one another,"³ or that personality is the "subjective aspect of culture,"⁴ then one should be able to view the life history subject as a participant in various forms of group life. The best way to get a child’s eye view of a community would be to study a child. This research is now in the process, but short of this, one might study the early material of a psychoanalytic life history from the standpoint of the group processes which it might reveal. This has been done, and a detailed life history record has been canvassed for the material from it which would especially reveal community processes.⁵

From a methodological standpoint, the intensive life history may be a valuable way of making an exploratory study. Too often the exploratory phase is missed in sociological researches, and the researcher relies on his own intuition in discerning the variables to be studied and measured. One of the greatest values of the anthropologist is that he gives us the perspective which makes familiar facets of our social life seem strange and therefore, to some degree, objects.⁶ Somewhat the same experience is obtainable by studying the life history of another individual,—the familiar and intuitive perceptions of social life can be made clear and external.

Everyone assumes, I suppose, that variables have to be discerned before

⁵ The data used in this paper have been abstracted from a voluminous record. They are perhaps a two hundredth part of the information available on this individual. No attempt has been made to present the psychological problems involved, but they have been controlled quite completely, i.e., the individual's history is more or less understood from the subjective standpoint. It is suggested that the clear understanding of the genetic-psychological aspect of the data gives a much greater freedom to sociological perception.
⁶ For example, see the clarity as regards our society which is brought forward by W. L. Warner, "The Society, the Individual and His Mental Disorders," Amer. J. Psychiatry, Sept., 1937, 94:272-283. The writer is much indebted to Professor Warner for his conception of "social place" and all that it involves.
they can be measured, and every sociologist knows that too often measure-
ments begin as a routine operation before there is adequate exploration of
the scene where measurement is to take place. Here, the life history is
offered as an aid in picking out factors of relevance in community life. It
reveals not only the processes familiar from studies on the societal level
of perception but also other factors which cannot be sensed on this level.
For example, the emotional forces bound by community life are seen near
at hand through the telescope of the life history. Exploratory research is
admittedly fumbling in a problematic situation; it is here offered that the
life history is one effective way of going about the fumbling process. It has
a way of showing not only the existence but the possible relationship or
contour of the functioning variables. A case in point would be the transfer,
as in our subject, of a passive, dependent relationship from the parents to
the leaders in the childhood play group. The intimidated child in the family
set-up carries the marks of his intimidation over to his companions of the
same age. Again, from the life history, one may see some of the functions
of collective life which are not obvious if only the behavioristic cultural
outlines are observed. Such a function is a special role of social arrange-
ments in controlling aggressive behavior. The importance of intimacy, for
instance, is more intelligible when one understands the degree to which it
is assurance against doing harm to others or being injured by them. This
kind of variable could not even be identified at the level of abstract com-
mi city study, and yet everyone would agree that intimate relations are of
importance in cementing communal solidarity.

The view of psychoanalytic life history materials here advanced is the
one which seems least important from the standpoint of the psychological
theorist. That it does seems so is undoubtedly a sign of naiveté, though
pardonable, on his part. The conceptual line of sight of psychoanalysis is
aimed at something different, i.e., at the emotional conditioning of the
individual, but the conditioning forces themselves are very meagerly
described in psychoanalytic theory. With the conceptual instruments of the
sociologist applied to carefully recorded life history data, we may discover
much of value to illustrate and illuminate societal life. A good deal of
what is to come has the character of being obvious from the sociological
standpoint; its only interest is in the fact that the data can be appropriately
classified against the sociological standpoint; and that this can be done with
the materials from a supposedly remote discipline like psychoanalysis will
come as news to some. It is also true that some of this material, such as the
size of the town, number of foreign born, etc., might have been gained and
more sharply defined from existing census materials; what the psycho-
analytic study seems to provide is the identification of relationships which
are not discerned by the census or discoverable in any other way than by
intensive individual study.
The record from which these data are drawn was made on a male individual who was thirty years old at the time of the study. It represents data from the first seven years of his life, notably years four, five, six, and seven. The record then relates to a small American town between the years 1905 and 1909, since the study was made in 1931. The individual studied exhibited at the outset of the study serious deformations in his social relations, such as acute mistrust of other people, inability to work efficiently, and a low level of satisfaction in his married life. These problems and their solution will not be reported upon, but the attempt to solve them provided adequate motivation for the acquisition of a very detailed report of the person's life along its whole length. Some of his early memories will be utilized for the following analysis.

The informant remembered his town as a long, narrow one, strung along the bank of a river. On one side were the shoe factories, but no people lived over there; on his side of the town was the business nucleus which was actually on the bank of the river with the residential area flung around it. He lived at the edge of town, and he remembered that in doing errands for his mother, it took him about fifteen minutes to walk to a store in the business section. It was, on the other hand, five minutes to open country from his house. He had a clear picture of the streaming throngs of workmen going across the bridge to the factories, of the low mill buildings and of the water tumbling over the several dams. The factory whistles blew six days a week at seven in the morning and six at night, and he remembered his parents setting the clocks by them. On Saturdays, he recalled catching rides on the backs of farmers' wagons loaded with produce for the downtown stores. The same wagons went back on Saturday afternoon, taking home supplies.

This is obviously then a small industrial town in a rural area. Both parents came from farms in the area surrounding the town, which would suggest the possibility that the native born population is recruited for city life from this local area.

Though the informant was not a social analyst, his data provided immediate definition of the family form into which he came. He had the conventional recollections of being threatened with his father's authority for misdeeds at home. Father, he learned, was a very fine man but also a severe one to unruly children. He worked very hard and earned all the money that the family got. Therefore, to spend money carelessly or to throw a stone through a neighbor's window was really robbing father. It was clear to informant that mother was dependent on father, and although she was the real boss in the house, she always pretended to defer to him and probably was at bottom afraid of him. In domestic arguments, mother might end up by crying, whereas father never cried; he only glowered if his ultimate control was challenged. There was no one around to dispute
father's authority,—no grandfather, no uncle. Father did have a boss somewhere, but that did not mean much in the home.

The informant experienced a good deal of resentment toward both of his parents, but particularly toward his mother. She was busy with the other children, three of them, and the oldest son had to take his place in line; as more children came it seemed that the line in front of him grew steadily longer. He craved for companionship with his father and that the father would take him as a real confidant, but this never happened; the father seemed too busy and too preoccupied with his own work. When the boy brought a lunch pail to his father, as he did every day, he always hoped to be allowed to handle his father's tools and to have their use explained to him, but this again did not happen. It seemed that he only came to his father's attention when disciplinary matters were involved. Otherwise, life was too strenuous for the "old man" to be concerned about any but the youngest child during its baby period or a little longer if it was a girl. His mother was also busy. As a usual thing, there was no help in the house and beside childbearing there was the complete routine of family duties to be done,—washing one day, baking another day, cleaning another day, and the like. The mother seemed too harried and heckled by her life to spare love for the older children. On the contrary, she was likely to stress her burdensome position and to use it as an argument in demanding absolute obedience from the informant and his brothers and sister. The informant felt, therefore, very much alone and somewhat neglected in the family circle and, for this reason, welcomed with extreme eagerness his first play-group contacts.

A partial rejection by his parents, as described, resulted in a considerable animosity toward them which could not be expressed, but toward the brothers and sister who were in part the cause of the parental neglect he could and did fell extremely vindictive. They had the privileges of childhood which he had begun to lose. They were preferred and, so it seemed, protected by the parents. However, they were relatively defenseless against him, especially if he could find ways of abusing them which were not detectable, and he showed a devious defiance toward his father by punishing his siblings. He invented names for them, referring to their babyishness and immaturity, made up songs in which these derisive names were used, and made a number of excursions into actual physical attack. The latter was always put down by the parents but the less tangible derision was difficult to catch.

The longing for tenderness from his parents, a tenderness which would have comforted him for the many bad intentions he had toward them and the disobedient things which he actually did, accumulated on a particular Christmas in his fifth year. He had desperately expected some mark of preferment in the type of Christmas presents which he would receive. He
had exploded, of course, the Santa Claus legend by this time, since he had
found the presents before Christmas and overheard his parents writing
labels on them and decorating the tree. This deceit on the part of his
parents gave him some courage for the many deceits which he was practic-
ing and later had to practice himself. Christmas morning came, and the
presents were just ordinary presents, not much better than those of the
other children; perhaps not as good in some ways. This event ended the
struggle for rapport with his father and mother. All right, then, it was every
man for himself, and one got affection wherever one could get it and ex-
pected nothing more for nothing.

From the foregoing, the outline of the roles of this father and mother is
fairly clear. We see the isolated, small family unit of the patriarchal type,
with formal authority lodged in the father. There is no assertion that this
family form was typical for the community. There must have been a type
of family, however, which did its "duty" toward children, was perhaps too
busy to do more than this bare duty, too busy to give its children the affection-
ate contacts which they needed. Possibly this family type develops
strong and ruthless personalities in the most deprived children just because
they must turn away from family sources of security at an early age.

Clear in the informant's account of his family was the imposition of the
incest taboo. He remembered that occasion when he was still sleeping with
his little sister, his next sibling. He remembered waking up in the morning,
and the rest is unclear. All he knew is that he felt something toward her,
and that he was teasing her or that he asked her if he could do something or
see something. At any rate, he crawled over on top of her, though he did
not exactly know what he wanted to do. She screamed and the mother
came running. The sister "told" on him, though he tried to "shush" her.
The mother threatened to tell the father when he came home, and a dread-
ful fear settled on the informant, but he did not know of what. Nothing
seemed to have happened in fact, but the fear persisted, and with it per-
sisted an animosity toward the sister. Undoubtedly this is the psychological
correlate of the incest taboo. In this connection, the informant remembered,
also, that when his father went away, he used to say, "Take care of your
mother," and there seemed to be a warning lurking in his voice. He was
warning his son to be obedient and docile toward his mother, but the
informant took the words to mean something more. Did his father know
of those strange, strong feelings which the boy had when sometimes he
was still caressed by his mother? What would he do if he did know? At
any rate, the informant understood that he must be very tender toward
his mother, must never make any aggressive gestures toward her and
must behave like a good boy. Apart from the atmosphere of the house which
was a restraining one and the general taboo on sexual thoughts and feelings
which was indicated by complete avoidance of reference to them, these
were the only data derived directly on the question of the subject's erotic feelings toward family members.

If the informant's feelings toward mother and sister were vague and confused, he does remember strong, erotic wishes toward a maid who was in the house for a few weeks at the time of his mother's fourth pregnancy, that is, when he was six years old. He remembered wanting to go in and sleep with this maid; he wanted to see her dress and undress, and in particular he wanted to see her breasts. He was discouraged from the attempt to see her, however, by a story which his mother told about a woman who caught a man peeping through a keyhole at her and shoved a hat pin into the keyhole and into his eye. Nevertheless, on one occasion he did get up his courage to approach the maid. She was standing at the telephone (certainly a mark of high working class status for this family) and the informant reached under her dress and grabbed her by the leg. She hit him a blow on the head which sent him spinning and ended his approaches to her. She too, apparently, was within the circle of the forbidden. He felt this blow on the head, in memory, many times later when he tried to make contact with women.

The informant learned another fact about the behavior of his family. He noticed that his parents would stop a quarrel if the maid were to appear, and that he was often reproved especially for quarreling with his brothers and sister if strangers were in the house. He learned that a family puts up an appearance of solidarity before the outside world whether it actually feels it or not and that in-family aggression is to be suppressed or concealed in the presence of "others." Impertinence toward his parents was reproved with special severity if outsiders learned about it because his parents "did not want to be made fools of by their own children." The informant was, of course, manifesting the mos which enjoins family solidarity.

In the course of our discussions, the informant enumerated all of the people that he knew in his neighborhood group. It proved to be a small group in the immediate area around his home and added up to about forty people. More important than this, these people whom the informant knew all knew one another and were related to one another dynamically in important ways. He knew the parents of all his child friends, and their parents, in turn, knew his. He belonged, therefore, to a little "band" in Linton's sense. Of course, it was not a band from the standpoint that there was common cooperative work but only from the standpoint of common occupancy of land and vital social relations. He noticed that there seemed to be a kind of informal policing of all the children by all of the parents as well as informal feeding and protection. For instance, he often got cookies and candy at Aunt Ella's house next door, and at the same time Mrs. White,
who lived across the street, reported to his mother that he was seen running logs on the river bank. It was a small, stable, neighborhood world into which our informant came.

The boys' group into which the informant was inducted at the age of six was a differentiated aspect of the neighborhood. For some time he was kept out of this group because he was too little and he had to observe its interesting expeditions as an isolated outsider. If one did not belong to the group there were only the detested younger children to play with. Finally, however, one of the group leaders approached him and made him a proposal, if our informant would agree to marry the leader's older sister when he grew up, he would be admitted to the group. The sister was very homely, but the informant felt that no price was too high to pay for this privilege, especially if payment was sufficiently deferred, so he consented to join. He was taken on the frog spearing expeditions, introduced to the hut behind the barn where you crawled in and told stories, allowed to compete with the other boys in walking the rails on the near-by railroad track and given much very specific sexual information. By age and emotional disposition our subject was always a "follower" in his play group; this has already been referred to as a chronic attitude toward authoritarian persons which was transferred to the playgroup from the family where it originated. Placation of father and playgroup leader remained for many years a distinguishing psychic characteristic of this man.

No sex practices were carried on by the gang, but the subject was told, what he did not need to be told, that his father did something to his mother at night, that something came out of his father's penis and went into the mother, that you don't get this until you are grown up, and that this "something" made a baby in mother. He was rigorously warned never to let on to his parents that he had this information on penalty of expulsion from the gang; he never did tell, and his father was so stupid when the boy was ten years older as to give him, very shyly, some of the information in a roundabout way which he had long had in such concrete form. These data suggest the possibility that there is a definite "child level" of culture which is transmitted from one generation to the next, exclusive of the formal parental inculcation.

Another important aspect of the playgroup for the informant was that he was definitely weaned from close emotional dependency on his parents. For the first time, he was able to deceive them whole-heartedly and with the sense of group support. The thoroughgoing band-control of child behavior by a unified group of parents was met by an opposed playgroup which validated many of the behavior tendencies disapproved by the adults. Guilty deceit was changed for a more courageous deceit which was possible with the support of other and older boys. Undoubtedly, the lesson of deceit had been learned in the family itself, as the Christmas incident shows,
but it was enormously strengthened by association in the playgroup. It seemed, in fact, that the playgroup performed a great service for this boy in thus mitigating the destructive effect of the high parental ideals of perfect behavior which were held up to him.

Although the neighborhood or band dominated his life quite completely at this age, he was not without knowledge that this neighborhood was limited in area. He knew, for instance, that there was a group of German boys in the same school where he went to first grade. There was fighting and stone throwing between him and his gang and this group. These boys talked a kind of gibberish at home and were said to eat nothing but sauerkraut and sausage. Their fathers worked in the mills, and they went to a separate church where they had a minister who came from a long way off. He knew also that Aunt Ella next door was a seamstress, and he used to see her working on the long veils which were used in the Polish weddings. He did not know anything about the Poles except this; they also talked a funny and different language and lived on the other side of town. They were supposed to be dirty and very much less respectable than his own family. Once his gang went down to Polack-town and exchanged a shower of stones with the Polish boys, but beat a hasty retreat when the Polacks gathered in force. Polack girls were said to be easy to play with if you could once get at them. In general, they were a low group, but were supposed to be very strong as individuals.

We see above, of course, the familiar minority group picture which has shattered the solidarity of the native white American society and which differentiates a town like this one from a similar town in England. Where social groups of contrasting customs exist side by side, the impression of crushing absoluteness is gone from primary group life.

The informant's father did not drink, except for possibly a glass of beer at a family reunion. No liquor was kept in the house, but across the street was a saloon; there was much activity there, especially on Saturday night. The subject sometimes heard shouts and sounds of fighting from his bedroom and sometimes even before he went to bed he would see a drunken man staggering out of the saloon. On one occasion, he saw two men fighting in front of the saloon in the late afternoon, and one of them picked up a stone and struck the other on the forehead. The boy was terrified at the stunned, crushed, and bleeding body of the man who had been hit. Some of the Polacks and "sausage-eaters" used to go to this saloon as well as the younger fellows just in from the farm. Now and then one of these fellows would try to pump the informant about the maid. Did he ever see her undress? Did she drink, and whom did she go out with? He always resented these queries as invading the family privacy.

He was undoubtedly witnessing here a lower class recreational pattern which differed sharply from the conservative behavior of his parents and
their immediate associates. The sight of this behavior was both appealing and terrifying, perhaps more the latter, but it did show at least that there were other modes of life than those so urgently recommended to him.

We have so far seen in our material the family form, band, and minority group phenomena; we might now note the establishment of a sharply differentiated male sex-role in our informant. He remembered, for instance, the time when his father had shamed him for playing with dolls, that his mother had told him "not to be a calf" and cry at disappointments, that little boys did not do this, though they did not seem to mind it in his sister. His parents had forbidden him to attack his younger brothers and sister, but, on the other hand, he was not allowed to complain about challenges or assaults from other boys at school. His father wanted to know why he had not hit back. Less overtly expressed but very strong also, was a wish to be like his father and to take the same confident and dominant attitude toward women which the latter did; this was one of the best reasons for growing up, for then one really could control a woman. He learned that he was not expected to be interested in cooking but that, on the other hand, mowing the grass was evidently to be his job and that running errands was more suitable for a boy. He was quite outraged once when he had to wear a coat which was made over from a garment of his mother's; he had learned that it was improper to wear women's clothes even in a disguised form. One can see from the record the persistent sex-typing of character under the influence of his parents and colleagues. Girls, of course, were excluded from the gang as inadequate to participation in male pursuits.

In connection therewith he learned also of the dangers involved in stealing women. It came to him by a story which he heard from one of the older members of his playgroup. It was about a certain Bill Packer who came home and found another man with his wife, "doing it." Bill took out his jackknife on the spot and operated. The offender did not die, but he was not a man any more after that, and nobody did anything to Bill. Of course, this was only the case when you did something with another man's wife, but, the informant reasoned, even unmarried girls had brothers and fathers who might be possessive. His sex role was quite well consolidated by this event against premarital sex experience or adultery, and the taboo tended to spread to all girls, married or otherwise. It would seem an unintentional effect of our society to carry the mores against incest and adultery to objects other than the socially tabooed ones. In adult life, the image of Bill Packer was still a potent force in arousing fear in any heterosexual situation.

Due to the deprivations and dissatisfactions of childhood, there was aroused in our informant an intense desire to be grown up. Being grown up seemed the condition in which one could be independent of parental
restriction and capable of building one's world on more satisfactory lines. His parents also described being grown up as a state when one had many more privileges; at a younger age, however, one had to accept the limitations of this age. "When you are a big boy you can . . ." go out with mother and father, sit up late, ride a horse, have a bicycle, perhaps drive an engine or a street car, get married, have a real part in work and responsibility, be independent, and, the informant thought, be the match for these powerful adults with their unexpected prohibitions and restrictions. On the negative side, each one of the things which he wished most to do were things that could not be done by a little boy, and one had to go by the long, dreary route of school and present limitation to reach them.

Age-grading behavior is clearly delineated by the detailed life history which is adequately explored in its earlier phases. Protest against age-grading in childhood is undoubtedly one of the powerful emotional supports to social mobility in our society.

The informant's father was a plumber, and this gave the informant an unusual position in the band in which his family moved. He reported how surprised he was when one of his gang said to him, "Why, you're rich! You ought to be able to afford a bicycle because your father is a plumber." The speaker's father was a "hand" in the mills; his son was keenly aware of the difference between himself and the son of a plumber. The informant's father owned his house, had a telephone, had a bank account and was planning to "send the children on to school." By contrast, Aunt Ella's husband was killed in the mills during the informant's childhood, and Aunt Ella was in despair; they had only paid a little on their house, there was no insurance, and the boss only gave her a very little money for her husband. The informant luxuriated in the high position of his father and tried to capitalize on it so far as his own position in the gang was concerned. He soon found out, however, that this status was likely to be a disadvantage in his playgroup, especially if he tried to utilize it outright. There was an aura about him, nevertheless, and he knew it; he valued it while he pretended to his playmates that it did not exist.

On the other hand, there was the case of Hanky Bisworth who went to the same school as our informant. His father was rich, really rich, and they lived in the biggest house in town. It was a great, dark red brick house and the informant always walked by it with a certain amount of awe. Would he ever be able to go into a house like that, and why didn't Hanky ever ask him around to play? At home, too, there was a good deal of conversation about the Bisworths, and his parents referred to them with extreme respect. His father often said that Mr. Bisworth's career proved that it was the "Almighty Dollar" which counted in this world. It was humiliating to notice that there was someone who had a position higher than that of his own parents, those parents who had heretofore seemed so absolute in their
prestige. Now he could see that merely being as good as his parents was not enough. There was something better to be than even these heroic figures.

I am sure that everyone will note in the foregoing how prestige levels are associated with wealth, because the Bisworth family made no other claim to eminence, and also how the informant perceived in a very simple sense how he stood on a status terrace with some below and others above him.

His mother was careful to tell him already at this period that she herself was an educated woman, that she had been two years in school after she finished her country school. She also told him that her father had been a teacher-farmer and stressed how well he had done with the advantages that he had. Informant's mother felt superior to his father in this respect. The father had only a grade school education, and his father, in turn, could barely read and write. The mother knew what it meant to have advanced socially in her own life from a pinched position as the daughter of a poor farm family to some position between lower and middle class status in a town. She justified many of her severe impositions on her children by stating that they were necessary to "get on" in the world. She also wholeheartedly conducted a domestic economy in the family which made it possible to save money and ultimately to realize her insistence on better opportunities for her children. The father was less concerned on this score and less willing to sacrifice for the future of the children and the security of his old age.

That the family was actually mobile is quite well shown by the fact that the informant was told about the different houses they had lived in before his memory began. These houses were all in the neighborhood and he saw them all and had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the house he was living in at age six was the best of the lot. It had more conveniences and a larger lawn, was farther removed from the annoyance of the railway tracks, and finally it was actually owned in full, whereas none of the others had been. He could see in sober fact that his family was getting on in the world and that he was to receive a projectile push from them.

He was himself required to make renunciations for his future schooling. This came out clearly in the bicycle incident. He desperately wanted a bicycle, but it was decided by his parents that this was the type of item which the informant would have to do without in order that there might be a platform of capital for the later schooling. The father said that if he should die he would not want to leave his wife and children without some money and that he was himself giving up many things in order that this money might be accumulated. At the time, the boy was bitter over his disappointment and could have no conception of the compensating advantage of going to school, but the idea was so strong in his parents that he lived a very meager life so far as spending money was concerned during his entire childhood.
The constant atmosphere of scrimping and saving, of everlasting worry about money, undoubtedly made the parents seem heavy and depressive to the informant. The father looked like a trussed, burdened man. He could not enjoy his daily life because he was forever thinking about the uncertainties of the future. The future, in the sense of higher status, was too much present as a goal to allow for contemporary satisfactions. The mother, though also the “worrying type” of individual on other counts, was particularly eager and insistent on this score and led the campaign for immediate renunciation in favor of saving for education and old age.

In fact, all of the children of this family have had occasion to thank their parents for these sacrifices when the compensations of higher status finally began to come in; all of the children have secured college educations, and the mother and father are living an independent old age on their property. Whether the game was worth the candle or not is something no one may say with finality; what is certain is that the renunciations imposed in order to achieve higher status were in this case a real penalty and a penalty which had implications for the character formation of the subject.

The informant remembers both parents stating that they expected him to do better in life than they had done, and that they were going to aid him in getting better training so that he might thus be more secure against the hazards of life. However, the parents sometimes used this fact as a reproach and apparently felt their own lives to some degree as a transition point in the status march of the family. Life was not represented to the informant as something to enjoy but rather as a mission in which he was to raise the family prestige. The hazard of Aunt Ella’s lot was pointed out, how poor her husband was, how little training he had, and how badly off he had left her. Such impressive penalties for a hand-to-mouth existence were quite adequate to justify the family policy to the informant.

It would take a more intensive analysis than I have been able to make to discover to what degree the powerful mobility tendencies of this family were responsible for the neurotic discontent which the informant manifested from his childhood on and which became acute when he faced the responsibilities of adult life. Certainly we can see that from behind his memory comes discontent and rebellion and hatred against other people, both women and men. In a sense, the mobility pattern was passionately welcomed by this individual as an outlet and followed, one might almost say, with animosity. Tendencies to outdo others, to humiliate others and to revenge oneself upon others can be displayed amply under the competition which leads to the securing of higher status. It is of greatest research interest to inquire to what extent the mobility of the family may be held accountable for the subject’s neurosis. Certainly the actual adult difficulties of change in social status cannot account for it, for they were not unusual; the real disposition can only be referred to his childhood. It is possible that the total frame of the family life, which imposed such priva-
tions on this subject, was determined by the powerful mobility tendencies
which were present, especially on the mother’s side. In the family struggle
for social advancement, it is conceivable that too much pressure was
exerted on this individual and too much renunciation expected of him.

The conception of differences of intelligence became quite clear to our
subject through observing Art Bovis, the feebleminded boy. His blank, fat
face, unintelligible muttering and ineffectual social responses were early
observed and derided. It gave the informant a terrible pang to hear that
this condition might have been associated with masturbation, and this
news acted as an effective barrier in putting out of mind the genital sensa-
tions which the informant felt at times in childhood. He wanted to have a
“good mind” and was indeed told by adults that he did have one; he
knew too that smart people got along better in the world, and this seemed
an additional reason for disavowing all practices which would interfere
with his growth and sanity. At this time was established the conflict be-
tween intelligence and sexual impulse which is so common among those
who expect to rise or have risen in status through their own talents. Indeed,
one of our informant’s difficulties in adult life was that when he was finally
called upon in marriage to exercise a limited impulse-freedom he was out
of practice and carried with him many strange and unsuitable internalized
taboos. This possible relationship will reward much more intensive study.

The informant early learned that there were still other forces to which
his parents submitted. One of these was God and his representative, the
minister. At church he heard sermons that he did not understand very
well, but he did learn that most of the things you wanted to do were sins,
and that death was the one final punishment for these sins. Even then,
however, it was not all over. There was also Hell and the everlasting venge-
fulness of a rejected and outraged God. During this period of our subject’s
life, a male cousin died, who had been a prominent professional man but
who had given up going to church. The minister was quoted as commenting
on this event and pointing out how slowly the mills of the gods do grind.
The informant tended to associate everything that he feared as stern and
severe with religion and to feel that the minister too demanded the depri-
vations which he experienced. There was, he knew in a vague way, other
talk about the minister, talk of admiring him, of getting comfort from him,
but this aspect of the religious institution made no appeal to our subject.
He could not see how the minister or God could be loving and forgiving
if they did not actually let you do some of the things that you wanted to
do and if they demanded that you live an unbearable life in order to be
good. One of our informant’s first acts of adult rebellion was to renounce
the religion of his childhood,—with the aid, of course, of the permissive
patterns which he found in college. If this hostile attitude toward religious
symbols is held by many persons from the same social group as our infor-
ant, it may be seen as a permanent force for social change. This force might exist for centuries and make itself felt only when a political or technological shift made it expedient to challenge theological authority on some other ground. Study of the life history may often show the concealed tensions which erupt in periods of social crisis.

Our discussion so far does not cover by any means the totality of societal forms which can be viewed intimately through the material of this life history, and, of course, none of the forms referred to is adequately discussed. The main point has been, however, to show that such material does submit to analysis from the societal standpoint, and that it reveals some variables in social life which cannot, perhaps, be discovered in any other way. It is, therefore, genuinely useful as an exploratory tool.

A remark may be added on the question of the type of struggle which this man had with his environment. On the one hand, there is the struggle of very early childhood, which might be phrased as one between the organism and the unified family group. In this battle, of course, the individual is always beaten if he is socialized at all. There is a second type of conflict which this individual also exhibits and which is frequently noted by sociologists, viz., conflict in the mature person, i.e., within a developed personality which is faced by societal segments with opposing or confusing definitions of life. In the latter case, "choice" is offered, and it is apparently this choice which results in conflict. Both types are apparent in this case. My conclusion is that without the second type of conflict this individual would still have been neurotic, but his neurosis would have been smothered by the unified front opposed to him by society. His misery would have been laid to spirit-possession, the devil, or to biological defect.

If community studies are to include a realistic account of the emotional forces in society and are to discriminate accurately the difference in degree and type of participation within specific groups shown by different individuals, then we will find the intensive life history a material aid.
AMERICAN REGIONALISM AND THE REGIONAL
SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY*

J. O. HERTZLER
University of Nebraska

There are five regional sociological societies in the United States which draw their memberships from the sociologists of every state except West Virginia, Ohio, and Michigan. The latter two states, however, have state organizations. (Since this paper was written, The Ohio Valley Sociological Society has been organized as a regional society. It draws members from these three states and from parts of Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Indiana. Editor) These regional organizations, in the chronological order of their establishment are (1) The Southwestern Sociological Society, originally the Sociology Section of the Southwestern Social Science Association (1920); (2) The Pacific Sociological Society (1929); (3) The Eastern Sociological Conference (1930), now “Society” (since 1938); (4) The Southern Sociological Society (1935); and, belatedly, the Mid-West Sociological Society (1936). While there is some overlapping, these organizations reflect rather clearcut divisions of the country.

These regional societies are the logical result of social, economic, and political changes which have been taking place in recent decades. The developments which have produced the region are by no means characteristic of the United States alone, but are evident throughout Western Europe, though there is much variation in form and manifestation in different countries. This paper will attempt to focus our knowledge of American regionalism upon the regional sociological society, its natural place and functions.

At the very outset, obligation must be expressed to the pioneer, Howard W. Odum, not only for his analysis of the contemporary trends producing American regions and for his highly useful and widely accepted mapping of these regions, but also for the trail-blazing work in regional research and organization which he himself has carried on, promoted, or inspired in the Southeast. Other sociologists who have done outstanding work in this field are Rupert B. Vance, T. J. Woofter, Jr., William E. Cole, C. E. Lively, Louis Wirth, Harry E. Moore, L. L. Bernard, and others.

Regions and Regionalism. Regionalism is the result of social and economic trends growing from recent advances in communication, transport-
tion, and certain other technological changes. It deals with a geographical area, known as a region, within which a combination of physical, demographic, and cultural factors create a relative internal homogeneity of features pertinent from some point of view, and an obvious external uniqueness. The region tends to appear at a time when "the flow and interchange of regional forces reaches an equilibrium." It is evidence that our country has outgrown its chaotic frontier-youth and is settling down. Each natural cultural area, as it grows older, takes on its own peculiar traits and characteristics and becomes more truly "itself."

The boundaries of such regions, of course, will vary somewhat as the indices of homogeneity relate to cultural, administrative, literary, economic, industrial, physiographic, social psychological, or other determinative standardizing factors.

From the point of view of the contemporary social scientist, particularly of the sociologist, the region has come to be an essential new spatial unit, due to the fact that the social phenomena to which he must devote his attention increasingly are not confined to any of the existing traditional smaller spatial units. Every trait, physical or cultural, that is possessed of fixed spatial distribution, it is discovered, has a regional aspect.

An age which continuously demands wider contacts and standardized activities requires that its cultural specialization be conceived within wider geographical and cultural bounds. Furthermore, many of the cultural traits, patterns, and complexes, as represented for example, in agriculture, forms of wealth, standards of living, thought and opinion, social classes, education, the various arts, and recreation, are not separable local entities, but exist within a regional complex.

The increase in mobility and the growth in the size of population agglomerations, with all that implies in the way of individual anonymity, has broken down the peculiar contacts that once made the community, the neighborhood, and other primary groups pertinent social units with areal extent. In fact, it is difficult to limit local communities. Cities expand into metropolitan areas and these merge into a region. Demographic, economic and cultural problems spill over the boundary lines of established political units such as the incorporated village, the city, or even the state; their comprehensive analysis and effective treatment involve a region or even

2 Bernard states, "In determining major regional boundaries at least three types of criteria must be taken into consideration, and these are, first, physiographic; second, demographic including ethnographic; and, third, sociographic. No plotting of a major region can be accurate if it violates the unity and integrity of these criteria of areas." "Sociological Phases of the Proposed South-Western Regional Survey," Publs. Amer. Sociol. Soc., 1935, 29:96.


5 Vance, op. cit., 85.
a nation. Efforts to confine them within such areas for administrative purposes frequently bring in their train a new series of complications which aggravate rather than clarify the situation. One need only mention such problems as relief, marriage and divorce legislation, the care of transients, health, industrial and financial regulation, or the treatment of urban-rural tensions, to see the point of the contention.

Even the sections, which Frederick Jackson Turner once foresaw as having sinister divisive effects, have largely evaporated before the growing regionalism. And this is well, for, to use Odum’s apt phrase, “sectionalism may be likened unto cultural inbreeding, whereas regionalism is line-breeding.” Sectionalism emphasizes political boundaries and state sovereignties, local loyalties, selfishness and provincialism. In the light of the growing tendency toward standardization and the increasingly obvious fact that all aspects of social life are cross-linked over wider and wider areas, there seems to be little chance of Turner’s prediction being realized. Increasingly, localism and sectionalism must give way before regionalism and interregionalism. Thus, enormous and fairly stable and self-conscious areas of differentiation have developed, in which we find a rather high degree of homogeneity as to their multiple physical, demographic and cultural traits and their major economic and social problems. It must, of course, be granted that these areas share with each other certain common bases, some of which are nationwide and even international in scope and extent, but each, as Bossard puts it, develops its own distinctive superstructure upon this common foundation. Odum, on the basis of extensive statistical and cultural study has divided the country into six such regions. In doing so, he has taken into consideration, to use his own words, ...

historical factors, present trends and movements toward new developments, and a large number of elemental focusing indices, such as population, urban and rural trends, production and consumption of commodities, occupational and industrial factors, educational and philanthropic developments, special institutional character, political uniformities, and other measurable factors.

His regions are the Northeast, the Southeast, the Middle States, the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Far West. Each region is designated in terms of a number of states. For practical reasons, we cannot get rid of states in such classifications; they are historic political units. This practice means, therefore, that some violence has been done to natural or cultural determinants of region; true regional boundaries would only occasionally coincide with state boundaries. That the suggested regional divisions are sound in high degree, however, is borne out by the fact that studies of Odum and

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6 “Regionalism vs. Sectionalism in the South’s Place in the National Economy,” Social Forces, March 1934, 12:338.
others show that these divisions not only show distinctiveness in various qualities and manifestations, but are tending to become more, not less, distinct. After all, we have not been levelled into uniformity, even by the modern means of communication and pressure, or by the powerful agencies of machine production. The nationally uniform traits which do exist are increasingly of a more superficial character, with the possible exception of those related to the national government. Thus, while the meaning of the concept, region, is still somewhat vague, and while its boundaries as an area are somewhat intangible, it does represent an actuality of increasing importance.

Regionalism in its values, viewpoints, and objectives, is not particularistic, divisive, or provincial, as was the old sectionalism. Rather, as Odum points out,® regionalism envisages the nation first, making the national culture and welfare the final arbiter. On the other hand, as Vance points out,¹⁰ it takes the stand that excessive national centralization is an obstacle to progress, since it paralyzes the activities of the natural and cultural areas and places upon the shoulders of the central authority burdens which, because of ignorance of local conditions, it is not fitted to bear. Regionalism is the mean between localism and sectionalism on the one hand, and national overcentralization on the other.

In view of the nature of his science as it has developed in the last third of a century and because of his predominant interests, objectives, and responsibilities, the sociologist must be concerned with these areas which are designated as regions. His object matter is increasingly of a regional nature, and the region offers him a most useful area for professional organization and for scientific activity. The rest of this paper will treat these latter points in some detail.

General Advantages of a Regional Sociological Society. The factors discussed above make the regional sociological society a natural functional organization of the teachers, investigators, and others with special interests in the field of sociology. Other considerations make it a logical and practical necessity.

When the American Sociological Society was organized in 1905, the colleges and universities teaching sociology were relatively few and widely scattered, and the investigational activities were sporadic, individual, and of a general nature. The only organizational unit that would produce sufficient membership to merit organization was the national society. Now practically every junior college, normal school, agricultural college, arts college, or university has an array of courses, offered usually by persons with some specialized training in the field; sociological investigations have

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⁸ "Regionalism vs. Sectionalism in the South's Place in the National Economy." Social Forces, March 1934, 12:338.
⁹ R. B. Vance, op. cit., 90.
become relatively scientific and systematic and quite generally are considered basic to the understanding of any social situation anywhere.

Furthermore, as sociology has become part of the standard collegiate curriculum everywhere, its teaching personnel is to be found among educational institutions grading downward into the lower salary levels. Such teachers want and need the advantages of professional organization and the enrichment of their thought and teaching which comes from exchange of ideas and viewpoints at periodic meetings.

Whether due to inertia, or custom, or the greatest convenience of supposedly the greatest number, the fact remains that all the meetings of the American Sociological Society during the last twenty years have been held within a relatively small area lying east of the line from Chicago to St. Louis and north of the line from St. Louis east through Richmond, Virginia, to the ocean. This means that large numbers of sociologists living outside that area could not attend, due to the enormous distances, the expense, the time, and the winter season with its weather hazards, and therefore saw no reason for taking out membership. Various surveys have also shown that incomes and salaries are appreciably lower in colleges and universities outside of the favored area, making membership and participation a more difficult thing to manage as part of the family budget. For example, a man teaching in one of our Nebraska colleges finds the $40 to $50 necessary to attend the annual meetings even when they are held in Chicago, the nearest point, almost prohibitive on his $1200-$2000 salary. He can, however, come to Des Moines by clubbing together with others in someone's family car and the whole trip will not cost him over $15. Such situations can be duplicated all over the country.

In two of the states of the favored area (Ohio and Michigan) we find state sociological societies. But few states outside of this area have a sufficient population of sociologists to maintain a self-sufficing, self-supporting organization. In most states, such groupings would be too small for stimulating discussion, too "parochial," offer too little diversity of viewpoint, and make difficult a desirable division of labor. In certain other states, the sociologists are allied with the social science section of the state academy of science. The difficulty here is that the sociologists are too much diluted with the other social scientists to accomplish anything of a fundamental nature. Participation is usually not a matter of joy or profit, but is looked upon largely as an "exercise," an obligation to "keep a good cause alive."

Midway between the state and the national societies lies the regional organization. With its membership of from 75 to 250, it makes for more intimate personal contacts and invites a spirit of friendliness, fellowship, and mutual helpfulness. In general, it is a good thing for the teachers of sociology of a region to know each other personally, because they are still on the defensive here and there. The more intimate association, the greater
cohesion and the mutual support gives them more backbone and spunk than can be derived from the more formal, impersonal, and intermittent contacts in the national society. To further the findings we are able to make, and to gain place and recognition for ourselves in various private and public undertakings, we need on the one hand, freedom from individual and departmental jealousies and recriminations, and on the other, esprit de corps, an audacious marching shoulder to shoulder, a close-knit unity. The fact need not be emphasized that sociologists are not receiving the consideration for the findings and skills which we have to offer, proportional to the crucial significance of these findings and skills. That we have among us many consulting experts skilled in social investigation, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention, need only be mentioned in passing.

The smaller and more intimate regional group provides a much greater opportunity for frank and spontaneous discussion. While the regional society makes possible these intimate contacts, at the same time it provides a large enough membership to give numerical strength, financial independence, diversified discussion, a wide range of materials, adequate opportunity for comparison of experience and findings, a comprehensive division of labor, and a sufficient areal extent for fundamental investigation of regional patterns and complexes of social phenomena.

Among a host of other general advantages of the regional society, the following may be mentioned:

1. The regional society, no less than the national, can and should encourage the production and diffusion of sound sociological theory, because this is the foundation of all else. This it does, among a larger portion of the sociologists of the area than the national society is ever likely to influence, by providing occasions and agencies for discussion and criticism, by fostering luminous standards, by encouraging the professional advancement and scientific productiveness of its members, and by stimulating individual scholarly initiative.

2. It should serve as a more intimate clearing house for the teaching of both the basic and more specialized courses in sociology, emphasizing higher standards, more uniform content, experimentally successful instructional aids, and possibly paying some attention to regional factors and regional knowledge of value to future citizens, leaders, and administrators.

3. It should aid in improving the relations between the undergraduate instruction in sociology and the departments offering graduate work, the objective being to standardize content and quality of the undergraduate work so that it will give the students an adequate foundation for graduate work. As it is now, many a student is penalized, due to the necessity of piecing out his undergraduate courses after he arrives at the university as a graduate student. At the graduate level, it should be possible to work out some division of labor in teaching and research specialties and to devise some method of rotating candidates for higher degrees among such departments.

4. If we are not yet ready to promote the instruction of sociological materials in the secondary schools, we at least ought to be concerned about the preparation in subject matter of those who do teach them. This certainly is a matter for our
consideration, since the competitive factors affecting teacher qualifications are largely regional in scope as are also the accrediting agencies.

5. The regional society makes it possible not only to draw individuals together on a regional scale for purposes of acquaintance and discussion, but also to bring together these individuals as representatives of all the different types of educational institutions of collegiate rank in the area which offer some instruction in sociology or carry on some social investigation. This includes privately and publicly supported junior colleges, agricultural colleges, municipal universities, normal schools or teachers colleges, denominational colleges, state universities, and the private universities. The regional organization draws these together in one common enterprise.

These regional sociological organizations need not necessarily be little American Sociological Societies. They have functions to perform and services to render to their members which are distinctive due to the fact, first, that they are smaller, more compact groups, and, second, due to the fact that they are regional and have regional situations to meet and regional needs to fill. On the other hand, they have not been conceived as rivals or substitutes for the national society nor do they function as such. If they are administered in a spirit of resentment or jealousy, if they foster division and exclusiveness, if they seek complete self-containment and self-satisfaction, they harm rather than aid themselves and their region. Each regional society should look upon itself as an agency for bringing about the most fruitful use of regional professional abilities and social resources; but it should be conscious at the same time of its complementary and cooperative relationship with the other regional societies and the national organization in effecting national professional and social advancement. The national society similarly should be conscious of the fact that a more intensive cultivation of sociology in the various regions really makes for a stronger and more militant national march of our science. These factors call attention to the desirability of a more effective integration of the regional organizations and the American Sociological Society.

Regional Research. Thus far the regional society has been presented largely as an agency for developing professional morale and improving the teaching of sociology. This is important because sociology has been and is mainly a college and university discipline. It should continue to give students a sociological training of high quality and wide scope, and a sound social equipment for life, but it has before it, as never before, the obligation of scientific investigation, of establishing everywhere a scientific attitude and of producing valid methods and techniques for dealing with social situations and trends. It needs to produce "works" which the world desperately needs. This function is much more than appeasing the appetites of local womens' clubs for lurid accounts of thrillingly shocking social evils,

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The report of the Committee on Regional Societies of the American Sociological Society made in December, 1936, to the Executive Committee presents material relating to the subject matter of this section.
or providing catch-penny facts and phrases for the “For-God-Sakers,” as Professor Ross used to call them. Before he is a participant in or promoter of welfare programs, before he is an administrator or statesman, the sociologist is a provider of scientific information.

The regional society in this connection becomes the medium by means of which social research in the region is fostered and conducted. It is singularly remiss if it fails to make social diagnoses, that is, to discover and analyze the social phenomena of its area, to present the peculiar aspects of folkways and institutions, to indicate shifts and trends, their nature, extent, and possible consequences, to examine lags and relationships, to criticize and synthesize this knowledge, to make predictions, and finally to popularize and diffuse this information, and make it available, not only for the citizenry at large, but for the broad-visioned teachers and the special administrators of constructive activities, the educators, social workers, technologists, politicians, publicists, etc.

This sociological analysis of the region falls into two parts: first, obtaining a substantial knowledge of the pertinent special geographic, historic, demographic and multiple cultural characteristics and resources; and, second, providing a continuous flow of data regarding the social processes of every sort. Howard W. Odum, in his masterful Southern Regions of the United States has presented us with a model study of a regional culture area, indicating the array of items that need to be examined, the methods to be employed, and the amount and type of information needed, if a clear and adequate picture of a region is to be obtained. The social processes that should be examined vary in extent and importance. In our region among the processes and trends of great importance which require detailed study as to nature and especially as to effects, are the following: the displacement of rural labor by machinery; intercity relationships and the influence of metropoli; the commercialization of agriculture; fertility trends in farm, village, and urban population; social effects of educational differentials; decentralization of industry; family and community changes in standards and planes of living; population mobility, redistribution, and selectivity; criminality and penological trends; security and other welfare programs; trends in utilization of leisure time; changes in social efficacy of institutions; acculturation of divergent population elements; and ecological processes, to mention only a few. It is essential that almost all studies of this kind be conducted on a regional basis.

Since regional social research is still halting, sporadic and unorganized in most areas, almost anything a regional sociological society does to foster it, even though it be only an opportunity to review individually and privately conducted projects, is clear gain, but cooperative research becomes the true forte of the regional society.

Professor R. D. McKenzie, in a paper which he has kindly placed at the writer's disposal, has presented some aspects of integrated research which might profitably be sponsored by a regional society. He calls attention to the diminishing role of the individual in the research field, particularly in the social sciences, as the number of workers increases and as the massive research units, outside colleges and universities, such as those in government bureaus and well endowed private foundations, develop and increase. Therefore, college men must band together for more effective and far-reaching cooperation than is possible when each man, as now, merely uses as well as he can the results of other men's work. He states,

... a research project conducted by a number of investigators working in cooperation is likely to be more worthwhile and to bring more status to the individuals concerned than if each had worked separately on an individual project.

Moreover, if the sociologists are to provide type-forms, abstract relationships, and general principles of social phenomena, they need a wider universe than the individual investigator is able to explore.

The older men, he believes, are not so likely to be interested in experiments in cooperative research; they, he says, "are cemented in their habit systems of individual enterprise and there is little hope that they will ever change." However, younger men, even graduate students, in different universities, could work out a definition of their problem, a systematic method of approach, collect their materials in their respective communities, and then collaborate in the final organization and interpretation of their data. Such a joint product in many fields of investigation would be a more comprehensive and valuable document than ordinarily would be produced by a single individual. Candidates for the master's or doctor's degree could be immediately enrolled in such undertakings.

Needless to say, a Regional Research Clearing House would offer additional opportunities, not only for receiving information regarding various individual or departmental efforts, but also for voluntary cooperation and coordination of such undertakings. Such an organization would prevent duplication, develop uniform units and methods, give at least partial inventories, and produce comparable findings, something which is now sadly lacking. It would function as a sort of regional social research weather bureau, and would unquestionably suggest projects and thus stimulate much new research of more general value throughout the region.

Beyond this lies the possibility of a Regional Bureau of Social Research with not only cooperative reporting service, centralization of reporting, and regional direction of activities and efforts, but also endowments permitting far-reaching regionwide investigations, a staff of investigators, and publica-
tion facilities for all information of regional significance. Such an organization would not only provide invaluable and enriching teaching materials, but would render service to social workers, local, state, and federal commissions and administrators. It might function in joint cooperation with the social science departments of the colleges and universities, the state departments of health and education, the boards of control, private and professional groups, and the federal agencies operating in the region.

Such regional research to be most fruitful cannot be carried on by sociologists alone. If it were, it would be limited both in its conception and in its results. Human geographers, human biologists, demographers, ethnologists, historians, economists, rural specialists, social psychologists, specialists in government, land use experts, engineers, and a host of other disciplines and special bodies of investigators must cooperate to produce a meaningful regional picture. Social phenomena cannot be divorced from their conditioners and correlatives.

A regional sociology, founded on such research as hinted at above, would, in Odum's words, "yield substantial returns in method and materials for the theoretical study of all society and for descriptive and practical study of modern contemporary society." By means of concentrated study in a definite region in which cultural materials have become somewhat unified and self-consistent due to common conditions prevailing over a period of time, facts may be discovered and methods of research and interpretation developed which will net fundamental data for the clearer understanding of all society, i.e., for valid scientific generalizations applicable to any society. Certainly a general sociology which is based on the principles and procedures of a regional sociology is much more likely to be reliable and sound; it has developed from a substantial study of particular societies and particular cultures; it is based upon a wider classification and comparison than is our present sociology whose uniformities are a composite of individually produced local and sectional findings, or armchair theories.

Regional Planning. One other larger aspect of the regional sociological society must be briefly presented; that is, its relation to regional planning. Whether we like it or not, social planning on a larger and larger scale is here to stay. The planning which we have done since the beginning of social time, and practically everything which individuals and groups have done, has been the result of planning, has been private, piecemeal, often limited or local in extent, and frequently in direct conflict with all other plannings. "Nature's Insurgent Son" has created so many instabilities and at the same time has produced such far-reaching and widespread interdependencies in the vast and complicated social mechanism, largely of his own contrivance,

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that he must now plan to correct his earlier planning as well as to produce the social order of his heart's desire. This must be done within all degrees of intercommunicating areas from the local community, up through the region, the nation, and finally, along many important lines, within the world as a whole, and the objectives and efforts of each area must be harmonious with those of all other units of its kind and of those larger than itself.

Due to the increasing significance of the region as a unitary culture area, as set forth earlier in this paper, it becomes, for the present, the area of first importance in intensive planning. It is the only logical way of combining the multiple and diverse subregions, physiographic, demographic, and sociographic, metropolitan, and interstate, into a unified scheme. When the most effective and orderly development of each regional unit has been brought about, as based upon its essential differences, capacities, needs and fitness, then it becomes possible to effect a well planned and balanced interregional and national social and political economy.

Such planning imposes a very heavy obligation upon all investigative groups within the region, but especially upon the social scientists. Among the social scientists, the sociologists are particularly involved as social theorists, as investigators, and as strategists.

If the regional sociological society is functioning efficiently, it becomes an unparalleled and indispensable medium for furnishing a number of basic essentials. First, it can contribute to the basic sociological principles which lie behind regional as well as universal cultural processes. No planning offers much promise of success without such a continually improved body of reliable theoretical generalizations. Second, through its research activities, it is giving an insight into the complex of social life of the region and producing a vast array of data which point to weaknesses, gaps, and needs to be met, and problems to be solved, as well as resources to be utilized and developed. Third, on the basis of these findings, and the predictive ability which they make possible, it is in a position to participate in the determination of policies and procedures. Fourth, it has to offer a trained and experienced personnel, cooperative and informed, capable of rendering service in consultation, investigation, and possibly even in administration.
Official Reports and Proceedings

PRELIMINARY PROGRAM, THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, HOTEL BOOK CADILLAC, DECEMBER 28, 29, 30, 1938, DETROIT, MICHIGAN

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28

8:30-9:00 A.M. Registration of members and guests of the Society and reservation of luncheon and dinner tickets.

9:00-10:00 A.M. Business Meeting for reports of committees and representatives of the Society.

10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Human Ecology. Everett C. Hughes, McGill University, Chairman.
"The Negro in the State of Bahia, Brazil," Donald Pierson, Fisk University.

Luncheon Meeting: Section on Educational Sociology. Arthur J. Todd, Northwestern University, Chairman.

12:00 M.

1:00-3:00 P.M. Section on Community. M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh, Chairman.
"Contributions of Sociology to Community Studies," Stuart A. Queen, Washington University.
"Sociological Aspects of the Housing Problem," F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota.
Paper, topic to be announced, Francis Merrill, Dartmouth College.

Section on Sociology of Religion. Hornell Hart, Duke University, Chairman.
The two sessions of this Section will carry out a practical demonstration-experiment in seeking working agreements between groups who at the start are in
wide disagreement. The following preliminary list of queries has been selected as the basis of discussion:

1. Religions have declared certain things “right” and others “wrong.” Many sociologists say that science has no business expressing such “value judgments.” Do you believe that sociology should abstain from attempting to determine what is right or wrong?

2. Should sociology seek to help mankind to attain rational, systematic and unbiased guidance as to what social policies should be pursued?

3. Do the teachings of the great religions provide a major and primary source of creative change in human culture which cannot be better achieved through science, humanism or other agencies without religious interference?

4. Would the weakening of existing religious faiths and institutions in the United States promote general social disorganization?

5. Can the scientific and humanistic world views, and the social institutions to which they give rise, satisfy the needs which led to the rise of religions?

Section on the Family. Willard Waller, Barnard College, Chairman.

“Feminism and Marital Adjustment,” Clifford Kirkpatrick, University of Minnesota.


Joint Session, Section on Social Statistics and the American Statistical Association. Clark Tibbits, University of Michigan, Chairman.


Discussion.

Section on Political Sociology. Cecil C. North, Ohio State University, Chairman.


“Class Conflict and War,” Hans Speier, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science.


Section on Criminology. John L. Gillin, University of Wisconsin, Chairman.

“Narcotic Addiction as a Factor in Petty Larceny,”
Edward C. Jandy.
General discussion.

Section on Sociology and Social Work. J. E. Cutler,
Western Reserve University, Chairman.
“The Community Control of Organized Social Work
in Chicago,” Arthur Hillman, University of Chi-

cago.

“Welfare Activities of Fraternal Societies,” Noel P.
Gist and Arthur Miles, University of Missouri.
“Activities of Philanthropic Foundations,” William

4:00-5:00 P.M. Meeting of the Nominating Committee.
5:00-6:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee.
8:00 P.M. General Meeting of the Society. Frank H. Hankins,
Smith College, presiding. Celebrating the hundredth
anniversary of Comte's first use of the term “Soci-
ology.”

“Comte's Sociologies,” McQuilkin DeGrange, Dart-
mouth College.

“Positivism in Contemporary Philosphic Thought,”
Roy Wood Sellars, University of Michigan.
“Contemporary Positivism in Sociology,” George A.
Lundberg, Bennington College.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:00-10:00 A.M. Business Meeting of the Society.
10:00-12:00 A.M. Division on Social Psychology. Walter C. Reckless,
Vanderbilt University, Chairman.
“Social Participation and Social Intelligence,” F. Stu-
art Chapin, University of Minnesota.
“Motivation of Human Actions in the Light of Time-
Budget Data,” Pitirim A. Sorokin, Harvard Univer-
sity.

“Some Phases of Personality Development in Com-
munities of White-Indian-Negro Mixture,” Guy B.
Johnson, University of North Carolina.

Section on Social Statistics. Ellen Winston, Division
of Social Research, WPA, Chairman.
“The Relation between Fertility and Length of Life,”
Harold F. Dorn, U. S. Public Health Service.
Discussion: Clyde V. Kiser, Milbank Memorial Fund.
“Some Factors in the Measurement of Internal Migra-
tion,” Samuel A. Stouffer, University of Chicago.
Discussion: C. E. Lively, University of Missouri.
"A Critique of Statistical Techniques," C. E. Gehlke, Western Reserve University.

Joint Session of the Section on Sociology and Social Work and the American Association for Labor Legislation. J. E. Cutler, Western Reserve University, Chairman.

Topic: Co-ordination of Relief and Unemployment Insurance.

"The Viewpoint of the Relief Administrator," William Hodson, Commissioner of Relief, New York City.


"The British Unemployment Assistance Program," R. Clyde White, University of Chicago.

Discussion: William Haber, University of Michigan.

Joint Luncheon, American Sociological Society, Rural Sociological Society, and American Farm Economic Association. E. F. Young, Purdue University, Chairman.


Discussion: W. E. Grimes, Kansas State College.

R. C. Smith, Farm Security Administration, Indianapolis.

Section on Sociology and Psychiatry. Harriet R. Mowrer, Chicago, Chairman.

"The Schizophrenic and Criminal Behavior," H. Warren Dunham, University of Chicago.


Discussion.

Section on Social Biology. Conrad Taeuber, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Chairman.

Topic: Migration of Farm Population, Especially as Affected by Drought.

Papers: Donald G. Hay, North Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station.

Carl F. Kraenzel, Montana State College Agricultural Experiment Station.

Paul H. Landis, State College of Washington.

Olaf F. Larson, Colorado State College.

Discussion: Lowry Nelson, University of Minnesota.

Section on Political Sociology. Cecil C. North, Chairman.

Topic: Social Determinants of Political Action.
3:00- 5:00 P.M. Division on Social Theory. Louis Wirth, University of Chicago, Chairman.


"The Professions and Social Structure," Talcott Parsons, Harvard University.

Discussion: R. M. MacIver, Columbia University
N. S. Timasheff, Harvard University (Not yet confirmed.)

Section on the Family. Willard Waller, Barnard College, Chairman.


"Law in the Family," Karl Llewellyn, Columbia University.

Section on Criminology. John L. Gillin, University of Wisconsin, Chairman.

"Success and Failure of Adult Probationers in Wisconsin," Reuben Hill.

"The Vocational Adjustment of Ex-prisoners in the District of Columbia," Sister Helen Angela.

5:00- 6:00 P.M. Meeting of the Executive Committee.

7:00 P.M. Annual Dinner of the American Sociological Society.

Presidential Address, Frank H. Hanks, Smith College.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30

9:00-11:00 A.M. Division on Social Theory. Louis Wirth, University of Chicago, Chairman.


"The Professions and Social Structure," Talcott Parsons, Harvard University.

Discussion: Hans Gerth, University of Michigan.
Alexander Goldenweiser, Reed College.

Section on Sociology and Psychiatry. Harriet R. Mowrer, Chicago, Chairman.

"Emotional Adjustment of 100 College Graduate Women, Half of Whom Are Employed," Mary S. Fisher, Vassar College.

Section on Educational Sociology. Francis J. Brown, New York University, Chairman. Topic: The State and Education.


"The State and Education," Herbert L. Spencer, President of Pennsylvania College for Women.

11:00—1:00 P.M. Annual Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society. Election of Officers and Discussion of Problems of Organization and Membership.

2:00—4:00 P.M. Division on Social Research. Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington, Chairman.

"Design for Social Experiments," F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota.

"An Investigation of the Effects of Statutes and Ordinances and Their Administration," Underhill Moore, Yale University.

"The Delineation and Characterization of Socio-Economic Regions and Subregions," A. R. Mangus, Division of Social Research, WPA.

"The Relationship between Verbal Behavior and Adjustment Activities," Read Bain, Miami University.

Section on Community. M. C. Elmer, University of Pittsburgh, Chairman.

"Experiment in Community Field Work," Lloyd Allen Cook, Ohio State University.

"Comparison of Centralized and Decentralized Community Activities," George Strong, University of Pittsburgh.


Section on Sociology of Religion, Hornell Hart, Duke University, Chairman.

Continuance of discussion begun previous session.

5:00—6:00 P.M. Meeting of New Executive Committee.

Committee on Local Arrangements

R. D. McKenzie, Chairman
Donald C. Marsh
Lent D. Upson
C. C. Van Vechten
Arthur E. Wood


MacLaren: *Morally We Roll Along*; Simonds: *Henry Ford and Greenfield Village*. Merle Curti. 760

Galpin: *My Drift into Rural Sociology*. Carle C. Zimmerman. 761

Machotka: *Americké sociologie*. Joseph S. Roucek. 762

Gellermann: *The American Legion as Educator*. Fred R. Yoder. 763


Rawlinson: *India: A Short Cultural History*. J. L. Hypes. 765

Fitzgerald: *China: A Short Cultural History*. Charlotte D. Gower. 766

Lederer-Seidler: *Japan in Transition*. Jesse F. Steiner. 767

White: *The Process of Change in the Ottoman Empire*. Donald E. Webster. 768


UNSIGNED BOOK NOTES

Carpenter: *An Ecological Glossary*. 769

Fauset: *Sojourner Truth—God’s Faithful Pilgrim*. 769

Hypes: *Knights of the Road*. 770

Committee on Family Budgets, Federation of Social Agencies of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: *Minimum Cost of Living Budget for Health and Decency in Pittsburgh and Allegheny County*. 770

Hill: *Man-Made Culture*. 770

Popenoe and Gosney: *Twenty-eight Years of Sterilization in California*. 770

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The rustic migrant, arriving in the city for the first time, may be no less confused by the medley of strange sights and sounds about him than the urban sociologist trying to find his way through the mass of “problem” materials that has appeared in his field. Interpretations, for the most part, have lacked an adequate frame of reference because of the absence of an organic conception of the city. Lewis Mumford’s *The Culture of Cities* has neither the myopic nor the astigmatic defects of much of the literature on the subject. The city is interpreted not as an isolated phenomenon, but instead is viewed in its organic relationships to the whole of society: as a
function, if you will, of a multiplicity of institutional processes and technological changes.

The first half of the book is devoted to the historical development of the city. Beginning with the mediaeval or “eotechnic” town, the author traces the evolution of urban life through the “baroque” city of the “paleotechnic” period to the megalopolitan community characterizing the “neotechnic” period of today, finally projecting his analysis to the “biotechnic” community which may be built in the future. Of the mediaeval city as a suitable environment for human existence, he paints a rosy picture—perhaps too rosy if all the facts were known or presented. But for the baroque cities of a later period (the term is used broadly as one of social description) he is severe in his appraisal. In them he sees life subordinated to the pomp of the military, or to the pecuniary motives of capitalistic industrialism and commercialism.

Although he dismisses Spenglerian philosophy of the city as that “strange rubbish heap of atavistic notions and arresting insights,” he himself does not hesitate to outline the gruesome fate that may await the dweller of megalopolis as well as the culture of which megalopolis is a part. But unlike Spengler, both in his method and in his final conclusions, he is not a philosopher of despair. It is not written in the stars that our civilization is doomed. “Cities exhibit the phenomena of broken growth, of partial death, of self-regeneration,” and are quite capable of prolonging their existence through the life-span of more than a single culture. Fascism he sees as a disease of megalopolitanism, a manifestation of the curse of bigness and a symptom of moral degradation; and while he both loathes and fears the fascist threat, he believes we still possess the social intelligence and the technical knowledge to build a civilization that will provide security as well as freedom.

The way out? Certainly not by scrapping the machine, nor by a simple back-to-the-country movement. To speak of demolishing the city is both naive and futile. To try to ruralize our civilization would be to heap disaster upon ourselves. We must accept the city . . . but we need not accept megalopolis. Social planning, pointing toward the decentralization of our great urban agglomerations, is the method; democracy and social well-being are the goals. It is at this point that the city is viewed in its regional setting. A region he interprets not as a mere geographic area but as an expression of complex geographic, economic, and cultural elements—a phenomenon that is as much a human creation as it is a product of nature. Planning, to be genuinely fruitful, must be done in terms of regional realities, but only when the major resources are collectively owned and democratically controlled can a planned society be realized. Plans are not to be viewed as rigid blueprints superimposed from on high; rather they must be kept flexible, adaptable to constantly changing conditions.

Perhaps nowhere in the writings of sociologists (unless it is in Catherine Bauer’s Modern Housing) has the housing problem been interpreted so effectively from a functional and organic viewpoint. Tracing the development of planned housing experiments, Mumford presents a critical summary of the numerous attempts that have been made to provide suitable
housing within the framework of a designed community—including in his comments the model communities of the Resettlement Administration.

Here is a book that may well qualify as a sort of magna charta for a planned society; and it is as applicable for Europe as it is for America. A model of literary style, the volume is effectively illustrated, and contains at the end a fifty-page bibliography of selected references. Perhaps an account of the cities of the ancient world would have added to the value of the historical section, and the author might well have utilized some of the research findings and theories of urban sociologists to fertilize his own ideas. Certain sociologists may find fault on the ground that it is over-weighted with "oughts" and "musts" and "shouldn'ts"; but as a social philosophy of the city there will probably be unanimous agreement that it has no peer in the literature.

In a certain sense American Regionalism might be considered a companion volume of The Culture of Cities. In this book the authors have gathered a vast amount of materials on regionalism, both in Europe and America, and have woven their data into a comprehensive compendium of facts and theories. It is a veritable encyclopedia of information and points of view.

In Part I the authors discuss the implications and meanings of regionalism, placing considerable emphasis on the distinction between the old "sectionalism," so important in the literature of the historians, and the new regionalism which is just emerging. From this point they proceed to a consideration of the various types of regions that have emerged: natural regions, including river valley regions and areas characterized by uniformities of soil, topography, and climate; culture regions, including metropolitan regions, rural regions, and regions of literature and art; service regions, both governmental and non-governmental. Like Mumford, they reject the specialized region for the broader and more comprehensive regional pattern.

The second division of the book is devoted to a summary of the regional literature in the fields of geography, anthropology, ecology, economics, political science, and sociology. Social scientists interested in knowing how the concept of the region is being treated in related fields will find this a valuable source of information. Finally, in Part III, the authors give a regional picture of the United States based on combinations of states that are more or less homogeneous in a number of respects. These six regions include the Middle States, the Northeast, the Southeast, the Far West, the Northwest, and the Southwest.

There is certainly no reason to cavil with the authors' argument regarding the importance of regional developments in the modern world. It is a challenging theme, one that we shall hear more about in the future. Naturally there are hazards in attempting to conceptualize so complex a phenomenon as the region. In their distinction between sectionalism and regionalism, for instance, the authors are convincing, but they seem to have overlooked at least one of the new versions of sectionalism now coming into vogue. We refer to the present tendency of states to build up tariff barriers as a means of attaining economic self-sufficiency. Along with the trend toward regionalism is the opposing process pointing in the direction of forty-
eight little economic nations within the national framework. It is a game that states as well as nations can play, with the result that most if not all of the states have erected economic fences for protection against out-of-state competitors. And the end is not yet in sight.

It is through regionalism, say the authors, that national unity and equilibrium can be achieved. Perhaps this is true. But what of class alignments and class conflict? All the signs of the times point to an approaching struggle for power between the economic classes, a struggle that may or may not be regional in character. At one place the authors do mention class conflict, but since it does not harmonize very well with their thesis they play it down. Furthermore, they fail to come to grips with what is perhaps the basic issue of our society, namely, the socialization of our wealth and resources. At one place (p. 268) they frown on “individuals . . . who appear to believe that the regional planning movement may be used subtly and subserviently in changing the American system.” Is this a warning to those holding unorthodox economic views? And does not the regional planning program which they propose imply a change in the American system, whatever that system is? Perhaps, like many other academicians, they are fearful of being labelled “unscientific” if they propose a program which involves the collectivization of our resources, although it may be quite “scientific” to urge the adoption of a regional planning program.

What we apparently need to do now is to subject the concept of regionalism to rigorous tests that will insure its validity as a working tool. The group-of-states method of regional delineation as it is here stated will probably prove inadequate; but at least the authors have established a point of departure which will make possible further refinement of methodology and analysis.

University of Missouri

Noel P. Gist


These four volumes differ widely in style, length, content, and purpose. They find common ground in the facts that all deal with some aspect of social planning, and that they are concrete and “practical” rather than abstract and theoretical.

The subtitle of Schmid’s volume declares it to be “an ecological and
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statistical study of social trends in Minneapolis and St. Paul.” It is primarily a descriptive and historical study, although it contains a considerable amount of analysis. The data were obtained from (1) census reports, (2) a real-property inventory, (3) records and reports of police, courts, and numerous other public and private social agencies, and (4) local histories. The monograph contains a wealth of data, organized under four major headings: (1) growth and expansion of the twin cities (including a “natural history” of the central business area, and a description of the entire metropolitan area); (2) population composition, movements, and trends; (3) housing; and (4) social and personal disorganization as evidenced in divorce, crime, juvenile delinquency, vice, and suicide. Methods of analysis include spot maps, base maps, census tract maps, concentric zone distributions, and statistical correlations. A combined index for housing has been worked out. It is based upon the number of times a given district falls into the upper or the lower decile of ten arrays arranged on the basis of selected criteria of housing desirability. The wealth of maps, beautifully delineated by the author, forms one of the outstanding features of the volume. The statistical data are not all presented in terms of any uniform set of areas. Some of them are given by enumeration districts; others by wards; others by census tracts; while some have not been distributed among any of these smaller areas. The reviewer regrets that considerations of space forced the author to omit all detailed statistical data. Without these materials the ecologist and the student of urban life cannot make such checks and further analyses as he might desire. This lack of detailed data may be especially regretted in the case of certain readers who question the validity of statistical conclusions concerning housing, which conclusions are based on districts that contain an average of only three hundred residential structures each. On the whole, however, the monograph constitutes a valuable addition to the literature of human ecology and urban communities. Of the four volumes here reviewed this one probably has greatest value to the student of theoretical sociology.

The Social Study of Pittsburgh proves to be a social work survey of the city and its surrounding Allegheny County. The study, which covered a period of three years, was made by a faculty member of the New York School of Social Work, together with thirty able collaborators. The main body of the volume “deals with the ways and means by which organized philanthropy and government meet the diverse needs of the county’s population through social service, medical care, and preventive activities.” It strives to answer the questions: What needs must be met? What factors produce, increase, or diminish these needs? To what extent do government and philanthropy meet these needs adequately? Are the agencies properly staffed, organized, and co-ordinated? This part of the well-written volume affords an interesting analysis of social and medical service in a complex, industrialized, metropolitan area. The sociologist will, however, probably find greater value in the opening section (especially pp. 35–346), which deals with the social and economic backgrounds of the Pittsburgh area—living conditions, housing, racial and ethnic groups, unemployment, labor
organizations, social legislation, and schools. The ecologist will find interesting data and valuable insight in the chapter on “Allegheny County as a Place in Which to Live.” Social psychologists may find further interest in other chapters of the background section, especially the one on “Social Attitudes, Public Opinion, and Pressure Groups.”

*New Horizons in Planning* contains the papers that were read before the 1937 meeting of the American Society of Planning Officials. The papers cover the fields of city, county, regional, state, and national planning. Certain of the papers, especially those upon the city, were based upon research work done in connection with the National Resources Committee. The papers consist primarily of (1) reports by officials or advisers of planning bodies, which describe their own experiences, programs, or laws; (2) reports by government officials concerning special aspects of planning, e.g., land utilization, farm tenancy, housing, and national production; and (3) reports by academic or administrative specialists on population, urban life, and transportation. These papers prove interesting mainly to administrators and officials who want a summary of the planning experiences of other persons. Only a few of them contain materials of direct value for sociological theory.

The little volume by the Nelsons, *New Homes in Old Countries*, was well named. It consists essentially of a popular, interesting travelogue description of housing programs and progress in nine European countries. Mr. Nelson, the executive vice president of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, and his wife, a newspaper woman and author, were admirably equipped to observe and report upon housing developments. They traveled ten thousand miles by auto through Europe, and talked with government officials, members of co-operative housing associations, contractors, workmen, and home owners. Excellent full-page plates make the descriptions more vivid. The volume is essentially popular and mildly propagandistic. It analyzes factors which make for housing backwardness in the United States, and offers recommendations for improvement. It is of greater value to the general reader than to either the administrator or the student of sociological theory.


The sociologist interested in American cultural patterns will find suggestive data in Miss MacLaren’s reminiscent interpretation of the Chautauqua movement and in Mr. Simonds’ eulogistic “essay” on Henry Ford’s educational project comprised in Greenfield Village and the Edison Institute. Chautauqua is no more, but the rise and disappearance of this remarkable adult educational movement beautifully exemplifies the relation-
ships between an educational enterprise and its social milieu. While it has been common knowledge that Chautauqua provided an outlet for pent-up emotions, a balm for frustrated hopes, and a source of uplift and recreation for an isolated rural population, Miss MacLaren shows by a wealth of incident what these general functional uses meant in concrete terms. The combination of inspirationalism, naive idealism, and commercialism is, apparently, peculiarly American; and no less so is the intermingling of get-to-getherness with a moral faith in the ability of the individual to conquer his world if only he could periodically be reminded of what he commonly accepted but did not as commonly practice.

Mr. Ford also believes in the old-time American individualism, which he is attempting to reinvigorate through McGuffey schools, a practical learning through doing, an assembling of tangible evidences of pre-industrial and early industrial culture, and, finally, by combining old-time crafts and decentralized industries with farming pursuits. It is the protest of the great producer of machine products, under the system of division of labor, speed-up and mass marketing, against some of the effects of this system of production. How much more it amounts to, apart from its purely antiquarian value, is doubtful in spite of Mr. Simonds' enthusiasm.

Merle Curti

Teachers College, Columbia University


Quite appropriately, the Rural Sociological Society of America has begun its series of monographs with the memoirs of Galpin, distinguished father of rural sociology as an intellectual discipline. The work includes the author's autobiography, the story of rural sociology's beginnings at Wisconsin and its establishment in Washington, an account of Galpin's contacts with the movement in Europe, and the correspondence between Galpin and Sir Horace Plunkett of Ireland. This delightful document clearly demonstrates that exceptional men may be literate and informed as well as scientific.

Galpin's greatness arises out of his constant willingness to take sociological theories to the proving ground of reality. The success which has attended his career, the recognition of the need for rural social analysis, and now the more formal and manifest aspects of the movement (the establishment of the Society, the beginning of this series of monographs, etc.), demonstrate the reality of rural sociology as an intellectual discipline. Indeed, some of those nonbelievers who, ostrich-like, refuse to admit the validity of rural sociology and continue to promote questionable contributions under other names, may be brought to see the light by reading this book.

Harvard University

Carle C. Zimmerman

It is questionable whether those who know the average European scholar, as contrasted to the American "type," will agree with the broad generalizations of this young Czechoslovak sociologist. But there is no question that his suggestions are highly interesting, and at times imperiously amusing.

Thus, we learn that the American scholar is not as nervous, absent-minded, unaccustomed to physical work, and remote from practical life as his European prototype. In America, his work is very similar to that of the average American business man—it is regular, well organized, uses much money and physical equipment, and is prosecuted according to a detailed plan, with the assistance, frequently, of several collaborators and research aides. The European scholar, on the other hand, follows the leads of inner "inspiration," works irregularly, modifies his ideas and his lengthy theoretical treatises many times.

The causes of these differences are bound up in the different social patterns of scientific work in the United States and in Europe. The pattern in Europe is that of the medieval philosopher and artist, both of whom—and especially the monks—were heavily influenced by religion and felt themselves, no doubt justifiably, quite superior to the layman and the common folk. In America, on the other hand, scientific work follows more or less the patterns of business life. American scholars are better paid than their European confrères, but the latter enjoy considerably more prestige. American universities are well organized, well equipped, have much money and many research funds; they place particular emphasis on practical knowledge and common sense, while the European schools emphasize precision of thought, and the ability to deal with abstract concepts and to make sound analyses.

Sociological thought in America in its very beginnings was largely an imitation of European sociology; consequently, it, too, was philosophical in tone. However, Cooley and Ross began a process of Americanization, and Thomas, Park, and others have now brought sociology directly in line with American ways of thinking; in the place of sociological systems of philosophical character, we now deal with specialized studies of social reality, with a real science instead of a type of philosophy.

American life has encouraged the development of scientific sociology. The presence of immigrant groups, the cosmopolitan racial constitution of the population, the rapid growth of cities, the differentiation of the urban types of population and the rise of huge cities, the special character of American criminality, as well as all the practical problems connected with these unique social conditions provided a vast laboratory for the investigations of American scholars. In Europe, however, these special conditions were not present; hence, European sociologists believed more in general principles and ideas as basic in the nature of society; they did not concern themselves with the nature of concrete social life. Only the Jews in Europe, feeling themselves outside of the society of Christians, were in a position
to see society not as a part of themselves, but as a reality outside of them. A great many European sociologists are Jews: Durkheim, Simmel, Gumplowicz, Oppenheimer, Salomon, and others.

In the United States, sociology has been free from this philosophical tendency, but it has been confronted by another—perhaps an equally serious—disadvantage: Protestant morals. In general, American sociology is interested chiefly in the problems of practical life, seeking the improvement of human conditions and the happiness of mankind; in Europe knowledge is still accumulated "for its own sake."

It is quite obvious that Dr. Machotka was fortunate enough—or unfortunate enough—to meet only the "best" of America's sociologists while studying in this country as a Rockefeller Fellow. Otherwise, he might not be so sure that most American institutions of higher learning are well organized, well equipped, have vast pools of money for research. We are also not convinced that the philosophical approach is not still the favored approach of most of our so-called "sociologists." Furthermore, it seems that at present Europe has an abundance of "conditions favorable for the development of scientific sociology." Twenty years ago America tried to make this world safe for democracy; perhaps in 1938 European social thinkers can begin to teach us how to make this democracy safe from a world which is at present hell-bent for war and fascism. Here is certainly a most fruitful field of sociological research.

In spite of our skepticism concerning the numerous generalizations of the author, we must congratulate him for attacking the theme and wrestling so manfully with it. Although the subject still waits for a more brilliant and searching interpretation, he has done an interesting piece of work; one only regrets that his equipment was not equal to a truly major achievement.

New York University

Josepu S. Roucek


This book caused quite a stir in Legion circles early in the summer of 1938. Coming from the press just a few days before the National Educational Association held its annual meeting, it was heatedly discussed at several sessions of the Association.

Professor Gellermann, an ex-service man and active in Legion affairs for eleven years while in public school administration, says that this study of the Legion grew out of the "marked difference" he observed "between the friendly confidence in public school teachers on the part of local Legionnaires and the lack of confidence in American education evidenced by communications from American Legion national headquarters" (p. v). He studies the origin of the Legion, its organization and methods, its leadership, its "Americanism" program, its campaigns against "subversive
elements,” its economic and peace educational programs, and its program for American childhood and youth.

The author concludes that the Legion, which has become one of the most powerful pressure groups in American society, was organized by “a small group of high ranking military officers,” a privileged class primarily interested in maintaining the status quo, and that this type of leader “with a marked disposition to participate in politics” has dominated Legion affairs. Its “Americanism” program has been narrowly construed to mean upholding the Constitution, maintaining law and order, and intolerantly attacking minority groups sincerely advocating economic and social changes. “Subversive doctrines” to the leaders of the Legion have too often been anything that the “privileged class” leaders have suspected as an attack upon their privileged position in society. These leaders have definitely followed the laissez faire tendency in their attitude towards governmental activities, except as they affect public assistance to veterans. The leaders of the Legion have little faith in any of the peace movements and are inclined to look upon them as “subversive.” The Legion’s program for childhood and youth in the schools, as shaped by its national leaders, has been one of indoctrination that looks to maintaining the status quo.

The reviewer’s reflection after reading Professor Gellermann’s book is that this is just what one would expect after our military expedition into Europe in 1917–18. A few political leaders took us into that war against the desires of the great majority of the American people and the men who fought in it. (Every poll taken just before our entrance into the war and since shows this.) The four million men who were enlisted in the war were told that nothing would be too good for them when they had made the world “safe for democracy.” The average soldier or local Legion man is not a leader. He has joined the Legion out of memories of his sacrifices with his “buddies” and for what it may help him get from the government for his war services. He is not a “red-baiter.” The better educated, the aggressively interested, and the privileged always become the leaders in any organization. They must have issues with which to rally the followers. It is natural that they have undertaken to shape the Legion’s program to suit their interests. If educators and sociologists do not like some of the activities of the American Legion, they might begin now to do their part in showing that wars always make G.A.R.’s and American Legions inevitable.

Fred R. Yoder

State College of Washington


Mr. Landis’s study of three towns in the Mesaba iron mining range of northeastern Minnesota is a substantiation of Chapin’s theory of synchronous cultural cycles. He describes the early days of Eveleth, Hibbing, and Virginia as logging and mining camps, with their gambling, drinking, and lusting; their gradual transformation with the arrival of wives and wealth; and now their position on the threshold of decline.
The historical and political detail in the book is clear, although sometimes repetitious; the cultural and social data, however, merely whet the appetite. The outline is given, but the reader is not made to feel the actual life of the communities. One sees them second hand, through newspaper files. How do these Finns, Swedes, and Minnesota Americans actually behave? Mr. Landis has done his present job well enough to make one hope for a more thorough study later.

This book is photo-lithographed, rather than printed. It is satisfactorily legible; the price seems high, however, if the process is as cheap as it is advertised to be.

James G. Leyburn


This book is a valuable treatise on the cultural history of India by a British scholar who for many years has been connected with the educational work of that country. Like Thurston, Russell, Lawrence, and in more recent years, Darling, Brayne, and others engaged in the various branches of Indian service, Rawlinson exhibits a keen appreciation of the inherent worth of Indian peoples and cultures, and also a sincere desire to understand them with respect to their application to the various problems of nation-building. Patient research, the study of native languages, extensive travel, and keen observation have been employed in the gathering of data by these men, and their findings have been made available to government, Christian missions, and other voluntary effort in the fields of education and social reform. Much of this work has been voluntary as a sort of leisure-time hobby in connection with a regular job in a governmental office or private business; nevertheless, it is evident that Britain appreciates the work of such men, for almost invariably she selects for her Indian service men of ability, initiative, and integrity, and encourages them to make of their office a lifetime profession. This policy, no doubt, is an important cornerstone of success in British dominion policy.

This book is written for the layman rather than the specialist; hence the nontechnical nature of its presentation. In it the author has attempted to make clear some of the notable historical achievements of India in the fields of religion, politics, science, art, and literature, as these are personified in such religious leaders as Buddha and Mahavira, rulers like Asoka and Akbar, poets like Tukaram, Kalidasa, and Tagore, and in great works of art like the plastic masterpieces of Sanchi, the Ajanta frescoes, the South Indian bronzes, and the temples, mosques, audience halls, and mausoleums of incomparable beauty scattered throughout the land. These aspects of Indian culture, selected with discrimination, have been presented as a narrative that extends from the Indus Valley civilization of 2500 B.C. down to modern times, and the account is cast simply and clearly in a historical framework of famous dynasties, kings, invasions, and civil strifes.
and intrigues which have punctuated the political history of India from time immemorial even down to the present. However, the British period is lightly touched upon. Important topics dealt with are the Vedic and Epic India; the rise of Buddhism, Jainism, and other religious movements; early cultural contacts with Greece, Persia, and other countries of the Far East; the Empires of Magadha, Harsha, the Moguls, and others; the art and culture of the Moguls and of other periods of Indian history; and the movements leading to British occupancy and control.

The principal contribution of this book is a connected historical perspective of military, political, religious, and other cultural factors and movements as they occur contemporaneously and significantly in this most interesting country. Philosophical and dialectic discussions so frequently found in current works on India are absent; and we do not find here the defense of any particular thesis, cause, or personality. The author has attained admirable balance, clarity, and impartiality. This book is well documented with authoritative material, and the print, binding, and illustrations are excellent.

Connecticut State College


Mr. Fitzgerald's admirable book traces the development of Chinese civilization from the protohistoric Shang (or Yin) period, the earliest of which anything definite is known, down to the latter part of the Manchu dynasty. The political events of this period (ca. 3400 years) occupy only a quarter of the volume. The rest is devoted to chapters on religion, philosophy, social and economic conditions, art, literature, and contacts with Western civilizations. As is suitable in a history, the material is organized chronologically: Feudal China, First Empire, Age of Confusion, T'ang Empire, Sung Dynasty, Ming Dynasty, China under the Manchus. The author has successfully avoided the difficulties attending the treatment of the various branches of art under such a chronological scheme by discussing each particular art in connection with the political period in which it attained its highest development. Thus poetry is dealt with under the T'ang, painting under the Sung, and the novel and drama under the Ming. (Mr. Fitzgerald deplores the Mongols and includes the Yuan dynasty only as a catastrophic interlude between the Sung and Ming.) Under Mr. Fitzgerald's skillful handling, the device is most successful.

Throughout the book, the author shows admirable restraint in confining himself to documented materials. Thus, in the section on prehistory he is content to indicate the resemblances which certain Chinese ceramic wares and bronze objects bear to similar archeological materials from Europe and Western Asia. He does not concern himself with the problem of the possible western origins of certain Chinese food plants, domesticated animals, and technical arts. Similarly, he gives more space to the later developments of
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Taoism and Confucianism than to the more speculative reconstructions of the original teachings of the somewhat legendary founders of those philosophies. This adherence to actual records in no way detracts from the interest of his narrative. On the contrary, the political history, highly condensed as it is, is considerably enlivened by well-chosen excerpts from Chinese sources.

The chapters treating of contacts between China and the West are of especial interest to the Western reader because of their subject matter but also because in them the author's personal sympathies lend dramatic interest.

The book is excellently written and well illustrated. It is also remarkably free from errors. There is, however, a confusion in the dates on page 402. The maps are very useful, as is the clear exposition of Chinese geographical divisions which forms the Introduction.

Charlotte D. Gower

Lingnan University


This book is a translation and revision of an earlier volume (Japan-Europa—Wandlungen im Fernen Osten) by the same authors, published in Germany in 1929 following a two-year residence in Japan. The authors' interest is centered on the problems faced by the Japanese as their traditional ideas and institutions clash with Western culture. The volume they have produced does not give much space to facts and figures describing Japan's recent progress, but is rather an attempt to explain the course of events through an analysis of the historical backgrounds and social structure of the Japanese nation.

The cleavage between the East and the West is shown in the role of conventional form. In Japan, life follows prescribed forms to a degree that would be regarded as intolerable in America. The response of a Japanese to a given situation can easily be predicted, for he knows the standardized social code and is expected to follow it. The area of individual, spontaneous activity is narrowly circumscribed by countless conventions. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard the Japanese as mysterious, for while their behavior may be different from ours, it should be readily comprehensible to those who are familiar with the Japanese philosophy and way of life.

In a thought-provoking chapter the authors show how the forces of myth, religion, and history are fused so successfully that they form the foundation of the state. From the point of view of the Occident this becomes a precarious foundation in this modern world of science and technology. That the Japanese authorities fully recognize this seems evident from the fact that critical discussion of early historical documents is taboo even in Japanese universities. In fact, the number one "dangerous thought" in Japan is not communism but anything that might tend to throw doubt upon the divine status of the Imperial family. One of their chief problems is how to take over modern science and Western industrial methods with-
out introducing at the same time the liberalizing and revolutionary forces contained in Western civilization. The military leaders of the reactionary type have attempted to cope with this problem by repressive measures designed to check liberalism and preserve intact the traditional foundations of the state. Under their leadership the spirit of nationalism has grown rapidly during recent years and finds expression in emphasis upon old customs and in antagonism to many aspects of Western culture.

This volume should be of interest to American sociologists because of the light it throws on the problems of social change in a civilization far different from our own. Not all will agree with the many generalizations made by the authors, but the book cannot be ignored by Westerners seeking a better understanding of the Japanese people.

University of Washington

Jesse F. Steiner


The processes discussed are, chiefly, limited to "the old methods of war and illegality" and "acceptance of the postwar institutions for the settlement of international disputes." Thus "process" means the relatively limited study of the political scientist more than the concern with drives and controls of the sociologists. Within these limitations the author presents an adequate and readable account of the dissolution of the Empire. In Europe it was nationalism aided by the machinations of the powers; in North Africa, European imperialism; in Egypt and the Asiatic provinces, imperialist conquest followed by belated nationalism—all conditioned by the intrigue of the powers.

Only a few paragraphs are devoted to internal forces of dynamic significance within the several succession states—the social factors without which military strife and diplomatic bargaining would have had quite different consequences. Likewise the author fails to account for Turkish factors, almost giving his book an anti-Turkish cast. The work is equipped with excellent footnotes and bibliography, and is a genuine contribution to the political science of the region surveyed.

Donald E. Webster

Beloit College


No praise for the careful and illuminating scholarship which governs the execution of this book could be too high. Yet equally praiseworthy is the originality which Professor Nettels has shown in finding a pattern of American development in the colonial and revolutionary periods. Within this very readable volume is to be found a dynamic and lucid treatment of the fusion of two principles, the introduction of European peoples, cus-
toms, and ideals into a new environment, and the modification of these importations by the climate, the natural resources, and the total new setting that was America. Many historians would have been content to stop with as much deference as this to general concepts. But Nettels has gone further and has shown that this process is in large measure explained by the conflict of emerging social classes based on economic foundations. In the delineation of the lot and life of the common people, and of their struggles with the greater folk, lies a key which few historians of this period have sought to use. The reader of Nettels' book will gain from it in consequence a fresh understanding of the revolutionary origins of the American nation. He will, moreover, see that "the basic institutions of American government and the prevailing philosophy of today were shaped in large measure during the colonial period."

Merle Curti

Teachers College, Columbia University


An elaborate glossary of concepts and descriptive terms from the fields of plant and animal ecology, it contains no references from the literature of sociology. Sociologists may possibly profit from the volume in three ways: (1) some such aid seems essential to the average social scientist who wishes to read publications in plant and animal ecology; (2) careful study of bioecological concepts may afford helpful hints to human ecologists; (3) an introductory section on The Development of Ecological Nomenclature contains valuable warnings and suggestions for sociologists who may wish to introduce uniform terminology and concepts within their own specialized fields.


Here is a brief, pointed, and amiable biography of Sojourner Truth, the lean, wide-eyed Negro suffragette, abolitionist, and rebel who became a national figure in the turbulent years of the Civil War era. Part fanatic, part prophet, Sojourner was born a slave, attained freedom when she was past thirty, took God for her new master, spent the rest of her life traveling about the nation as an apostle of freedom for the Negro and for woman. This charismatic spellbinder, "The Libyan Sybil," Fauset presents enthusiastically as "one of the truly great seers of the 19th Century," pointing with satisfaction to her prophecy: "These colored people will bring the whites out of Egyptian darkness into marvellous light . . . They will teach the slaveholders the truth that they never had and never knew of . . ." Sojourner Truth, were she living today, would probably be picketing Ford at Dearborn or flailing fascism from a soapbox. She was the apotheosis of sharp-tongued, nimble-witted, passionate protestantism. A readable book.

Except for Chapter XI, “Current Social Problems in America,” this is a somewhat pedestrian tale of a trip around the world, a sentimental journey which ends with the decision that the good old U. S. A. is a pretty nice country after all. The insertion of helpful travel tips for the uninitiated and of all four verses of “America the Beautiful” helps to relieve the monotony. Chapter XI had best be considered a stowaway.


This book contains standards for making relief grants and actual prices prevailing in October, 1937, for food, rent, home operation, clothing, household furnishings, personal care, leisure time, and special expenses (carfare and church). The food and clothing schedules are itemized in great detail. A bibliography of free and cheap budgetary materials is appended.


Mr. Hill spent three months attending meetings of business and professional men’s clubs throughout the country. He reports that the Chamber of Commerce, contrary to Paul Studenski’s characterization in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, is actually a constructive force in the democratic process; that these “private centers of intellectual ferment” are, potentially, a vital element in organized adult education; and that while “the female bird has worn the brighter plumage and sung the louder song,” the American business man, in his own shy, blundering fashion, has all the while been helping himself to great slices of education, music, art, discussion—to culture!


This brochure arises from the author’s conviction that “the generally admitted trend of the population towards degeneracy challenges the serious consideration of all intelligent people.” It is an account of the results of a recently completed study of about 10,000 cases of “eugenic” sterilization, a study which confirmed their earlier conviction that “Sterilization... (is) not a punishment but a protection, alike to the afflicted and their families, to society and to posterity.” Of particular interest is the author’s refutation of the frequently-voiced objection that sterilization leads to an increase in sexual promiscuity.